> With the dawn of the 1980s, however, Boeing’s traditional way of doing things seemed increasingly out of touch. Deregulation under US presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan had changed the economics of the industry, Greenberg said. “The idea was that if you had more competition, it would drop prices for consumers. Suddenly, airlines are looking at this and saying, ‘Oh my God, we can’t pass on the cost by continuously raising ticket prices.’ That put pressure back on Boeing, and on Airbus eventually, to become cost-conscious.”
I think the ultimate root cause that led to the 737 MAX crisis was de-regulation and the airlines race to the bottom on price. The whole reason for making the plane a 737 and not a new aircraft was to cut pilot re-training costs.
I used to think that highly competitive markets with low prices are the best, but now I am not so sure. Those kind of markets tend to push the quality down as well as squeeze the workers. Compare the union workers for the Big Three during the 1970's to that of the gig economy workers now. Maybe an oligopoly with high profits and strong unions is what is best in the long term? Or maybe, we need to alternate periods of disruption and highly competitive markets with periods of stability and oligopolies? I suspect we as a society will have to try to figure that out, and that it is not a simple answer.
Living in first world country it's easy to be biased against race to the bottom - it hurts previously very well paid jobs and breaks established status quo.
But that race to the bottom made cost of flying at least order of magnitude more affordable, and as a result likely saved and improved countless numbers lives (lifting out of poverty, ability to travel for treatments, ability to see your loved ones, ability to travel for work, etc).
And to put things in perspective - air travel is still safest form of travel, even accounting for MAX, and during this whole race to the bottom it was constantly improving, by orders of magnitude.
Point being, just that something has some upsides does not mean that it is a good thing overall. I personally believe that if flying millions of people across the globe is truly impossible without reckless exploitation of people and resources, we should rather not do that, no matter what the benefits of that would be.
This is illogical reasoning. We should look at the cost/benefit tradeoff. Looking only at costs or only at benefits will not yield the best decision.
We need to draw a line somewhere between safety & cost. I'd argue it is always possible to make something safer if you are willing to accept higher cost. Expensive plane tickets have negative externalities, and for some, does cost lives (inability to get treatments for ex.).
I don't think that is a good example. If the treatment you need requires you to fly, that means it a very complicated diseases, or a rare disease that only a few centers treat. In any case, it is likely that the care is very resource intensive and is either expensive or heavily subsidized. In those cases, even if the airfare were doubled or tripled, it would not be the limiting factor in treatment.
I'm not saying it necessarily applies for life-saving treatments AFAIK, but not everyone agrees on what medical care is. For example, in the U.S. it has been shown that state abortion restrictions hit the lower-income segment much harder precisely because they cannot afford to travel to states which have more liberal laws concerning abortion.
It doesn't have to be a rare disease—it can just mean that non-basic healthcare is hard to access.
Example: I live in the Philippines. Its healthcare system is affected by two things: centralization and the fact that the country is an archipelago.
Most quality health care is happening in Metro Manila. What you find outside is generally very basic, and even in 2nd-tier cities like Cebu or Davao they may refer you to Manila for something you'd think they ought be able to do.
With travel by boat being … rather slow, with vacation time not exactly ample, and the average salary being low I'm quite certain that affordable flights ($25 Cebu - Manila) are making ample difference in terms of what kind of healthcare situations are being addressed.
It is common enough that there is an entire organization (Angel Flight) dedicated to it. Using private planes and private pilots which are significantly less safe than commercial.
Another example is family members overseas. Many have to choose between providing for their family vs. being with their family. Affordability of flights can have a huge impact on their quality of life and ability to take part in the moments that many of use take for-granted.
This is partially self-inflicted. Cheap air travel incentivizes more people to move overseas because they know their families are just a flight away. I once knew a person that lived and worked in the UK, but studied in Poland - she flew back and forth twice a month(!). I guess it would be fine, if not for the environmental costs.
Anyway, I have this feeling that you could justify just about anything if you dig for nth-order effects, but it doesn't change the fundamental point: a race to the bottom sacrifices everything that can be sacrifices. Environment is usually the first victim, quality the second, but safety trade-offs are eventually made too. At some point in a product category's lifecycle, one starts to wonder whether it's so degraded that it would be better if it didn't exist anymore.
And n-th order effects and externalities are specifically excluded from corporate accounting.
Which means we don't know how much these things actually cost in real terms. We also don't know how to quantify potential benefits.
(And if someone says 'Well, that's subjective' - so is nominal market value.)
There's conventional profit-loss accounting, and there's everything else. It seems the everything else can accumulate to ecosystem-threatening levels, and conventional accounting will continue to pretend this is financially irrelevant.
If flying were very expensive for consumers, it would probably be a lot more expensive for the military too. Civilian aviation probably provides a lot of R&D that is used in military planes.
The discussion here is about more or less expensive air travel, within reasonable multiples. Al Qaeda would’ve probably been able to justify and afford 10x what it paid for its airfare so that’s mostly a matter of passenger air travel existing in the first place.
But memories are short and greed is long, and those who “forget” that every safety reg was written in the blood of others can sleep easy beneath golden parachutes and very good lawyers.
Honestly, best thing Boeing could do now is rename it the “737 MAX Fight Club Pinto”, fill it with all the incels who didn’t get the joke, and fly the whole crapload off into the great unknown.
In my opinion, Milton is right in that clip. Everyone agrees that we need to draw the line somewhere, define some level of safety as 'good enough'. IE flying is more dangerous in IFR conditions, so we could ban all commercial flights during those conditions. However that line is not the same for everyone. Most people are fine with accepting the slightly higher risk involved in flying during low visibility.
Risk tolerances are different, so why do we try to regulate to a given standard. It makes little sense to allow motorcycles yet have a regulation that requires the use of seatbelts in cars. Instead, I'd like to see regulations that enforce testing and information sharing. After that, let people decide which airline to take, which car to buy, and therefore where to draw that line.
If travel is necessary for medical treatment, it ought to be covered by insurance, so the price shouldn't matter. Medevac flights, aka air ambulances, are a thing.
"covered by insurance" doesn't mean much if you're still billed $10k or more after insurance.
My father has decent insurance as a retiree and still got billed for an ambulance ride after he had complications following a jaw surgery.
I've seen a bunch of anecdotal stories about how it's cheaper for someone on the west coast to fly to Korea, or down to Mexico, for non-critical surgeries, spend a week recovering, and then fly home.
I think it's a fair assumption that the US healthcare system would have been overhauled long before the complete elimination of the competitive market for commercial air travel, which is what this thread is about.
Isn’t this just another case of perfect being the enemy of good? If flying for a couple of hours is already safer than driving for 10, but we don’t want flying without a perfect safety record (making it much less accessible via much higher ticket prices)...then are we simply doomed? Instead of 99.95% reliability, do we really spend 10x more to get to 99.995%?
Drunk driving is low hanging fruit: it is really bad and easy to get rid of without great cost to society. It is incomparable to what is going on in the aviation industry.
I think the difference is psychological: you are in control of your car and you feel safer because of it. A plane gives you no control so you want more guarantees.
Als: Planes add another dimension of things which can go wrong so maybe that is also involved.
> made cost of flying at least order of magnitude more affordable, and as a result likely saved and improved countless numbers lives
Except for the climate change part. Continued carbon emissions threaten billions of lives.
To keep our planet inhabitable current-fuel air travel must be reduced to a tiny fraction of its current scope within the next few decades (alongside many other drastic changes to transportation, industry, and electricity generation). It’s not clear that alternative power sources for air travel will be practical at large scale any time in the near future.
Keep in mind that as a fraction of emissions, air travel is actually quite small, about 2-3% [1] (and this is from a harsh article). There's some concern that as the industry grows (roughly 5% a year) and other sectors decarbonize, air travel will consume a larger fraction of remaining "carbon budget" (25-50% depending on where you look).
Clearly as the denominator shrinks, and the numerator grows even slowly, percentage increases. That said, it's probably not the main issue in in climate change or even close to it. Other sectors such as ground transport, industrial heat (cement, steel etc.), agriculture (primarily fertilizer) and other fixed sources (buildings/homes) are a bigger deal.
If we end up with airlines as the last carbon source, that's probably OK if we deal with the rest. 25% or even 50% of remaining budget is fine if the rest of the (easier) problems get solved. Air travel is uniquely hard, let's get the easier stuff first.
It's true that, overall, air travel isn't a large fraction of our carbon emissions. But that's entirely do to that fact that most people don't fly. Every trip you make across the Atlantic and back takes about 10% of a typical American's yearly carbon emissions. If you're a typical person who doesn't fly then indeed it's not worth worrying about the flying that other people are doing. But if you're someone who flies every year or especially multiple times a year then cutting down is probably one of the most significant things you can do for the environment.
How many of those trips are cuttable? Maybe one or two business trips. And businesses would already rather teleconference these days if the trip is really avoidable. Given how cumbersome and expensive flying is already, I'm not sure there's a huge amount of "waste" in the system to cut at the moment.
As for the occasional personal trip (I assume by # of people though maybe not # of miles flown, the far more common use case, only 12% of passengers are business travel[1]), should we be telling people, "no you're not going to see grandma for christmas"?
I'd imagine a lot of them are cuttable. I have a friend who regularly flies to the US (from the UK) to run conferences. Frankly it's ridiculous that they don't hire someone from the US to so it.
With modern video calling technology, how many business trips are really essential? Some sure, but a lot could be cut, or merged into fewer longer trips.
You're right I think some are overdone. One example is the consultants taking a plane 2x a week (leave early monday, come back thursday eve, often with unconstrained distances). Maybe a bunch of those could be cut, though in that case I think a lot of these business models offer a "premium" service. If you're paying $1M/quarter for a McKinsey contract or for an I-banker or a big 4 accountant you definitely want to see that person physically. Though keep in mind McKinsey is also probably less price sensitive than the average flyer.
Still even with that, I'd like to better understand the economics. If only 12% of trips are business vs pleasure, killing all business trips won't move the needle in the long run. There's some question of how long business trips are, you can be 12% of trips but if they're longer it's worse.
