This article, like most others, overlooks the primary reason the A-10 has been slated for retirement for so long even though no one contests its effectiveness in its role. Due to the way the aircraft was designed, it has very limited upgradeability compared to most US military aircraft.
While the airframe still makes for a great weapons platform, the sensor suites, avionics, and countermeasures are obsolete, and not in a good way. They've been doing a lot of nasty hacks to allow it to support modern weapon systems and electronics but there are a growing number of important capabilities that simply cannot be "backported" to that airframe.
This has been increasing its vulnerability to more advanced threats and reducing its ability to deploy more advanced weapons over time. Its shelf-life has been extended by virtue of it being used in practice against adversaries with unsophisticated weaponry. This makes it immediately useful in practice but the military is well-aware that it would not be nearly as successful against a more sophisticated adversary and this is why they have been angling for an alternative.
It is a relic of the Cold War not just in its history but, unfortunately, also in its defenses and weaponry with no obvious upgrade path. Its survivability and effectiveness are predicated on being used against Cold War level adversaries. To replace it with something that could support the capabilities they desire, they would need to design a completely new airframe.
The "Upgradeability" argument is a moot point considering there is no other airframe that can come close to replacing the A-10 in the missions it is best at. To say that the plane isn't nearly "upgradeable" enough (A point on the face I would dispute, as it's already been upfitted with Pave gear) is to say, "let's get rid of the plane because it's not good enough for future battles we might fight, and if we do, then we'll have absolutely nothing capable now." It's an argument that completely lacks any real world basis.
I don't get rid of my only computer because it's a Pentium 3 because it's old, until I have something that can actually replace it (and no, it won't/can't be replaced by the JSF).
Also, I point out that the A-10 is actually young compared to some of the planes we're still flying. B52 anyone? U-2? We don't stop flying planes because they're old, we stop flying them because there is something better to replace them. At this time, no such thing exists for the A-10.
Also, it's insane to say that the missions that the plane "Might" be used for in the future don't suit the plane, considering the missions it actually has, are almost perfect for it (ground support in Iraq as the article states).
The truth is that the Air Force doesn't want the plane and they're trying to come up with any excuse to kill it, despite the fact that it actually saves US troops lives.
> The truth is that the Air Force doesn't want the plane
I'm not disputing the truth of this (as their actions seem to agree with you), but what do you think motivates the air force to want to get rid of such a successful platform?
You don't get to be an Ace by destroying tanks, or artillery, or other ground threats. You get to be an Ace by defeating another pilot in a dogfight. That's why the Air Force is reluctant to support the A-10. They want to put all that money into their fighter jets.
Close air support really should be an Army responsibility, but the Air Force doesn't want the other services flying planes. The only reason the Army is allowed to have helicopters, is because they're not "real" airplanes.
> Close air support really should be an Army responsibility, but the Air Force doesn't want the other services flying planes.
The Air Force doesn't want the Army flying fixed-wing manned combat aircraft. All services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force) have manned aircraft, all services have fixed-wing manned aircraft, all services have manned combat aircraft, and all services except the Army have fixed-wing manned combat aircraft.
Exactly. Fighters intercept bombers. Fighters intercept other fighters.
Bombers allow for cheap and reliable mass destruction of any ground target - compared to icbms and ground vehicles.
That these arguments come up only show how brain washed we are by the media.
#1 cost (mostly due to lack of upfront funding to keep costs down)
#2 it doesnt look/scound cool like those 'new' planes. it sounds great to have a cool new jet fighter with (some) stealth and can do neat loopty loops and use the latest and greatest air to air and electronic warfare systems, BUT
none of these new planes actually come anywhere close to fulfilling the close ground support role the A-10 offers. its much akin to wanting the best fantasy stat players on your sports team but come to find those metrics don't win championships / make teams.
> none of these new planes actually come anywhere close to fulfilling the close ground support role the A-10 offers
What makes you think that way? Low-end missions can be fulfilled by drones and apaches, and high-end obviously by F-35.
A-10 is obsolete mostly because high precision bombs and missiles combined with good sensors are much more efficient than what A-10 has.
