>> ProPublica labelled the algorithm as biased based primarily on the fact that it (correctly) labelled blacks as more likely than whites to re-offend (without using race as part of the predictor), and that blacks and whites have different false positive rates.
>> In the conception of these authors, “bias” refers to an algorithm providing correct predictions that simply fail to reflect the reality the authors wish existed.
The gist of the article is that statistical bias is not the bias that journalists are interested in. The article doesn't discuss how these biases are related or relevant to each other, but rather assumes that statistical bias is the only one that should matter. I think the article is missing a discussion of the gaps between what are the measured inputs into your statistical model, and what can be acted upon from a policy perspective.
As a thought experiment, suppose the only two inputs that determine a person's recidivism rate is their past criminal history and whether they had lead poisoning as a child, but that of these two we can only measure past criminal history as an input into our algorithm. If race is strongly associated with childhood lead poisoning (such as in real life [1]), then our algorithm might get higher classification accuracy by including race [2] as an input in its training data. This might have less statistical bias, but would bias against individuals of a race who are in truth not at higher risk of recidivism.
I feel the author failed to address the crux of why people argue that "non-statistical" bias is bad – that we should be judged by our actions, and not by factors out of our control such as race, class, the family we were born into, or where we were born.
If we included every aspect about a person in some statistical model, we may discover "uncomfortable truths" that hold true for the general population. But these truths, while statistically correct, may fail our test for what we consider to be philosophically fair, and ultimately undermine an individual's agency to act independently.
So perhaps in your experiment, the problem is that our feature selection is not reflective of the values we'd like to uphold, and that aspects like "had lead poisoning as a child" is not a sound feature to include in our model because it measures aspects of a person outside their control. Instead maybe our feature set should only include aspects that measure facets that are under the individual's control such as community service, whether they still associate with other criminals, whether they have or are pursuing education, whether they have children to care for, etc. (or some other feature set that's more thought out and sound, but you get the gist)
This still may not have as good accuracy as a model that included other features about the person, but it's arguable that this system would be more fair, especially over a model using more features but was artificially fudged to satisfy some prior about what we consider fair/unbiased.
>I feel the author failed to address the crux of why people argue that "non-statistical" bias is bad – that we should be judged by our actions, and not by factors out of our control such as race, class, the family we were born into, or where we were born.
This is exactly what the author is talking about. You are comparing the predictions against your fantasy of a world where these aspects do not matter because they're not "fair". When they don't match up, you call the predictions biased. But these factors outside our control do matter, accounting for them does not introduce bias, and averting our eyes will not change that fact.
I'm not claiming that we should ignore these aspects and lie to ourselves about reality, in fact I'm acknowledging that these relationships exist. My greater point is that the author is trying to use the meaning of statistical bias to dismiss what journalists/laypersons consider bias without addressing why the latter is concerned with bias in the first place.
My suggestion is that we should be using a better feature set that only looks at aspects that we can reasonably hold an individual responsible for rather than using demographic information which is out of an individual's control. If we have two convicted criminals with similar crimes, behaviors, and histories, but one is white and grew up in a wealthy neighborhood while the other is black and grew up in a poorer town, why should the former be granted a higher probability of parole than the latter? Why should either of them be held responsible for the actions of others? Even if in expectation people from the latter demographic were more likely to reoffend than the former, that is not justice – it undermines liberty.
If "these truths, while statistically correct, may fail our test for what we consider to be philosophically fair" then perhaps it is your philosophy of 'fairness' that is biased and incorrect.
Would you like to point out how it's biased and incorrect? My latter claim is that we should base features on aspects that an individual could be reasonably held responsible for, rather than aspects out of their control such as their race, gender, or where they grew up.
So my philosophy of "fairness" here is that we should hold people responsible only for their own actions, which, while off-the-cuff, seems like it would agree with most justice systems. If we included demographic information in our models, we would effectively be holding individuals responsible for the actions of others, which doesn't seem sound.
Journalists may not be using the term bias in a statistically appropriate way, but they do seem to be capturing a colloquial sense of what bothers people about these models: the potential for the individual to be subsumed into his demographic, and the use of suspect classifications (like race in the US) as highly salient but 'silent' factors in the model. I don't think this is a misleading use of the term for the average reader, whom I suspect would consider the FICO redlining example as exhibiting 'bias' as the term is commonly understood by laypersons. The fact that these models are difficult to understand and interrogate for the average citizen is not exactly a point in their favor, since a lot of consensual governance is based on transparency and information symmetry, even at the expense of optimization/efficiency.
Of course all models are biased, but we can try to build models that minimize the types of bias we care most about.
I think the so-called panic comes from the fact that more complicated algorithms are difficult for an untrained person to understand. For example, it's also illegal to discriminate housing/lending based on race, but if I hide that discrimination inside of a sufficiently-complicated ML model, I may be able to get away with it.
Remember that these algorithms are attempting to predict the future based on past results. What the author calls a "true fact about reality" is a fact about the present or past. We then use this understanding of the past to try to predict the future. But as they say in finance, past performance is no guarantee of future results.