My overall point is that there are a lot of factors in how people chose to travel. It's far from clear that increasing the already quite high price is what's going to deter people unless you tax it massively. In which case we'll effectively return to a situation like the pre-deregulation days where only the rich flew, which may be fine, but should be directly considered.
In terms of impact there's a generally accepted ~2.7X multiplier applied to flight emissions:
"Among the reasons for this focus is that these emissions, because they are made at high altitude, have a climate impact that is commonly estimated to be 2.7 higher than the same emissions if made at ground-level." [0]
So you can look at 2-3% of co2, or you can look at impact and if we use the co2 proportion as a proxy of overall emissions, ~8% in terms of impact - and growing fast.
I wonder what the emissions from a methane powered suborbital BFR is compared with a 16 hour flight, especially if that methane was generated from CO2 extraction from the air using renewable sources of electricity.
3% of global emissions being due to air travel, when 4/5 of the world population has never set foot in an airplane, is incredibly huge, not quite small. This is an activity almost entirely engaged in by the very wealthy, that has a huge adverse effect on the planet.
Taxing air travel to reduce frivolous trips would be a great policy. Add fast trains between major US cities.
What you say isn't wrong, but when you're asking what the most impactful changes to the current system would be, the absolute climate impact of flying vs. other sources of greenhouse gases needs to be considered.
Which is to say, the world-wide policy priorities need to be on transportation (other than flying), electricity production and industrial emissions [0]. Giving up coal and petrol cars has potentially much greater impact than giving up flying.
That said, when you consider the CO2 emissions that you cause yourself directly, a good rule of thumb is that as soon as you fly at all, CO2 from flying dwarfs all your other CO2 emissions. On the individual level, not flying, flying less, or offsetting carbon emissions from flying has the biggest impact.
I think reducing CO2 emissions from a personal level is the wrong way to go about it. It needs to be addressed from a more higher level, because the majority of CO2 emissions cannot be attributed to a single person.
Take for example shipping, which uses 4.5% of global co2 emissions, yet most people haven't stepped on a ship in their lifetime, and never will!
Shipping also very often uses the dirtiest of fuels and is therefore much more polluting than airliners which burn quite high quality refined fuels. That's why, to get around recent laws limiting sulfur emissions, large container boats now first "scrub" their exhaust gasses with sea water, so all sulfur will now nicely pollute and acidify our oceans. [0] No emissions though, because emissions bad.
I agree with you wholeheartedly that this is not a problem that should be solved individually. I don't hold my breath for what the higher ups are coming up with though, their measures seem misguided at best, deliberately loop-holed at worst.
Like every time this comes up, there are 7.5 billion humans on the planet and thus no need to only do X or only do Y. We can and must reduce every aspect of our global pollution problem, right now, or it will kill the majority of humanity. We aren't resource-constrained. This isn't a 5-person startup where you have 5 workers and that's it. You can put a million people (if needed) to work on fixing air travel at the same time as you put a million people (if needed) to work on any other aspect of climate change.
All arguments that we shouldn't fix X climate problem because it's less important than Y are just arguments that we shouldn't fix climate problems because the arguer doesn't want them fixed.
No individual actions have any effect at all, and people who argue about them are, again, just distracting from the important work of creating collective solutions.
Yes, it's more efficient to concentrate on making one thing better. If you have a limited amount of people. But leaving the flying industry to play freely, the amount of saved environment will just move to the airplanes instead of taking the car. There is nothing that says we all can't do our part in lowering environment cost wherever we work.
I take your point, though I'm not sure taxes are the answer. Very rarely is air travel even close to the cheapest option (in the US here, Europe has low cost airlines that may shift the math). Although I'm pretty well off as compared to the average person, I don't know anyone personally who takes the plane purely on a whim, and I know nobody who prefers to fly when another comparable time option is available. If you were to tax air travel at say 10%, that would likely not change my travel, just make it more expensive. A $200 ticket now costing $220 isn't going to make me not take the flight. If you tax it more, sure I won't take the flight, but then you reduce quality of life given that in many places the alternatives don't exist.
In Europe I usually take the train places. If it's 2-3h away by train it's usually faster to take the train, and it's often (though not always) comparable or cheaper on price. In the US, I virtually never take the train, there simply aren't adequate options. The distances tend to be much larger, and we simply haven't built the infrastructure. We could build it, but that's proven quite hard (see CA high speed rail and efforts to modernize northeast corridor) for both political and practical reasons. NY<->DC I often take the bus, it's cheaper and only a slight time penalty vs. the train.
4/5 people sounds like a big number but those people are much more likely to start eating meat or buy a car at first than to fly. That's a way bigger problem environmentally.
In europe, jet fuel isn't taxed at all (but train/car fuel is) which often makes flying the cheaper option. From london, I can fly to several european cities cheaper than I can get a 2 hour train within the UK. Which is pretty ridiculous.
A train with 500 seats running London to Manchester costs about £4/mile in electricity, of which 20p will be VAT (which I think is reclaimed) - so tax would be about £35, or 7p per passenger.
A flight of a 150 seat plane from London to Manchester attracts £3900 in tax.
Not in most of the USA (well, it is electric generated from a diesel hybrid). Electrification over large distances is expensive, the only country to have done that so far are the Chinese (and even then they don’t bother with way out Tibet...yet).
The USA is big but not that big. It's about twice as wide as Sweden is tall. Sweden is all electric rail. From the south of Sweden to Rome, is the same distance as Sweden is tall.
All of Sweden's rail is electric and most of Europe's too.
Sweden’s population is confined to a narrow corridor, so it’s not like they need many lines of coverage. Likewise, density in Europe is good enough to make electrification worthwhile, while America is way too spread out. An extreme case would be Australia, imagine electrifying the entire route from Melbourne to Darwin.
> In europe, jet fuel isn't taxed at all (but train/car fuel is) which often makes flying the cheaper option. From london, I can fly to several european cities cheaper than I can get a 2 hour train within the UK. Which is pretty ridiculous.
Australia and America are irellevent. Almost all long distance trips in Europe is electricity
That's wild, agreed that is out of step. I usually book fairly last minute so I haven't seen those prices personally, but I know they exist. I surely don't believe we should favor air over train.
This is out of context. Same thing could be said with the advent of the internet and massive energy consumption that came with it. The debate here is about the effect the technology had on day to day human lives, not on the optimization of it afterwards.
> Global air travel is projected to significantly increase in the future without any obvious way to sufficiently reduce its carbon footprint.
I think we all understand that flying is not "green" or "sustainable".
> To keep our planet inhabitable current-fuel air travel must be reduced to a tiny fraction of its current scope within the next few decades (alongside many other drastic changes to transportation, industry, and electricity generation). It’s not clear that alternative power sources for air travel will be practical at large scale any time in the near future.
> If you uncritically define negative consequences as “out of context” then every technology can be declared to be an unalloyed good.
Reminds me of something really out of context: food. I was shocked when a gym trainer told me that if my goal is weight loss, I must focus on what I eat.
(I am not a vegetarian or a vegan btw) To keep our planet inhabitable, we must reduce the amount of meat we consume and alter our diet very significantly. I know this is a fact and yet I continue to stuff our faces like there's no tomorrow. I don't fly a lot but I eat a lot. I actually enjoy eating (to the point that it wasn't obvious to me that many people don't). It would be very hypocritical of me to suggest that there be a huge surcharge to discourage people from flying but no surcharge on meat products, leather, almonds, ...
> Continued carbon emissions threaten billions of lives.
It does not.
Climate change is real and will cause serious problems. It will emphatically NOT threaten billions of lives. The people who tell you that are either misinformed or lying.
On the other hand, the new pricing structure means some airlines shut down and other airlines cut out unprofitable/less-profitable flight routes entirely, making it more difficult for some people to travel. ️
Reportedly a lot of this is because deregulation eliminated many requirements that previously forced airlines to service less-profitable areas, in a similar fashion to how the USPS is required to provide service to Anyone instead of just people in profitable areas.
It's not the safest way to travel if you look at per trip or per hour spent death ratio [0]. To have even more correct numbers you'd have to add death ratio for transport to/from the airport as well.
Usually, when comparing modes of travel, a person has some destination in mind which is a fixed distance in mind. If you're just trying to get out of the house, say, then I'd agree that air travel is a more dangerous way to do it than driving around the block. But if you're trying to travel to a specific place for business, family, or vacation then it makes sense to compare based on danger per mile.
But then you should probably only compare trips with somehow similar distances/times involved right?
Since I'm unlikely to fly my 20 mile commute to work, logging those miles under the "drive car" category isn't comparable, but is likely how I'd be in a car accident since that's something like 75% of my driving life. It seems you should only compare flights of 3 hrs vs car trips of 3 hours, or similar.
I’m not following. If I want to go visit my family 700 miles away for a holiday, I should most reasonably compare driving there with flying there as the risk choice is between those two manners of getting there.
Comparing flying for an hour vs driving for an hour isn’t a comparison between two substitute goods, unless the purpose of my trip was “to kill an hour”, making those valid substitutes.
Its normalized by distance, so the fact that 75% of your driving is short trips doesnt matter. You could argue that you need to look at only sustainable trips, but I think its unlikely to change the conclusion that per mile flying is safer than driving on a per mile basis.
You'd need to set some minimum trip distance for which flying is a viable alternative, like say 300 or 500 miles. Then throw out all the driving data for under that. Now, how would you expect this to shift the deaths/mile of driving?
In order to reduce it, driving short trips would have to be more dangerous per mile than driving long trips. I think this is unlikely to be true. Long trips often take place on highways at higher speeds and thus accidents have higher consequences. Drivers are more likely to be fatigued on longer trips. Drivers are less likely to be familiar with the roads on longer trips.
You've probably also got to throw out all flights for which driving is not a possibility. Like transcontinental trips. That may make flying appear safer since flights over oceans are more dangerous since there arent as many emergency landing opportunities.
> driving short trips would have to be more dangerous per mile than driving long trips. I think this is unlikely to be true.
I would be shocked to find that short trips were safer (per-mile) than long trips, as my intuition is that interstate highways are likely to be by far the safest type of roadway on a per-mile basis.