The modern Apache fires its weapons from so far away there is no hope of hitting it with a machine gun. Those things are probably the most high tech the Army has, it can communicate with a drone miles ahead of it, that will transmit back the location of a vehicle and the Apache can destroy it without even having line of sight.
>This article, like most others, overlooks the primary reason the A-10 has been slated for retirement for so long even though no one contests its effectiveness in its role. Due to the way the aircraft was designed, it has very limited upgradeability compared to most US military aircraft.
The real reason is that it has always been the red-headed step-child of the ch-Air Force. There has never been any real interest in the CAS role from the mgmt, other than to keep that turf away from the Army and Marine Corps.
>While the airframe still makes for a great weapons platform, the sensor suites, avionics, and countermeasures are obsolete, and not in a good way. They've been doing a lot of nasty hacks to allow it to support modern weapon systems and electronics but there are a growing number of important capabilities that simply cannot be "backported" to that airframe.
I was about to make a similar comment that the A10 performs its role well despite having relatively primitive weapons / targeting systems. But I disagree about the reason for the obsolete weapons / electronics. Sensors and computers have only gotten smaller and better, and I am afraid I don't understand why you think that the A10 cannot be fitted with proper electronics and sensors.
>This has been increasing its vulnerability to more advanced threats
The definition of a CAS role practically implies that the airplane can only operate in an arena where air-superiority is assured. The A10 is by definition vulnerable to "more advanced threats" and so will any acceptable substitute share similar vulnerabilities.
>Its shelf-life has been extended by virtue of it being used in practice against adversaries with unsophisticated weaponry.
Exactly the kind of adversary it is being deployed against, though it has proven itself against others as well.
>It is a relic of the Cold War not just in its history but, unfortunately, also in its defenses and weaponry with no obvious upgrade path. To replace it with something that could support the capabilities they desire, they would need to design a completely new airframe.
I agree, and I hope they call it the A10-mkII, and that it is practically a modern rebuild of the A10.
The vulnerabilities and limitations of concern are not addressed by air superiority. It lacks modern protection from more sophisticated ground threats.
Basically, the US military is concerned because they know that they already have ground threat capabilities that would significantly reduce the survivability of platforms like the A-10. Looking forward, they expect this level of weapon sophistication to trickle down to increasingly unsophisticated adversaries. The A-10 lacks the power systems required to drive modern defenses and weapons.
It is no different than how the US military has been planning for the obsolescence of heavy armor.
As an example of the kind of losses that can result from better equipped adversaries, consider what has happened to the Russian Su-25 CAS in conflicts in Georgia and in the Chechen wars. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-25#2008_Russia.E2.80....). Quite a few have been shot down. MANPADS are getting more omnipresent, and overall theater air superiority will not always be enough.
"On 4 October 1999, a Su-25 was shot down by a MANPADS during a reconnaissance mission over the village of Tolstoy-Yurt killing its pilot. The wings of the aircraft were put on a pedestal in the central square in Grozny."
Ok there's the fist problem. Why is a CAS plane doing recon?
The CAS role consists of two things: 1st, bring death from above with heavy firepower and weapons capable of seriously damaging and mobile threat in the area of engagement; 2nd, be the invincible angels, surviving everything from small arms fire to light Flak cannons through to even a stinger missile or two.
The survival part of their role necessitates not going in blind, a CAS plane has no place doing a recon flight. It would be like riding a wounded horse through a hungry pride of lions to check on how hungry they are.
In a world of satellites and drones, recon is their job, they are unmatched at it, smaller, safer, cheaper. Tasking a CAS airframe with recon work is going to cost you a plane, and possibly a pilot as well.
This is why the A-10 remains effective. It's a bone saw or a rib spreader, designed for a task. Yes these days with a da vinci robot you don't need to crack open the ribs as often, but when you need the rib cage open or you need to saw through the humerus to amputate, those are the tools you use.
The A-10 is a dedicated specialist the airforce wishes to replace with more general purpose planes, which may work some of the time, but won't work all the time.
>The vulnerabilities and limitations of concern are not addressed by air superiority. It lacks modern protection from more sophisticated ground threats.
>Basically, the US military...
Chair force types itching for a new jet.
> Looking forward, they expect this level of weapon sophistication to trickle down to increasingly unsophisticated adversaries.
