Jesus Christ - way to bury the lead. The headline reads 'prevent encryption above all else', but three paragraphs in:
"But Steinbach's testimony also suggests he meant that companies shouldn't put their customers' access to encryption ahead of national security concerns -- rather than saying the government's top priority should be preventing the use of the technology that secures basically everything people do online."
The hearing was concerning ISIS use of social media as a recruitment platform and how it related to the recent shootings in Garland, Texas and in Boston on Tuesday.
The subject of encryption is not the primary focus of the hearing, but when it does come up I think he makes his point clear at about 39:30 when says this: "I think we need an honest conversation and get past the rhetoric of what we are talking about. We're not talking about large scale surveillance techniques. We are talking about going before the court, whether the criminal court or the national security court, with evidence, a burden of proof/probable cause, suggesting a crime has been committed or in our case there is a terrorist and showing that burden of proof, having the court sign off on it, and then going to those providers and requesting access to the stored information or communications that's ongoing. So we're not looking at going through a backdoor or being nefarious - we're talking about going to the company and asking for their assistance. We suggest and we are imploring Congress to help us seek legal remedies to that and asking companies to provide technological solutions to help that. We understand privacy. Privacy above all other things including safety and freedom from terrorism is not where we want to go. "
He later goes on to suggest expanding he scope of CALEA to include more than just telecommunications companies.
If people are going to debate this topic, I think they should start from his actual position and not a half sentence soundbite.
He's arguing categorically against end-to-end encryption. All encryption, according to the FBI, must be negotiated through centralized points that can be served with a warrant and made to MITM the communications.
It's not even clear that's the extent of what they want. They probably also want the communications to always be MITMed by the centralized nodes, so that warrants can request historical communications dating back to some retention limit.
The Boston example is interesting... From articles I've read it's not really clear when they started surveilling Rahim, but I found it interesting that they knew he bought 3 knives on Amazon.com. The Boston Globe implies that it was the knife purchases themselves which clued the FBI into starting the investigation;
But in the course of laying out those allegations against
Wright, the document goes into detail about why federal
officials said they had Rahim on 24-hour surveillance in the
first place.
... goes on to discuss the knife purchase, and subsequent conversation ...
"But Steinbach's testimony also suggests he meant that companies shouldn't put their customers' access to encryption ahead of national security concerns -- rather than saying the government's top priority should be preventing the use of the technology that secures basically everything people do online."
Here is the actual hearing: http://www.c-span.org/video/?326360-1/hearing-cartoon-contes...
The hearing was concerning ISIS use of social media as a recruitment platform and how it related to the recent shootings in Garland, Texas and in Boston on Tuesday.
The subject of encryption is not the primary focus of the hearing, but when it does come up I think he makes his point clear at about 39:30 when says this: "I think we need an honest conversation and get past the rhetoric of what we are talking about. We're not talking about large scale surveillance techniques. We are talking about going before the court, whether the criminal court or the national security court, with evidence, a burden of proof/probable cause, suggesting a crime has been committed or in our case there is a terrorist and showing that burden of proof, having the court sign off on it, and then going to those providers and requesting access to the stored information or communications that's ongoing. So we're not looking at going through a backdoor or being nefarious - we're talking about going to the company and asking for their assistance. We suggest and we are imploring Congress to help us seek legal remedies to that and asking companies to provide technological solutions to help that. We understand privacy. Privacy above all other things including safety and freedom from terrorism is not where we want to go. "
He later goes on to suggest expanding he scope of CALEA to include more than just telecommunications companies.
If people are going to debate this topic, I think they should start from his actual position and not a half sentence soundbite.