So I did some digging. It was surprisingly hard to find data that broke it down by roadway type, but I eventually found an article[1] that also linked to data[2].
Taking the most recent year available [2004], and converting to the typical airline standard (deaths per 10 billion miles travelled), urban interstates have a death rate of 57 deaths/10Bmi, urban collector roads 85 deaths/10Bmi, urban local roads 128 d/10Bmi, and rural local roads 315 d/10Bmi.
Airline figures for comparison are about 0.2 deaths per 10Bmi for scheduled commercial airline travel (Delta, United, Southwest, American, etc; not charter, not corporate, not general aviation), yet people are much more fearful of airplanes than automobiles on average.
Higher speeds does not necessarily equate to a more dangerous trip.
High speed delta to predominant flow is the more accurate metric.
Your fatigue comment is well received, but not a given either. A person may feel driving in a fatigued state is more acceptable for a short trip, but enforce more rigid limits on behavior for a long trip from home.
A foot or bicycle journey is not comparable to a commercial flight (except in the case of a few, statistically insignificant, cases). Furthermore, one flies commercially in order to get from A to B, not to spend a certain amount of time doing it, so the risk per hour is not a particularly useful figure.
> Furthermore, one flies commercially in order to get from A to B, not to spend a certain amount of time doing it
This isn't actually true for recreational travelers. People roughly spend the same amount of time traveling as before commercial flight, they just go further.
To put it differently, people generally have the same vacation time available to them. They're also generally willing to burn roughly the same fraction of their vacation on the travel portion.
Commercial air travel has just enabled people to travel further in the same amount of time, while also burning more fuel doing so vs. the alternatives (road, rail...)
What's implied in your statement is that the introduction of air travel reduced overall fuel consumption vs. where it was at when people traveled more by automobile.
This is obviously not the case.
Trying to compare the two "per pax mile" ignores the fact that the convenience of air travel createdmoretravel than it ever saved in fuel efficiency as a bulk mover. It covers longer distances in generally less time and more comfort, it created a new class of travel in an additive fashion, it didn't strictly replace the alternatives.
If we're actually debating fuel and emissions on a large scale, this is a major part of the larger picture.
Furthermore, since the primary dimension which matters to individuals is time and cost not distance, when you'd compare a vacation by automobile to flight, the automobile vacation would likely be to a nearer destination. So one shouldn't even be comparing equal distances if attempting such a comparison, it's just not comfortable and/or worthwhile for most people to drive across the country for a weekend trip - many will do that flight without batting an eye.
Fortunately modern vehicles, especially the likes of Teslas and supercharger networks completely destroy even your disingenuous comparison.
That's a fair point, though, in these cases, I suspect cost is even more of a determinant (and as train travel is often more expensive than flying, trains would probably also look safer by that measure, too!)
If someone invents a plane which has the same probability of death flying between point A and point B, but gets there in half the time, it's not really less safe.
> But that race to the bottom made cost of flying at least order of magnitude more affordable
This is a point that needs to be made more often.
I'm not sure more access to air travel has made people's lives better (different, sure)... but it's not like the flying experience has been getting worse in a vacuum. AFAIK, way more people have access to it today than did half a century ago.
When reading old novels and travel logs up to a century ago, the main difference is that people took their time. Travelling often took days or weeks, but it was okay since there was no alternative, and since enjoying the journey was sometimes a part of the process. It's amusing to read about trains that stopped for 2 hours so that passagers could go out for lunch. Trains and boats were places were you lived and met people.
Since travelling was slow, people had to adapt. From Paris, a bourgeois family could spend a day or two in the neighboring countryside, but if they wanted to visit Italy or Russia, you'd stay there for a few months. Nowadays, it's the same: from Paris, a middle class family can spend the week-end at Tunis, but they will take two weeks of holidays for Thailand. Yet our time-constrained lives have made months-long stays less frequents.
What you're missing is the vast majority of people simply never traveled any real distance from their hometown at all. Spending a few months visiting Italy sounds lovely, but most people have always been too time-constrained for that kind of luxury.
> air travel is still safest form of travel, even accounting for MAX
That wholly depends on how often you fly those damn death traps. I highly doubt accounting for just the MAX alone would still give you the same result (safest form of travel). My car sure feels safer than a MAX, but I didn't run the numbers.
USA innovated and created POTS, land line phones - and then again with wireless phones/radio phones that ultimately became cell phones.
Emerging countries skipped all that, landline, pots, regulation of monopolies and ultimately in the end just were able to put in some towers and voila, cell phones all w/ imported technology that majority of people in that emerging country do not understand to the equilivent of magic.
If there is no profit, it won't be built. Many countries didn't get cell phones until late 00's. Where now it's not really a cell phone, but "facebook."
Your points about cost reduction spreading wealth and access don't preclude the idea that a race to the bottom incentive might pass a stress tolerance threshold somewhere.
Yes, it's certainly a tricky one. But note that deregulated markets not only allow harmful race-to-the-bottom style behaviour, they all but require it, because "good apple" companies will be outcompeted by those cutting corners.
I think it's worth considering the effect that political and social narratives have on this. Reagan-style politics not only deregulates markets, it pushes a moral narrative that it is righteous to exploit the market as far as you possibly can, even when that means taking advantage of market flaws and externalities such that you are causing a net societal harm.
Their ideology is such that this is "capitalistic" and therefore good, and so we should not attempt to curb, regulate or otherwise discourage such behaviour. This has no basis in economic theory, and it's causing huge harms to our society (and economy).
Could this "lifting out of poverty" nonsense stop. In the West people have been put into poverty in the last decades, precisely because decent medium skilled jobs were exported by greedy managers who hide behind multiculturalism as a rationale.
To these people multiculturalism is just a means to increase the size of the industrial reserve army.
> I used to think that highly competitive markets with low prices are the best, but now I am not so sure.
The market for air travel is highly competitive, the market for airplanes is not. In the market that the 737 serves, there's options from Boeing, Airbus, Tupolev and maybe Comac. Comac and Tupolev are deeply connected with the governments of China and Russia respectively; Airbus and Boeing are heavily subsidized by European and US government too, although more independent. There's a few more manufacturers if you include slightly smaller jets.
Building high capacity passenger jets has large inherent barriers to market, but then you also see things like Bombardier being forced into partnership with Airbus when it tried to develop a new jet around the market of the 737.
Long manufacturing queues and logistical difficulties of mixed fleets also make it hard for airlines to switch models or manufacturers, especially for smaller airlines.
The main reason Bombardier sold the CSeries to Airbus was that it was about to be hit with big tariffs that would have made it noncompetitive in the U.S. market. Airbus has a U.S. production plant in Alabama that can do final assembly and avoid the tariffs.
The 737MAX was still safer than air travel in the 1970s. Boeing definitely screwed up, but it's a mistake to overstate how dangerous it really is. It's still far safer than driving. Air safety has advanced to a point where we're capable of having almost zero fatal accidents, which IMO leads us to overemphasize each one that still happens.
Ultimately, the airlines wanted a common TC and type rating for very good reasons -- it saves money, i.e. human effort in pilot training, the number of pilots that need to be on reserve, maintenance training and staffing, spare parts inventory, etc. These are all laudable goals, and to simply say that Boeing should have designed a new plane is too simplistic. The real problem IMO was the contracts Boeing signed with very high penalties for delivering late or having any additional training whatsoever.
This didn't give the engineers enough flexibility or time to design a safe augmentation system, especially after the discovery during test flights that the pitch instability was worse than expected. That led to a quick patch-up job that totally compromised the redundancy of MCAS.
It's also clear in hindsight that the FAA handed too much authority to Boeing on the certification side, and that they should have been scrutinizing their safety analyses more. That is clearly happening now, to Boeing's consternation.
I'm not sure how those figures shake out, so if you could provide a source that would be terrific. Deaths per unit of distance flown for the 737MAX vs a comparable 70s plane.
And still, even if that is the case, the anger stems from the fact that corners seemed to have been cut and warnings ignored. In other words this was not some unforeseen event that was unavoidable. It was in fact avoidable
According to Wikipedia, the 737MAX flew 500,000 flights before it was grounded. According to this: https://randy.newairplane.com/2018/05/22/737-max-a-year-of-s... The average 737MAX flight was about 3 hours. Typically 3 flight hours is about 1250 miles, so the 737MAX flew about 625 million miles, for about 3 fatalities per billion passenger miles.
It looks like the U.S. in the 1970s had about 1 fatality per billion passenger miles. To get to 3 per billion, you have to go back to the early-mid 60s. I wasn't able to get worldwide data, but generally the rest of the world has lagged behind the U.S. by a factor of at least 3x.
The civil air transport airframe business environment was brutal long before Carter and Reagan. Look at the history of Lockheed, Convair, Dehavilland, etc. in the development of passenger jets during the 50's, 60's, and early 70's. There has always been a lot of technical and economic pressure in this business.
> I think the ultimate root cause that led to the 737 MAX crisis was de-regulation and the airlines race to the bottom on price. The whole reason for making the plane a 737 and not a new aircraft was to cut pilot re-training costs.
Can't you also plausibly in a similar spirit argue for the point that the regulations about retraining pilots were responsible for the 737 MAX disaster? Otherwise Boeing would not have made such crazy engineering decisions about its design.
Plus, studies by even Boeing themselves after the fact showed that retraining caught the problem, further cementing that retraining is a good thing. Had more pilots retrained specifically for the 737 MAX (rather than on older 737 simulators or test flight 737 vehicles that airlines had lying around from earlier models), a larger alarm would have been rang before problems were experienced in the wild at the worst possible time (when people's lives are endangered).
What do you mean regulations about retraining pilots? Any time you change airframe you generally have to retrain, and it really isn't that big of a deal, just an expense. My father-in-law retrained from the MD-11 to the 777 a few years back at over 60 years old and did completely fine. The regulation to retrain on a new plane is absoloutely reaonable and it was boeing trying to pretend the MAX was similar enough to the next gen that caused the issue. In terms of inherent flight characteristics it never was similar, and no amount of software could make up for that.