That is a totally reasonable assumption. I agree that MANPADS may prove problematic. There is the potential to develop countermeasure for these, just not the will, which is a shame because the rotors would benefit from it as well. But, the AF doesn't care for those, either.
>The A-10 lacks the power systems required to drive modern defenses and weapons.
You state this as if it were some kind of objective proven fact. It isn't. It may be the case that some existing weapons system can't be bolted on; but it is not a credible assertion to say that that a suitable solution cannot be developed.
>It is no different than how the US military has been planning for the obsolescence of heavy armor.
It is quite different. Heavy armor is useless, everyone knows it, and to the .mil's credit they are phasing it out. The A10 fills an important CAS role that other platforms can't replace. The F35 definitely isn't going to perform well as an A10 replacement. The Apache works well, but for some reason (sortie cost / availability?) it hasn't obsoleted the A10. Some yet undeveloped unmanned drone might be able to do so, but that is yet to be demonstrated.
And a story here where Warthogs saved 60 US soldiers in 2013, where "because people were shooting all over the place, the JTAC didn't feel safe bringing in helicopters in to evacuate the wounded personnel."
>I think the Apache's are not able to take being hit nearly as well as A10s,
No, they definitely can't! But they are much better at avoiding taking fire in the first place.
>plus have less fire power and take longer to get places.
This, and the higher maint-man/hour per flight hour.
>"...the JTAC didn't feel safe bringing in helicopters in to evacuate the wounded personnel."
Thanks for that link, hadn't seen it.
>...the convoy's commander approved the pilots to engage "danger-close." The term is meant to clearly communicate to the ground and air forces that the need for support is so grave the ground commander is willing to accept the potential risk to the friendly unit for the life-saving employment from the air.
Scheisse. Gives you chills if you really think about it.
A related concept is "final protective fire," which means something like "We are being overrun, please drop artillery shells directly on our position, we're in foxholes and they're not so hopefully it will work out." Scary.
My company gunny (1988) got a bronze star when, as an 19-year old mortarman in 1969, aimed his tube straight up and dropped rounds all over his company's position, saving the day.
I know this because he grabbed me by the scruff of my neck and made me read it, as part of up-close and personal counseling.
Exactly that, "his own people" including himself, which is arguably more brave than calling more powerful artillery fire on your own position. See PhasmaFelis comment in this subthread; this is the true last resort after final protective fire.
He was with a rifle company, in mortar squad. The company was over-run during an attack, at night: Marines in fighting holes, bad guys running around in the open, a very chaotic situation.
To eradicate the enemy, and save his company, he pointed the tube of his mortar straight up, dropped a shit-load of rounds down the tube, one at a time. The rounds went up (pretty far, but I no longer recall how high up they go) and came back down all over the place.
Risky, but Marines, generally, were in their holes, the bad guy were not, and so were more exposed to blast and shrapnel.
>No, they definitely can't! But they are much better at avoiding taking fire in the first place.
From what I've read, that really depends on the terrain. The Apache, from what sources I've seen, was really designed to take on Soviet ground forces in Germany. It's a tank hunter, designed to hide around and behind rolling hills, make quick attack passes on advancing armor columns, and then get the hell out of Dodge before AA can shoot back. Unlike its Soviet counterpart, the Mi-24 "Hind", the Apache isn't very well armored. This makes it not very well suited to the sort of mission where it has to loiter in an area and provide fire support for friendly forces.
Cost per sortie on the apache. They prefer sending vipers which arent as good but cheaper to operate. A10 isnt even really in the picture.
Another thing is the limited amount of aircraft carriers, their lack of agility.
F35s and helis can take off smaller, cheaper,more numerous amphibious vehicule carriers. Thats why theyre even making the f35...
We keep hearing how heavy armour is useless... Then events keep happening that demonstrate otherwise. You can't hold territory from the air. You just can't. The Russians know this, and they know the psychological effect tanks have too.
Those articles merely state the Army doesn't want to upgrades, they want to wait until a new version of the M1 is available in a few years? I took the above conversation to mean that there's a (universal?) consensus that heavy armor's time is past. These links don't support that.
At the end of the day, it's kind of hard to do a thunder run [1] without tanks.