The whole idea behind "debiasing" is to avoid writing people off based on history of their group. Yes, taking chances on people who haven't done anything yet can cost money and a profit-maximizing algorithm will sometimes automatically avoid the risk by reproducing biases.
And that's why the algorithm designers need to watch over the algorithm and make sure it's not writing people off based on inferring the group they're in. As a society we've decided that giving people a chance to defy the historical odds of their group is worth the cost. Maintaining the status quo may be profit-maximizing but profit isn't actually the only goal. (Any more than paperclip-maximizing is.)
On the other hand these inferences can often be used in better ways. For example, colleges can identify "at risk" students and make sure they get extra help.
>On the other hand these inferences can often be used in better ways. For example, colleges can identify "at risk" students and make sure they get extra help.
I like that last sentiment. We shouldn't lie to ourselves about the truth, but we should use it to help make the situation better for society as a whole, not to discriminate against certain groups.
This brushes over the very real prospect of automated discrimination that we increasingly face as AI techniques replace simple statistical methods.
As a society, we would want to avoid a situation where someone is turned down for a job for being female or black. There are various laws in place to try and prevent this.
In the olden days, a way of pricing insurance policies would be to pick a bunch of features, identify how each one contributes to risk, and use that for pricing.
Some characteristics are protected and you can't use them for pricing. If you are using them in your CV sifting algorithm you are heading for a lawsuit. It's fairly easy to spot if ethnicity is in your feature set.
Sometimes, you'd have a feature that was a proxy for a protected characteristic. Supposing that women are safer drivers, perhaps a medical history of using contraceptive pills would be predictive of safe driving, because it is in fact a proxy for gender. So statisticians would examine the dominant factors in their pricing model and show that whey were not proxies.
Now maybe we could conceivably throw a bunch of data at a neural network type thing, and get an opaque pricing model. It might find proxies, even if you don't include the protected data items.
Maybe, if (according to the article) black people with certain characteristics are more likely to default on loans, it could be using common black names or media preferences as a proxy for ethnicity. An applicant who had few negative characteristics might get a high quote simply because the system figured out he was black. And no one would really know.
It would be very hard to look at a complex bunch of weights in layers, and figure out that not only did liking certain TV shows effect your claim, but also that certain specific TV shows had a high impact and were correlated with race or gender or whatever. You'd just see a bunch of weights trained on clickstream data or something.
You mean if we model an AI after our biological brains it will be prone to stereotyping? So our artificial brains do in fact do what we set out to do. They act a bit too human.
Older statistical methods were not complex and could be analyzed by a human to ensure they complied with legal and moral obligations.
Newer approaches such as but not limited to neural networks create a model that is so complex that it is opaque. You cannot necessarily verify that it is complying with legal and moral obligations.
This is fine when you are doing song recommendations. It is more of a problem when you are making decisions that could be seen as discriminatory.
There are probably best practices that can mitigate some of these problems, and we can use our human understanding of the features to try and reduce risk.
Indeed, this is the same problem as 'How do we build a safety critical system with AI, and deterministically show its safe like we could with a simpler one'. Here is a writeup of some of those issues [1].
But not everyone will - because sometimes discrimination is profitable if you can get away with it. If a car insurance company can hide gender discrimination behind a complex model then they are incentivized to do that.
So, we possibly have a social problem.
The problem is not that newer techniques are 'like a brain and susceptible bias in the same way' because to some extent that isn't true - they work on the real data available unless you feed them movie scripts.
The issue is if they intentionally or accidentally become a way of getting around laws society made for good reason.
The thing that I worry about more is the media’s bias toward fairness. Nobody uses the word lie anymore. Suddenly, everything is 'a difference of opinion.' If the entire House Republican caucus were to walk onto the floor one day and say “The Earth is flat,” the headline on the New York Times the next day would read 'Democrats and Republicans Can’t Agree on Shape of Earth.' I don’t believe the truth always lies in the middle. I don’t believe there are two sides to every argument. I think the facts are the center. And watching the news abandon the facts in favor of “fairness” is what’s troubling to me.
The gist of the article is that statistical bias is not the bias that journalists are interested in. The article doesn't discuss how these biases are related or relevant to each other, but rather assumes that statistical bias is the only one that should matter. I think the article is missing a discussion of the gaps between what are the measured inputs into your statistical model, and what can be acted upon from a policy perspective.
As a thought experiment, suppose the only two inputs that determine a person's recidivism rate is their past criminal history and whether they had lead poisoning as a child, but that of these two we can only measure past criminal history as an input into our algorithm. If race is strongly associated with childhood lead poisoning (such as in real life [1]), then our algorithm might get higher classification accuracy by including race [2] as an input in its training data. This might have less statistical bias, but would bias against individuals of a race who are in truth not at higher risk of recidivism.
[1] https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/alixwinter/files/sampson_w...
[2] The actual COMPAS algorithm doesn't use race as an explicit input, but that doesn't really change the issue.