You can do it, but it's not cheap for the airlines to retrain pilots. Adding another type of aircraft to an existing fleet is also expensive, because it's difficult to maintain currency on multiple aircraft types. This means that you can't swap crews between flights and you need to maintain more reserve crews. This is one of the reasons Southwest only flies 737s -- they never need to retrain for another aircraft type, they can swap any crew for any other crew, and they only need reserves for one aircraft type.
The inherent flight characteristics of the 737MAX are very similar to the 737NG. The difference is only in abnormal, high AoA maneuvers, when the aircraft is being mishandled. MCAS was supposed to correct for this situation. Unfortunately the final MCAS design was highly failure prone and instead of protecting from an abnormal situation, it caused the plane to become uncontrollable.
> it was boeing trying to pretend the MAX was similar enough to the next gen that caused the issue.
The regulations lead to the situation that Boeing had an incentive to do that. Nearly every economist will confirm you that economy is all about incentives.
I think that is true, and I still think we should have those regulations. Companies in regulated markets area always incentivized to do bad things to skirt around those regulations. That doesn't make the regulations bad.
> Can't you also plausibly in a similar spirit argue for the point that the regulations about retraining pilots were responsible for the 737 MAX disaster?
I don't think that's a great argument, pilots needing to be trained/certified for a significantly different plane is a pretty sane regulation. Would you feel comfortable flying in a plane that the pilot was never trained on?
Also, I would argue that the ultimate cause of this disaster is that the Pilots were not adequately trained on how the MCAS system works. This only further supports this kind of regulation being important.
As an outsider, it seems like regulation led them (or the airlines really) down a path of avoiding retraining at all costs, while it seems plausible that some sort of cost effective retraining for a plane that still was substantially similar to predecessors should have been possible.
This only works if the assumption is that it would be equally safe for pilots to operate a new plane without training. I'm not willing to fly under that assumption.
> I used to think that highly competitive markets with low prices are the best
They probably are.. but it's probably not wise to consider a market dominated by three players as "competitive."
> Maybe an oligopoly with high profits and strong unions
I also don't think "more monopoly" is the sensible conclusion.
> and that it is not a simple answer.
Why is "more government regulation" not even a part of your consideration? The article itself even hints at this, before deregulation a company like Boeing could exist and be profitable, but after deregulation it becomes beholdant to Wall Street. It seems pretty clear what the solution is.
Most regulations aren't price controls, but the historical regulations being discussed here are. In the US, routes and prices used to be decided by the Civil Aeronautics Board, removing price competition between airlines. After the price controls were dropped, air travel became a lot more affordable and profit margins got smaller. "Airline deregulation," in a US context, refers to this.
(The terminology is a bit unfortunate, but we're stuck with it for now.)
> I used to think that highly competitive markets with low prices are the best, but now I am not so sure. Those kind of markets tend to push the quality down as well as squeeze the workers.
I have also mostly changed my mind here. Largely because I've worked in a quality focused shop and seen the difference. But, I also appreciate that cheaper means more people can access goods and services, even if at a lower quality.
“Quality of what” is an important question as well. Oftentimes business incentivizes maximizing easily measured (and therefore also short-term) metrics. As well as metrics that are easy to gain wider buy-in, and therefore don’t rely on expert knowledge.
In this case, it’s easy to understand “pilots don’t need new training” and “we don’t have to recertify as much”, but it required more expertise to understand the increase in risk of dangerous situations occurring due to those changes, and the long-term impact of a loss of trust.
It also sounds like the changes in the company culture reduced the status of the people with that expertise who were responsible for measuring, understanding, and informing the physical risks of the product.
It’s pretty logical in retrospect, then, that Boeing suffered a airline accident scandal rather than an overspending scandal. Because of the nature of the product, there wasn’t a gradual warning sign that the risks were getting untenable. Things crossed a threshold, air disasters happened, and permanent damage was done to the company’s reputation.
Even if Boeing did replace the 737 with a new plane, I’d now be wary of flying on it due to the de-escalation of engineering concerns I’ve read about. If the importance it places on engineering has dropped to the point where it can’t upgrade its own existing planes without causing them to crash, how can I trust them to design a completely new one?
In some markets, yes. But in most markets there needs to be some minimum acceptable standard of QC & assurance. In the market for aluminum tubes hurling through the skies at 500 mph it's to everyone's benefit to make sure they don't come crashing to the ground.
Even markets for more innocuous products/services require some minimum acceptable standard or else the race to the bottom will give us more affordable but more dangerous products: Thomas the Tank Engine ($3) vs Deluxe Thomas the Tank Engine with Lead-Free Paint ($5)
Which is what we already have at the consumer end of airline pricing. The economy seats on an airplane put together aren't enough to pay for the cost of fuel. Business and first class passengers are the only ones that make the airlines any money.
>The whole reason for making the plane a 737 and not a new aircraft was to cut pilot re-training costs.
If you ask me this is a problem in every highly regulated industry. You often find that the regulations have exceptions for smaller changes. What then happens is that you have many tiny changes that are made to fly under the radar, because it's unduly expensive to recertify after a big change. This makes it impossible to do big changes that are necessary to get rid of technical debt. Since it's impossible to get management approval for these. And technical debt keeps on building up.
If the incentives were more continuous (not sure how this is possible), instead of abruptly changing (no training <-> full training dichotomy), then we would see fewer of these cases.
So cases like this become a question of certain cost vs. risky reward (cheating or other hacky solutions). And if you've already invested in a few hacky solutions and not been caught, then the incremental risk seems to go lower, while the abrupt cost change stays the same.
> If you ask me this is a problem in every highly regulated industry. You often find that the regulations have exceptions for smaller changes.
Another example of this is getting planning permission to build a house. Renovations are generally easier to get approved than new construction and keep any variances that have already been granted, so you’ll occasionally see someone “renovate” a house by tearing down everyrhing except for a single wall and building completely new otherwise.
I think part of the problem is the focus on the financial figures for the next shareholder call. With a significantly longer time horizon it would be easy to justify investment in a total redesign, because it would lead to a number of cost savings down the line as technical debt was eliminated. And all for the low, low price of one comprehensive new government approval.
Instead it seems the goal was to get a moderately viable product to market as fast as possible, and the fastest and cheapest way was force some changes and fly under the regulators' radar.
That's at least one alternative perspective worth considering.
I think the ultimate root cause that led to the 737 MAX crisis was de-regulation and the airlines race to the bottom on price. The whole reason for making the plane a 737 and not a new aircraft was to cut pilot re-training costs.
No! That's shifting the blame away from those that engineered and built that death trap. Which is the Boeing Corporation.
If airlines demand features, which are just not feasible to provide at the price range they're willing to pay then it's the plane makers responsibility not to provide such planes. Period!
The core issue (apart from what happened much earlier, after McDonnel's reverse take over) was not the fact that airlines were trying to drive the price down, but that Boeing didn't have a competing product in the most critical market and wouldn't have one for a decade if they engineered a modern plane.
So they hacked an ancient 60th design to modern standards and shunned, demoted or simply fired engineers, which dared to raise concerns. Having the FAA in their pockets and spending tons of cash on lobbying instead of investing it into the construction of good reliable planes also didn't help.
This one's on Boeing. Not on airlines and certainly not on pilots. It's on The Boeing Comnpany; period!
And what galls me most is that the only entity, which was in a position to know what was wrong after the first crash did everything in it's power to blame, befuddle, obstruct and deflect from the real cause. MCAS, which wasn't even documented in the manuals at that time.
In that sense the second crash is corporate mass murder for profit and I really hope that C level people go to jail for that one (alas, I doubt it).
I know this is Hacker News and we like to blame politicians or rich non-engineers, but isn't the 737-Max case a case of very bad engineering that they could have done better? Maybe management had a hand in that, but the final outcome is the engineering was terrible and it's not simply the fault of deregulation in the 80s.
Muilenburg is to blame. He got the stock price up by getting rid of all of the more experienced (older) higher paid engineers who knew to not make the sort of mistakes that were made on the 737-Max. I was a happy 35+ year Boeing employee who would have stayed where I was for maybe another ten years, but Muilenburg made my choice to retire very easy by changing the terms of the (retirement) plan to give me a compelling reason to leave. If I had stayed, I would have effectively taken a pay cut of about 20% because of the reductions to my defined benefit payout. Instead, I found a better job elsewhere for a 20% raise and took the early retirement.
I think part of that is, had there been different engineers there, it is not so clear that the outcome would have been different, but with different management decisions (e.g. whether to make a new plane or try to pretend it was still the 737) things could have been different.
Was the MCAS a lone example of rushed, poorly tested work done by people without enough knowledge of the industry they were working for? Or is it just the first one to come to light, because the MCAS caused the plane to be grounded before any others did?
We don't know, but my guess is, based on the other news coming out about the 737MAX since it was grounded, that there are other issues like this lurking. This tends to suggest that the problem is cultural, and the corporate culture is one of the primary responsibilities of the people in command.
To do good engineering, you need good engineers and you need a culture of good engineering. You need an organisation and incentives that encourage doing things well.
Looking at it through a software lens - even if you do have the best people, if your project structure squeezes development time, rather than producing solid code and catching all the bugs early, you'll produce flaky code that will produce surprises down the line.
Then on top of that, such will lose some of its best engineers (because they get frustrated) and probably won't attract new good ones because they don't value them sufficiently to pay them enough.
A competitive market should improve the quality of planes: no one should buy a Boeing if there is a viable alternative. Allowing the merger reduced competition.
We really shouldn't blame deregulation (in the sense of reducing the barrier of entry to airline markets). Lower airline ticket prices (Europe is a case in point) is better for everyone. And if quality were indeed lower, then another company should be able to swoop in and capture a higher tier quality market if there are people willing to pay for it (like first class, or business class)
Lack of anti-trust enforcement in the aerospace manufacturing industry is entirely orthogonal and hurts plane safety.