>I took the above conversation to mean that there's a (universal?) consensus that heavy armor's time is past. These links don't support that.
No, those links don't. Forgive me, it's the most recent / best that I could find in a single web-query. I also didn't find a better link for you after searching again today. (search results too full of RTS game related junk)
The tank's day is done though, and while we'll maintain a small number of them, our war strategies do no rely on them, nor should they. If that were so, then any opposing force with one (of the many available) Javelin missile[1] like capability could stop our tank forces in their tracks. Killing tanks cheaply is a solved problem.
Yep, but it's more like good combined arms operations (the use of multiple combat arms like armor, artillery and air, you might start with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_arms) and a "cooperative" enemy. Like France in WWII.
I get the impression that Saddam's conception of war was strictly WWI era (right down to chemical warfare, although perhaps the issue there is why it wasn't widely used in WWII (ask for details if you're interested)), although this was most relevant in the First Gulf War, where we tricked him into thinking he would receive a frontal attack, and we hooked around his right flank. This avoided the expense of a frontal attack, he was no doubt hoping would cause us problems back home or worse.
For the rematch, well, he certainly had a lot less force, I would suspect the "thunder run" might vaguely resemble Patton's dash after the breakout from Normandy (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_S._Patton#Normandy_brea...), or if you want Nazi analogies, the crushing of small/relatively weak countries prior to France.
Interesting, but is this really an obstacle, or one of those relatively fixable obstacles that's exaggerated by people who really want shiny new planes?
It just seems strange to me -- computers have gotten faster, batteries have gotten smaller, etc. If all of your avionics are theoretically lighter and smaller, how is it an issue to pack more functionality into the same airframe? Hell, remove the pilot and armoured bath-tub and make it into a drone.
Modern military aircraft generate and move an enormous amount of electrical power throughout the airframe to supply all of their avionics and weapons. Power systems take up a lot of space.
The A-10 is an old school design, and there was no use case for installing large power systems when it was originally built. Unlike some other ancient airframes which had the spare room to retrofit power systems, the A-10 had little room to spare in its original design for a modern power system.
True, but our ground troops (some relatives and friends) love this thing because it can hang around for an extended period of time. The F-35 and helicopters cannot. That is what matters and until we get something that has the performance of the A-10 (the F-35 does not), we need to keep this one active.
The other truth is that the Air Force doesn't like it and never has. I seriously believe that they have lost sight of their origin and am starting to think as a cost saving measure the Air Force should be put back under the Army. They want fighters not something that gets dirty.
"Its survivability and effectiveness are predicated on being used against Cold War level adversaries."
>True, but our ground troops (some relatives and friends) love this thing because it can hang around for an extended period of time. The F-35 and helicopters cannot
To what extent do/will drones fill this role? My understanding was that flight time was an area they often excelled at.
A drone shoots off its missiles and turns into an observer. An A-10 can hang around and shoot enemies that threaten the ground troops. No drone that I'm aware of has been built to provide continuous troop protection for a long period of time.
Is the USA likely to go to war against anyone with sophisticated weaponry any time soon? It seems like we're mostly interested in wars in the third world at this point, and the A10 seems pretty well suited to that.
I know someone will have a differing opinion, but a lot of times it's not about having weaponry for the wars you will fight, but the wars that you won't fight.
It's more game theory: If you have state of the art weaponry, the competition is less likely to start a war with you.
This mentality also lead to the nuclear arms race, and today it is more about a race for automation and precision than just mass destruction.
Army families pay close attention to the deployment of A-10's for good reason. On one side, A-10's provide critical assistance against enemy tanks and armored vehicles (combat leverage). On the other, it means soldiers (family members) are being deployed for possible ground combat.
Russia, Iran, China are all countries of concern in the middle to long term.
Iran would obviously retaliate against efforts to destroy their nuclear infrastructure. Russia has stated that it will defend Russians anywhere leaving many Eastern European countries in question. China has stated quite clearly this year that it will start to assert its position as a counterweight superpower to the US.
Totally makes perfect sense. It's not a good plane to fight the hypothetical wars against adversaries that the US might never engage on the battlefield. Though it is actually hugely effective against the current enemies of the US. And for that reason it should be retired from service. Makes perfect sense.