The market is just an optimizing function. Perhaps the problem is not competitive markets but rather the structure of the market, e.g. the optimization parameters & feedback loops.. For example, a common criticism of the medical market is that without accurate quotes, you cannot price compare- thus it's not a properly functioning free market with the appropriate feedback cycles, and the free market approach to fixing it would be to improve price information.
I don't think this has anything to do with airline deregulation. The FAA has really done an excellent job of managing the various airlines and it's an example I'd point to of how regulation can work correctly in that context. Mostly that's because airlines are even more interested in preventing their competitors form cutting corners that put airline crashes in the news than they are in cutting corners themselves leading to a good sort of regulatory capture.
But Boeing itself isn't one of the many airlines and is the singular US plane exporter champion. Wheras Delta, Southwest, et al want to see that the FAA isn't giving Jet Blue a pass there's mostly only Boeing to check whether Boeing is given too much of a pass and political pressure from up high is targeted at making Boeing better positioned to compete with Airbus which the FAA doesn't have jurisdiction or input from.
Free, deregulated markets work well when the market participants have high information about what's in the market. If you're interested in buying, say, books, there's not much need to regulate what's in the books - customers have a pretty good idea, they can page through the book at the bookstore, and they can read what reviewers say.
Customers don't have any idea about which airline is safer. Airlines rarely have an idea of which airline is safer - shortcuts taken in manufacturing might lead to problems 20 years down the line when no human who was involved in the engineering or purchasing work is still at either company.
Free markets push everything to the level of just bearable. Bad, but not quite bad enough not to use a service you rely on. Seats are tight, just not tight enough to make people in general seriously consider to not fly because of that. Food is bad, just not bad enough for people not to eat it.
Air travel is so much safer than traveling by car that anything you can do to bring down its price is probably a big safety win -- including corner-cutting on airplane safety.
High competitive / low prices marketeering at best gives you Walmart: where none of the products are very good, false values products are vaunted (the one gallon pickle jar for $4.99) and nobody is especially enthused about what's on offer.
The free market can work - if certain safeguards are in place to ensure the race to the bottom doesn't negatively impact either the safety and suitability of the products and services produced, or the wages and benefits paid to workers. Remove those and you end up with misery.
I think you're right that highly competitive markets can push down quality but that happens because the customer accepts the lower quality. If air lines or the customers actually flying on these planes decided that they were not going to buy/fly on Boeing planes, the quality issue within the market would be resolved fairly quickly. Either Boeing would produce higher quality planes or they would go out of business and their market share would be taken over by a competitor with higher quality. Of course, I'm assuming that such a competitor exists. In case they don't, my argument becomes invalid.
Nobody knew the 737 MAX was lower quality until it started falling out of the sky.
I think we can agree that an ideal system wouldn't require people to die horrifically in the process of price discovery.
Absolutely, I 100% agree with this. I wasn't arguing that the current system is anything even close to ideal. I was trying to point out that now that we, the public, have paid this horrendous price, we are still not using the information gained. A company that shows that they will put profit above their customers' lives should be abandoned very quickly by its customers. That isn't happening and the fault for that lies with the customers, IMO.
In my opinion, we all have the choice of not flying on Boeing planes any longer. If a company shows that they are willing to put profits above their customers' lives, then customers should not do business with that company any longer. The customer has to provide an incentive to the company to not do this. Going out of business is a very powerful incentive, I believe. If a company can kill a couple of hundred of its customers and still continue to make money, then why should it do anything differently, especially if the decision that caused the deaths also caused higher profits?
Also, air travel has actually got safer over time, not less safe - despite the massive increase in air travel, total deaths have actually gone down over time. The whole reason that the 737 MAX problems were such big news is that passenger airplanes are so safe these days that even one air crash is remarkable, let alone two which appear to have the same cause.
It's more like a $800 difference in ticket price. People forget just how expensive it was to fly back before deregulation. A ticket that cost $600 in 1980 dollars goes for $300 today.
According to Wikipedia, the original Mac 128k had a launch price of $2495 in 1984, equating to approximately $6100 in 2019 USD). I'd say they're behaving very similarly?
No information - They rarely have any information (you have to go through several menus to find out your plane on most sites). They don't know when / where the plane was last serviced [0].
No framework - Your average consumer of air travel is not equipped to accurately evaluate that information should they even have it. (c.f., 'if it's not Boeing I a'int going [1]). They cannot make rational and informed decisions without information and a rational decision making framework
No control - They have no control over whether that plane is changed for operational reasons even if they have the information and a framework to evaluate it. You may not even know until you are onboard with the door shut unless you are really well informed about airplanes that the plane model has changed (e.g., I avoid A321s because
No recourse - Even if they consciously choose a plane based on information and an informed framework and then it gets changed what can you do? Are you even going to know until you get on the plane at which point what do you do? Do you think you get a refund?
It's also not guaranteed which plane will fly which route. Every airline has "substitution" rules in their conditions of carriage, and frequently use them.
Unless you are an aerospace engineer or pilot I don't think you can judge the quality of a plane under the surface. I note the leg space and if the plane is noisy or shakes much.
One doesn't need to be an aerospace engineer to know that Boeing planes crashed because the company leadership decided to forgo quality for the sake of profits. Before the crashes, I agree, there was no reason for customers to expect Boeing planes to be unsafe. However, now that this information has become public, any customer can decide to not fly on their planes.
Is it rational for a customer to not fly on a plane that is as safe as any other just because the same company later made another plane that was less safe? It seems like a lot to ask.
In any case, even if 10% of people totally stopped flying on Boeing, which would be a wildly optimistic outcome for any organized consumer action, the airlines would just discount those flights ever so slightly and the other 90% of price-conscious consumers would immediately take up the slack. Nobody's going out of business in that scenario. This is, of course, why we rely on regulation rather than consumer choice to ensure safety, and why this is a failure of regulation, not of the market.
This presumes a perfect market where customers are rational actors with access to a variety of sellers whose product differs only on quality, which consumers have access to accurate information about and the time and expertise to precisely evaluate.
Of course the reality is we're just trying to book a flight to get home before Mom's chemo starts and all we know about each airline is the ticket price and how good the peanuts were the last time we flew on them.
Airlines are about the last industry on Earth where we should expect laissez-faire capitalism to produce optimal outcomes.
I wasn't suggesting that the customers could have known beforehand that the Boeing planes had issues that would cause crashes. However, we do know NOW that Boeing planes have quality issues. If customers still willingly get on those planes, then where is the incentive for Boeing to do anything differently? That's really the point I was trying to make. We don't need perfect information to now decide to not fly on Boeing planes. That would send a very strong message to the entire industry that putting profits above customers' lives will be met with very negative consequences such as reduced or loss of profits and possibly the company going out of business.
A further complicating factor is that quality can be masked from the customer, and indeed will be if that's less expensive than actually improving the quality.
And thus no one will actually know that Boeing's planes are of lower quality, until a couple hundred people die.
I spent 45 years in this industry and the following describes exactly what happened in the mid 90's throughout the entire industry. As subcontractors, we were told that we needed to get on board with the new way of thinking, or we would lose our contracts.
>Inside the company, there were rumblings of dissatisfaction. A formerly cosy atmosphere, in which engineers ran the show and executives aged out of the company gracefully, was suddenly cut-throat. In 1998, the year after the merger, Stonecipher warned employees they needed to “quit behaving like a family and become more like a team. If you don’t perform, you don’t stay on the team.”
I have a different view of the situation. I believe that the 737 Max disaster was directly caused by the idea that management is a valuable skill on its own, that management is somehow separable from the domain-specific knowledge required in order to make an honest buck.
There are plenty of examples of engineers that make terrible managers, to be sure. But there are also plenty of examples of managers with business backgrounds that have absolutely no idea about the consequences of their decisions. An optimal result requires skill in both domains.
By this point, you might be thinking, "Hey wait, isn't it true that cost-cutting also had a role in the crisis? Wasn't there at least one engineer that sounded the alarm in a memo?" And my answer to that is a resounding yes. But the question remains, where the hell did that idea come from? At no point did anyone think, "I'd love to spike my profits this quarter here and have huge disaster that will tank us in the next quarter." Therefore the problem isn't one of simple pursuit of the profit motive, because it is quite clear that Boeing hasn't profited from this situation long-term. And that's why I have focused explicitly on this foolish, self-defeating management fashion at the top of my mini essay here.
This brings us to the topic of Boeing's future. I could be wrong about him, but the fact that they have selected a person who majored in accounting to be their new CEO does not bode well for them. At the very least he has a major gap in his background to overcome, and at best I can only see them just managing to hang on instead of growing.
How does this relate to the merger issue? This management fashion I am speaking would have likely infected both McDonnell-Douglas and Boeing had they remained separate. That's because companies hire people out of the same pool of people that learn this stuff in their universities! Maybe there is a case to be made that having separate companies would make it slightly harder for them to both fail, but I believe that this isn't a very strong argument.
While I agree with some of your sentiment, I think it's worth pointing out that the recently-fired CEO on whose watch this debacle happened, was a lifetime aviation employee with an engineering background:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg
He’d been the CEO since ... 2015. I think it’s entirely unfair to push all the responsibility on him. He didn’t build the modern Boeing culture. He inherited it, and by accounts I’ve read so far, was unable to change it sufficiently to prevent the accidents. It’s hard to change company culture once entrenched and I’m hesitant to scapegoat him when there are obviously a lot of other significant factors at play.
Yes, of course. He didn't handle it well at all. The problems aren't going away with him stepping down, unfortunately, and considering his replacement, it doesn't seem like there's any interest in fixing the real issues that are plaguing the company.
Boeing lost the moment they didn't realize the aging 737 would be a dead-end and was imperative they'll take risks and say "no, but" to the airlines. Given how the corporate world works that was very difficult or almost impossible to someone actually do this.
Among other things it's the classic example of short term obsession demolishing the future.
That's true. But people do change. Once you stop wearing your engineering hat, most of the benefit goes out the window. Yes, of all people, he should've known better to heed to his engineers' warning. He also should've ensured the properly management structure was in place such that the warning was given proper due diligence and risk management.
I think you can still be an effective CEO of Boeing as long as you have right composition of senior leadership in place. Decades of major design-flow related crashes made everyone complacent.
I don't think deregulation, mergers or accountants killed the Max or its passengers. I think it was an engineering culture in love with the simplicity of an idea that on the face of it was genius. What made the Max work was the idea that you could use software - something Boeing in its military work already was very good at - to create essentially a new plane without all the rigors and costs of creating a new plane. This vision allowed Boeing to believe in its own BS that rather than have a collection of static designs incapable of evolution, it had a platform. The concept of the platform was the differentiator that Airbus had that Boeing did not have until it marketed the Max. Through software, the 737 became a way to create the illusion of a platform that could serve most if not all markets (wide body being the obvious exception). Once Boeing was in love with this idea, it never put it back through the rigors needed because to do so would have been to admit that the 737 wasn't a platform and that they were in fact building a new plane. I won't find it surprising that in a forum (HN) visited by engineers this comment doesn't receive the mother of all downvotes. However, I think if you're looking at Boeing honestly and not clouding your views with a whole bunch of economist-mumbo-jumbo about deregulation, you'll see that Boeing is just a leading indicator for what's about to happen in a lot of industries if it isn't already. My view, stop loving the elegance of your engineering and start thinking about the lives you actually impact. <-- That -- is what was lost.
I've got a huge issue with all the stories about the "software" being supposedly at fault. The problem was never about the software per se; it was about the avionic specs on system level.
You can do very complex things without even involving software - including non linear things - or by involving it but not necessarily in a primary characterizing way. What happened here was in no way a software failure except if you generalize the meaning of "software" to include the whole lifecycle of the domain it's applied to, and the comprehensive corresponding engineering. And that's what tons of "purely" software people (by that I mean people working in a field where the non-software components are only ancillary to making the software run, in huge contrast with what happens in avionics) are doing too often in that case. Except what failed here was good old boring engineering, risk analysis, and properly conforming to regulations. The software "worked", in the sense that it did precisely what it was designed to do. But what it was designed to do was stupid. And deciding what it should do was not a "software" thing. It was an avionics one. It is not possible to conflate the tech and the domain in this area, in contrast with what you can do for e.g. some websites or some smartphone apps.
There was software involved, but it is not more interesting in this case than noting that there was electronics involved. And it could also have been done through a mainly mechanical apparatus, but the only reason it did not is that software is more convenient. But that's an implementation detail that played very little role in the tragedy (unless Boeing is waaaay more fucked up than we are even all discussing about, but I actually don't expect that).
Another example is the Swedish fighter jet Gripen. So sure, it’s doable, but not as a quick hack (“if the single angle-of-attack sensor goes above X degrees force the nose down by changing stabilizer angle”). Any engineer worth his salt should be able to tell the difference.
I agree with this analysis, and find it overall reasonable, but it seems to need a little more evidence, e.g. do we have any data that shows companies who put "generic managers" on top on regular fail more than those who put engineers on top.
I'm disappointed that you're being downvoted, I wish someone who downvoted you wrote a reply.
> I agree with this analysis, and find it overall reasonable, but it seems to need a little more evidence, e.g. do we have any data that shows companies who put "generic managers" on top on regular fail more than those who put engineers on top.
That could be hard data to gather systematically. It's not like businesses fail immediately when you put a "generic manager" in change. A company can coast for decades before problems become obvious, and generic management confusing things even further by focusing on manipulating the most visible metrics (e.g. stock price) while taking actions that damage long term prospects.
Arguably an issue back in the heyday of hereditary nobility too, come to think of it. I wonder how much of modern executive culture echoes some of those older patterns.
I believe that the 737 Max disaster was directly caused by the idea that management is a valuable skill on its own, that management is somehow separable from the domain-specific knowledge required in order to make an honest buck.
I don't think that's a fundamentally different idea, though. I think that's exactly the idea that drives any leveraged buyout or any cost cutting measure - that "good management" can make up for jettisoning whatever previously enabled a company or division to succeed.
I dunno. At first this article almost felt like damage control: it wasn't Boeing, it was those McDonnell Douglas peeps. But then it seemed to focus more on the engineers themselves and try to make them seem like a cozy family shop .. even before the big merger; Boeing was hardly that. It was (and is) a massive employer that has tactically distributed manufacturing to as many different states as possible (to help with lobbying efforts under the banner of job creation; distributed with a very wide net of employees).
Even without the Douglas acquisition, would we still be here with the 737-Max8 failure as bad as it is? I think all industry over the past two decades have gone down the route of maximizing profits and cutting costs. Hell, there are startups build around the idea of just ignoring or lobbying against legislation (Uber, AirBnB) and marking that arrogance as being "disruptive," as if they were some kind of civil rights pioneers.
It's really impossible to tell what would have happened without Boeing buying MCD, but I there is a good chance we would have ended up here eventually anyway. Focusing on MCD in this article feels more of a narrative tool than an objective critique and analysis.
Maybe it's nostalgia, maybe it's the retro mindset of work as a way of life, maybe it's just "how things used to be"... but I've spoken with a few old, retired Boeing engineers that are acquaintances or family friends (I live in Seattle) and a lot of them really make out the 70's/80's Boeing to be a "family". There is a warmth and camaraderie and a fondness that is hard to describe.
Lot of these old engineers stay in touch, godfathers to each others kids, go on fishing trips, go to church together. Still have Thanksgivings together. At one late family member's remembrance I think more than half the attendees were retired Boeing engineers, or their families. I really do think that, rose-colored-glasses aside, it sounds like a few decades ago it really was the kind of place where aerogeeks ran the show and obsessed together over making great products like the article suggests.
I know two people who work for Boeing today, as well, and I don't think either of them really like it very much.
> It was (and is) a massive employer that has tactically distributed manufacturing to as many different states as possible (to help with lobbying efforts under the banner of job creation; distributed with a very wide net of employees).
This was specifically out of the MCD playbook. Boeing was pretty consolidated geographically before that.
Right. And I could imagine a few other scenarios that get us here as well:
Boeing's MCD buyout doesn't happen, industry keeps going where it was going, Boeing didn't adapt, their market share and market cap drop, MCD's on the other hand, rises, and MCD buys Boeing, variation of the MAX8 still happens.
Boeng's MCD buyout doesn't happen, industry keeps going where it was going, Boeing adapts, tightens margins, still builds MAX8, same deal, except we still have MCD floating around as another minor player in the market (or MCD just goes out of business).
It's weird to blame it all on MCD's executives taking over Boeing and turning it into a margin-driven company, when that's just where the market was going in the first place, and it's likely that any airplane manufacturer would have to make the same choices in order to stay relevant. Perhaps the root cause was deregulation, or something else.
The 737 MAX was right out of the McDonald Douglas playbook from crudely using the stabilizer to tame poor handling (like the MD-11) to undocumented features causing crashes (like the MD-80).
MCD's on the other hand, rises
That was never in the cards. Pretty much everything past the DC-9 was done on a shoestring budget and it showed. The military side of MD was doing OK but the commercial side was as good as dead by the time MD and Boeing merged.
Boeng's MCD buyout doesn't happen, industry keeps going where it was going, Boeing adapts, tightens margins, still builds MAX8
Without MD management the 737 MAX never would've happened as there would be no 737 NG to base it on.
> Without MD management the 737 MAX never would've happened as there would be no 737 NG to base it on.
I was referring to a non-MCD Boeing eventually committing a MAX-style failure, not specifically that plane. Obviously if Boeing+MCD had never happened, the timeline since then would look very different.
In a lot of respects, I find modern business tactics skewing ever further towards being more and more harmful to society at large for the sake of business capital owners. Let's not forget the social contract and that we, as a society, allow businesses to operate while they remain beneficial to society.
I'm not saying remove capitalism but some modifications of our current state of capitalism are certainly in order. Perhaps this is tighter or different regulatory constraints, changes to some core principles (e.g. Citizen's United, business rights as "people", etc.). I'm not saying I have the answers or the quick examples mentionrd are the core issues, just that the future doesn't look great if current trends continue. We need to start a productive conversation and elect representatives willing to be a voice in that conversation to explore and try improvement options.
That's exactly it. "Corporations are people, my friend", when they need to pump an insane amount of money into our election process, but when the time comes to pay for blunders and crimes - nah uh, don't touch the innocent corporation, you can't put it on trial, like a ... person.
Is this a genie that can be bottled back up? Lets say you enact these magical regulations. Will the corporations stick around or will they focus on other countries where they have more clout? Similarly, will they use international levers of pressure to "fix" the issues any one country poses?
It can be. As bad as it seems today, the Gilded Age had even worse income inequality. The part that's frightening is what it lead to, and I'm afraid to say that the country seems to be going down exactly the same path as certain countries in Europe did around that time (rise of fascism, nationalist leaders lying through their teeth to secure power by any means, erosion of democratic norms and institutions).
> Is this a genie that can be bottled back up? Lets say you enact these magical regulations. Will the corporations stick around or will they focus on other countries where they have more clout? Similarly, will they use international levers of pressure to "fix" the issues any one country poses?
If you try to bottle the genie back up, you'll have to work all those levers simultaneously or you'll have the problems you describe. The new set of regulations would also need to curtail the ability of corporations to move to avoid regulations and limit the kinds of political pressure they can apply, for instance. Otherwise it'll be like closing one barn door while leaving the other wide open.
We've gone so far down the road in one direction that we may have to turn around with a shock. It it's probably too late for some kinds of small, incrementalist course corrections to be effective.
Personally, I don't see the rest of the world as willing to indulge in that type of regulation havening. Besides which, where else are you going to find the combination of hypermodern physical infrastructure, relatively stable political/judicial systems, and the fiscal infrastructure to support these types of businesses all bundled together?
It seems to end up being a puck-two sort of thing otherwise, and if they did move out, they'd likely have to instantly write off the American market, as such a drastic measure would not go unnoticed. It starts to reek of nationalistic pride as the insurance policy, but history didn't build itself up without such a thing in the first place; so I see it as foolish to discount the mechanism moving forward.
One can only hope the cost in blood to maintain such security won't have to be repeated however.
I live in a city that conservatives have been claiming for years will drive away all business, real estate development, and wealthy individuals with our progressive taxes and regulations.
Yet every year our economy grows and our quality of life improves.
If businesses leave, they're the type of business you wouldn't want around anyway.
“We thought that we’d kill McDonnell Douglas and we had it on the ropes,” he said. “I still believe that Harry outsmarted Phil and his gang bought Boeing with Boeing’s money. We were all just disgusted.” More than that, he added, the company had “paid way, way too much money [for McDonnell Douglas] and we’re still paying for it. We wrote off so many tens of billions of dollars for that whole mess.”
A good lesson to not play games with hustlers. McDonnell Douglas was famous for being slimy, financial rent-seekers. They got hustled.
One great company after another destroyed by financial shenanigans. Avaya & Silver Lake Partners is another that comes to mind, but there have been many.
> Stonecipher seems to have agreed with this assessment. “When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm,” he told the Chicago Tribune in 2004. “It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money.”
Wow. In retrospect, this is an amoral path. Basically it's money over lives. Furthermore, this "intent" has cost them more financially.
And yet for Stonecipher it was a personally financially successful personal decision and none of the consequences will hurt him personally. When the rewards always go to the top (aka shareholders) and consequences always fall elsewhere, this is the predictable consequence.
We need some system such that shareholders and executives become personally responsible for these tragic yet predictable consequences.
A relatively smaller amount of money will influence state elections, and state-level politicians determine things like district boundaries (i.e. gerrymandering), vote roll purges, polling stations, etc. All of those have a very large impact on elections too.
1. More people voted for Clinton than Trump in 2016. If you look at the notion "More campaign funding = more votes", then this instance does not prove that wrong. It says a lot about Clinton's campaign strategy and America's election system, however, that she still lost the election despite more votes.
2. Trump still raised about a billion dollars. That is an insanely large amount of money.
Here's an excerpt that starts to answer your question:
> The 1970s was a turning point in the other direction. In the decades leading up to the '70s, the government had grown increasingly aggressive—intervening in the free market to defend competition in more and more ways over time. Then a lawyer named Robert Bork completely transformed the way courts would interpret antitrust law. The approach to enforcement reversed direction away from protecting firms and toward a consumer focus, paving the way for today's tech giants.
I read recently in the book "A Generation of Sociopaths" an interesting perspective I hadn't before considered. The book's claim was that as the Baby Boomer generation aged into a capital owning class, they used their democratic voting influence to impact companies they increasingly owned via stocks.
I don't know if I buy it, but it was an interesting take on the political and tax changes that began in the late 70s and early 80s.
I don't personally, it conflates boomers with capitalists, and there are plenty of boomers who aren't a part of the capitalist class by any stretch of the imagination. Just because some of them benefited from it, doesn't mean they had any part in its construction, execution, or intention.
This story just obfuscates the fact that this tension between capital and labor existed long before this generation and pretends like the entire generation was in on it, when it was really just the boomer capitalist class, not all boomers.
It does group (majority white) boomers together but I don’t think the auther conflates them with capitalists exactly. It was more so making the point that as a collective voting block, they tended to vote to their own selfish interests and had the numbers to sway policy. For example, reducing capital gains taxes which wasn’t necessary until they, as a collective, had enough vested interest in the stock of companies later in their life.
The book by Matt Stoller, Goliath, is a deep exploration of this.
The blame is scattered all over the place, but the main idea is that government has become increasingly technocratic; trusting industry leaders to tell us that their industries are too complicated for politicians to interfere in. This is not just a question of "regulation" -- the problem is bigger than regulation since anti-trust is generally not a regulatory issue so much as a law enforcement issue. Regulation is actually part of the problem to a degree, as regulating fewer larger entities is "easier" than regulating a diverse healthy industry.
In the 1970s, a combination of things -- Bork and the Chicago school's notion that "consumer protection" was the main objective of anti-trust action, Ralph Nader and the burgeoning consumer rights movement that joined forces with this (because of the regulatory pressure above), and the switch of the Democratic party from a populist party to principally a social justice party. All three of these had positive effects as well (prosecuting abusive monopolies, increasing customer safety and dropping consumer prices for goods, and advancing the civil rights movement), but between them they ended up dismantling the New Deal era protections against big businesses that led to the massive consolidations of the 80s and 90s across almost every sector.
There are many things that Stoller points to as positive things that I was dubious about but he makes a compelling case -- specifically pricing controls (where the manufacturer can set retail price ceilings and prevent discounting). Some of it has been things that I have had trouble specifically elucidating -- why it's bad that Disney controls both content production and distribution, and how Congress can wield (and has wielded, in the past) power directly.
I’ve heard someone claim that the US Government was responsible for this merger in the first place. I wasn’t clear on whether they actively pushed it or it was a result of policy change around defense contracting. The implication was that it was the former.
When you read the press there is this constant celebration of companies hitting ever higher market values or billionaires weighing on on issues. It seems the bigger and richer the more respect companies and people get.
Regulatory capture. Corporations entice regulators with cushy jobs when they leave public service, with the implied understanding that they won't act against their interests while they work in government.
That’s another effect of income inequality. Some players can pay so much money that people are willing to compromise some values. I am pretty sure I could overlook some things if I suddenly got paid ten times as money as before.
That's only one theory. The other is that it is natural to expect people who exit high-level positions in public service to enter high-level positions in private industry, particularly in the same field.
In the progressive era we had pretty good anti-trust enforcement. But during the early 20th century the fashionable view was that dog-eat-dog competition was inefficient and it would be better if the economy was made up of a series of well regulated monopolies like Ma Bell or at least cartels like the airlines used to be. Back when the USSR was reporting huge economic growth this theory was something people pointed to to explain how communism could be so much more efficient than capitalism.
Thankfully the pendulum has been swinging back in the other direction for various reasons like the fall of the USSR, realization of the dangers of regulatory capture, etc. But then we've been allowing all these horizontal mergers recently which just doesn't make any sense to me.
Then Boeing tried to deliver them just days before the end of the year but Qatar Airlines had them fly back. My guess is it really was that Boeing had not met the schedule for fitting the Qsuite and QA was having none of it.
It was eight months later, the planes were fine. This was about Boeing trying to deliver planes CY19 for accounting reasons that did not have business class seating that can turn into a conference room, the reason QA chose to buy them in the first place.
Agreed. I think holding executives criminally liable for their company would change a -lot- in a good way. More hiring, increased wages, increased safety standards just to name a few. I know if I were liable and in charge, I'd only want the best of the best working for me. And if it's customer facing, I sure as hell am not hiring the kinds of people typically associated with minimum wage jobs. Then again, maybe paying those folks more would lead to better behavior, who is to say...
Shouldn't then car industry executives be also to blame for negligent killing of the ones whose death was a result of a car failure related to planned obsolescence?
They absolutely should. This is why in engineering there are safety factors built in and ethical considerations seriously taken when designing projects.
From the article: “When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm,” [Harry Stonecipher, the new CEO from McDonnell-Douglas] told the Chicago Tribune in 2004. “It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money.”
I lay the blame at the feet of each person at the company who acted selfishly.
Selfishness gets an easy pass here on Hacker News --- well, just about everywhere these days, I guess. Take this recent thread, where the submitter confesses that he has been slacking off for 6 years at work. A lot of people egged him on. I remember one comment that advised him to double down and go Full Sociopath (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21964204).
I could not think of a good rebuttal. I mean, I work hard even when no one is watching, because I am religious, but I did not imagine it going well if I just laid out the idea of a transcendental world. But the only solution I see is reformation of the individual, one by one, not revolution of the social structure --- change from the inside out, instead of the outside in.
The enemy is not the rich or the poor, the executive or the engineer. Any of these people can be dangerous, if their philosophy is maximum selfishness. Furthermore, no set of laws is clever enough to keep the peace if the majority of citizens are sociopaths. They will always find the legal loopholes. On the other hand, a country with the dumbest regulatory set-up would still run fine if peopled by saints, people who are the opposite of selfish, who are always asking, am I treating others how I wish to be treated?
I’ve got to agree with you. Selfishness in your job at Boeing, perhaps, means you care less about the safety of the plane and more about doing the minimum you can. Maybe that means you don’t report something you may have if you were more invested. At my job as a software engineer working on tools for making websites, it may just mean that a user can not accomplish X or that a bug goes unfixed for a while. But compounded over time, those little things done by a lot of people can mean a plane crashes — or in my case, that the company looses users and I may be out of a job.
Of course, you should be selfish in that you should take care of yourself and not seriously stress yourself over work. But sometimes not doing an uncomfortable thing (for me, reaching out to an unfamiliar person) can seriously hinder the quality of my work. That quality definitely manifests itself in the product in big and small ways.
I have the same feeling you do, but I really wonder: is it the same as it's ever been and I am growing older, or are we really more selfish than we used to be? It sure seems like everyone is out to make a buck, morality be damned.
I just always imagine the shame that I would feel if I was in charge of making these short-sighted decisions. Sacrificing the quality/safety of the product to make a bonus. I would feel intensely ashamed about doing such a thing, but I guess that disqualifies me from ever being in charge.
I think if you want a glimpse into the future of competitive behavior as the population increases and climate change starts gnawing on the economy, look at the school systems in South Korea and China. Absolutely cutthroat from day one, because there are so many people competing for the same resources.
This is absolutely on target. I am hearing from friends in Wichita that the Textron Aviation merger with Beechcraft is creating the same situation as the Douglas-Boeing merger. I have friends that have been with Textron for a long time that are getting new bosses from Beechcraft and the term that is getting used is "well that was Beeched."
I dispute that McDonnell Douglas was 'on the ropes' before the merger - the MD-80/90/95 family was selling well, and while the MD-11 was not, the market at that time for wide-body jets was fairly soft. In addition the C-17 was still being made as fast as it could be at that time. I'd also point to the success of the Delta II heavy lift vehicle too.
Whats interesting to me, is the merger between McDonnell Aircraft and Douglas Aircraft was effectively a shotgun marriage. DAC was capital starved in the late 60's and merged for an infusion of capital.
Not many people would dispute that. From the article: "In 1996, Boeing took approximately 60% of the industry’s new commercial aircraft orders. Airbus, the European consortium, lingered far behind it, at 35%. McDonnell Douglas took the remaining 5%."
And falling fast. New military contracts had dried up too, with no meaningful wins coming in the foreseeable future.
Agreed, the parallels with the Douglas merger are interesting. Even including the military branch, not just DC.
The MD-80/90/95 didn't have a very big order book, and there was no replacement for it. The MD-11 was a failure, and the MD-12 was cancelled. Douglas essentially had no future after 2000. The military side was better, but the A-12 was cancelled, and they lost the JSF. The only bright spot was the Super Hornet, which was supposed to have been an interim aircraft until the JSF started to be produced.
2000 is a bit premature, also in 97, the MD-95 was still a paper aircraft (first flight was not until 1998) - and the last MD-95 rolled out of Long Beach in 2006. Nor was a replacement for the MD-90 obviously needed
The MD-11 had the same issues the 767 had at that time, meaning the market for wide body aircraft was slow, very slow.
I suspect that had the merger with Boeing not happened, the MD-11, MD-90 and MD-95 would have continued on in sales for a while. I'm lead to believe Boeing didn't try as hard to sell the MD-95 (Boeing discontinued the MD-90 entirely because it competed in the same space as the 737) as McDonnell Douglas would have. I also suspect Boeing would rather have cancelled the ship as soon as the merger happened, but it would have cost them more to cancel it then, than it did by waiting 8-odd years.
Growing up in Long Beach, it was clear to all the people who worked at DAC, that Boeing bought them for their Military side, not for the commercial aircraft though.
In the end, 9/11 made the whole new aircraft market go squishy, and it lead to several project ends across the industry - most notably the 757.
In 1997, the 767 had 682 cumulative deliveries, and 120 unfilled orders. The 777 had 104 cumulative deliveries, and 221 unfilled orders. The MD-11 only sold 200 units total in its entire history.
The MD-90 was also non-competitive with the A321 and the 757. You can take a look at the sales numbers. By the mid nineties, Douglas was producing something like 20 a year, Boeing was doing about 50 a year, and Airbus was producing about 25 a year.
Douglas badly needed a cash infusion to get a competitive product flying. Their whole product line was derivatives of 1960s aircraft that weren't even winners in the 60s. Meanwhile, Boeing had introduced the 757, 767, and 777, which were all great aircraft.
I am not an aeronautical engineer. A year or two ago I read a comment here that certainly seemed legitimate that talked about airplane design and it went something like this (paraphrased because I can't find it now):
> As soon as you move the engines, you probably need to move the wings. As soon as you move the wings, you need to redesign the airframe. As soon as you do that you're designing a whole new plane.
I can't even remember if this was talking about the Max at all.
So it seems to me the core problem here is Boeing had reached the limit of what they could do with a 50 year old airframe while maintaining the common type rating and aircraft and engine design have simply changed. Airbus may eventually have that problem with the A320 family. I really don't know. But they don't have it yet.
Part of controlling costs at a budget airline is maintaining a single fleet (in type rating terms). The two choices here seem to be the 737 or the A320.
The Max came about because there was a huge captured demand for it from the likes of Southwest. Would this have happened without the MD merger? I can't say but I'd be surprised if it couldn't given the demand from budget airlines.
Of course people like to take an issue like this and tie it to whatever axe they want to grind too.
> Airbus may eventually have that problem with the A320 family. I really don't know. But they don't have it yet.
Airbus is already fly-by-wire on the A320, and they know how to do it not too stupidly. They can provide the same control laws and feedbacks to new models without introducing ugly hacks on top of mechanical commands. That helps.
I believe other Airbus families already use controls that are very similar to the ones used in the A320, and even if that's not of the same type rating that probably also ease training a lot.
The 737 will eventually have to go; even the somehow modernized versions are a quite outdated way to make big commercial airplanes nowadays. (And the whole idea of grandfathering regulation is utterly stupid, btw.)
I think the thought is without the merger there is a deterrent timeline where Boeing maintains enough management competence to not turn development of the 787 into an outsourced/vendor funded cluster fuck. Which might have left them with enough funding to replace the 737 with something modern and safe.
Meaning failure to develop the 787 on time an on budget left them with no time to develop a proper replacement for the 737 without losing customers to the Airbus 320. Seriously it took Boeing about 9 years to develop and deliver the 787.
political corruption brought the 737 max to the ground. once a manufacturer has power to do their own QA instead of the FAA or any other independent authority, you're doing stuff on a 3rd world status level. no oversight. investor driven.
Recently the highly controversial bill S.386(https://antis386.org/) that mentioned Boeing used $9/hr India engineers to write some level of the software used on its airlines, is this true if there are any insiders who know something about it?
Without a competitor Boeing has no intention to make the safest product anymore, however, Airline unlike others, must make sure safety/quality remains to be the No.1 priority. Any outsourcing should be carefully thought out before running towards the cheapest offer offshore.
Companies merge, split up, get acquired, go bankrupt.
It's what they do, and there's nothing inherently dysfunctional about that. By themselves, these actions don't cause mines to collapse, plans to fall from the sky and highly polluting vehicles to be put on the road with full knowledge of the company's senior leadership. If there is a systemic cause for these things -- it's yawning gaps regulatory oversight (and enforcement).
But these gaps aren't accidents, and don't arise in a vacuum, either. Nor are they mere byproducts of what should otherwise by a working system.
In effect, they're there by design. They are exactly the desired outcomes of a system -- and the governing ideology behind it -- that enshrines the "right of capital" as a fundamental right. And which (not coincidentally) seeks to protect the exercises of this "right" from the inevitable consequences of their actions, as much as it can get away with doing so. With carnage and tragedy being the inevitable results.
Are we doing an another round of armchair aviation engineers outlining ad nauseum all the reasons they believe the 737 Max cannot possibly fly and should never have been considered that ignores all the evidence that the two accidents were successfully root-caused to an issue that has now been fixed and is undergoing an understandably and embarrassingly lengthy process of certification? Seems to be an almost daily ritual on HN these days.
Yes Boeing has issues; especially in their senior management. That's why they are struggling to keep up with competitors in the cheaper/faster/more efficient/less noisy category (aka. the market). But also, the 737 is still one of the safest and most successful planes ever and last year was one of the safest years in aviation history with many thousands of them flying around every day. Once patched up, the max will be part of that fleet for decades to come and is unlikely to bend the excellent safety record in any statistically meaningful way regardless of the current sentiments or the recent accidents.
IMHO, Boeing has some corporate culture issues to sort out and it definitely does not help that they operate as a state protected monopoly that mostly acts to shovel defense money around and enrich contractors, share holders, politicians, lobbyists, etc. involved with cutting up that pie. But lets be real, every other big aviation manufacturer works exactly the same way and it seems to work fine in terms of safety.
Fundamentally there are no good technical reasons for the hundreds of 737 maxes to be permanently retired over real, perceived or imagined risks. Yes, there are some technical issues that are addressable, are being addressed, and require lengthy inspections & certification to verify that they have indeed been addressed. That's basically what's happening because they are fixable issues. There are no known un-fixable issues here, no known show stopping design flaws that can't be worked around, no known unacceptable (i.e. uncertifiable) hacks, etc. Some of the fixes may indeed lead to some retraining effort, which I'm sure is annoying but not fatal for Boeing. And yes, there's brand damage and Boeing is probably going to have to do some pro-forma rebranding (737 maxi-cosi, anyone?) and symbolic modifications.
When their choice is to go out of business or attempt to fix entirely fixable technical issues they'd be complete idiots to get sucked down the first hole. Permanently retiring many hundreds of planes that once fixed are perfectly good for decades to come is just not going to be a thing. Boeing going bankrupt over this under the current political climate is also not a thing. To big to fail means rules can be bended, changed, abused, or otherwise ignored. That's how this happened to begin with. One way or another the FAA will ultimately rubber stamp whatever needs rubber stamping.
Some time this year, the thing will resume flying and Boeing goes back to licking its wounds and planning the next iteration of its products. I imaging they'd be tempted to unshelve some projects they had for future products as well and dust off what lingering R&D capability they have to come up with something new. That'd be a smart investment.
Capitalism is working in this case. Boeing is being punished. Market forces are not always instantaneous. The China boom made investors demand unreasonable returns for domestic companies as well. A good business plan and making solid money over time is no longer acceptable. The China boom changed the expectations of investors to unreasonable rates. But the China boom wasn't capitalism. The Chinese economy is highly controlled and this influence on more capitalistic markets is what happens where the two separate markets converge.
Both of you have a point! I believe that I have identified a crucial factor in my comment here (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21972656) that identifies the root of the problem. I hope that it helps in resolving this disagreement.
Capitalism is not working in this case since making faulty aircrafts should not be possible, by regulation, in the first place. Waiting for market to react gives companies to sort of "binary search" the market to find a sweet spot where they don't overspend on engineering, or underspend on engineering by making faulty aircrafts. The point of having regulation is to force companies not be able to perform this "binary search" so that there is a baseline they have to spend on engineering to be able to produce a commercial airliner.
McDonnell Douglas to blame for 737 Max crisis? I don't think so. But full marks to the PR team that thought up that retrospective self serving disinformation.
I agree with you, but what do you think of the point I have made here, which is that there's an even more fundamental problem drove the awful, immoral cost-cutting? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21972656
I think the ultimate root cause that led to the 737 MAX crisis was de-regulation and the airlines race to the bottom on price. The whole reason for making the plane a 737 and not a new aircraft was to cut pilot re-training costs.
I used to think that highly competitive markets with low prices are the best, but now I am not so sure. Those kind of markets tend to push the quality down as well as squeeze the workers. Compare the union workers for the Big Three during the 1970's to that of the gig economy workers now. Maybe an oligopoly with high profits and strong unions is what is best in the long term? Or maybe, we need to alternate periods of disruption and highly competitive markets with periods of stability and oligopolies? I suspect we as a society will have to try to figure that out, and that it is not a simple answer.