> It's not a good plane to fight the hypothetical wars against adversaries that the US might never engage on the battlefield.
More to the point, it is taking away resources to field the planes that would be needed for that hypothetical fight against an adversary with a modern military. Worse, the inability of the U.S. military to fight and win against states with modern militaries makes war more likely, not less likely.
While the A-10 is certainly a good CAS platform against armed forces unable to oppose it with even 20-year old anti-air defenses, the U.S. does have other aircraft that can perform that role (even if not to the standard as the A-10). Between the AC-130, Army helicopter aviation, F-15, -16, -22 and -35, there's no lack of capability to put ordnance on target in support of ground troops.
The big thing those airframes are missing (except for the helos and AC-130) is loiter time and cannons that go "brrrpt", but neither of those are so critical to CAS as is popularly implied.
In other words, the USAF is arguing against maintaining a weapon system that doesn't deter conflict against states one iota, doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event), and whose most prominent capability isn't that much of a leap ahead of other platforms the USAF (and US Army) already have to maintain and field anyways.
Although it can certainly kill people, the A-10 was designed to hunt and destroy Soviet tanks, and yet you don't see too many tanks being fielded by ISIS (even with the Iraqi tanks they've captured, they don't have the logistical or maintenance capabilities needed to properly employ them).
Taking away the A10 to feed the JSF program is like deleting txt files to get hard disk space back.
>In other words, the USAF is arguing against maintaining a weapon system that doesn't deter conflict against states one iota,
None of that other garbage deterred any conflict.
>doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event),
Right, so, why mention it?
> and whose most prominent capability isn't that much of a leap ahead of other platforms the USAF (and US Army) already have to maintain and field anyways.
[x] Can draw enemy fire while wingman locates attackers.
Not a capability of any other aircraft in the stable. Thanks to another poster (tim333) we have yet another recent example of an A10 actually doing a job like that, which no other group would do. http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/4667...
I don't know where the AC130 were but the helicopters didn't want any part of it. The A10 pilots were all like "I'll go draw some fire while you look for 'em." You can't do that in a helicopter.
> Taking away the A10 to feed the JSF program is like deleting txt files to get hard disk space back.
Sure, but A-10 is one of only many txt files USAF is trying to delete so they can defragment.
> > doesn't deter conflict against extremists (who are not deterrable by the same military calculus in any event),
> Right, so, why mention it?
Because it demonstrates that A-10 provides just as much value-add in the deterrence equation (i.e., none at all) that other weapons platforms in the U.S. inventory do.
> I don't know where the AC130 were but the helicopters didn't want any part of it. The A10 pilots were all like "I'll go draw some fire while you look for 'em." You can't do that in a helicopter.
It's a pity the Army got rid of Kiowa, their pilots were precisely crazy enough to do that kind of thing, "armored bathtub" or not.
Either way, no one is saying that A-10 provides nothing at all above other platforms (my comment you replied to acknowledges as much). Rather, the argument is that the cost of maintaining A-10 and its entire associated long tail of maintenance, sustainment, training pipelines, etc., does not provide enough marginal benefit to warrant its price tag.
If our enemies don't have antiaircraft capabilities that can beat it, it's not obsolete. So long we're fighting countries that use salvaged soviet weapons, we won't have a problem. We're not going up against China any to e soon.
I have a hard time seeing that. Serious nasty hacks to retrofit new avionics systems into improbably obtuse spaces is par for the course. My wrists are totally destroyed from years of screwing and unscrewing retrofitted black boxes with a screwdriver at weird angles.
I don't know anything about the A-10 airframe, but I kinda suspect its an airframe structural issue. Your theory isn't impossible or unlikely, but got any documentation?
as an Infantry Marine, I can tell you unequivocally that when it comes to fast movers, the A10 is the only platform you really want covering your ass in a tight situation.
It is mind blowing to many of us that the USMC didn't buy up all of these things when the Air Force wanted to dump them. Yeah, yeah they can't fly off a carrier. So what. What they can do is hang in there when bullets are flying, loiter for a fairly long time and fly low and slow enough to actually see what's going on on the ground...(yeah, that 30MM gatling gun is pretty handy too..heh)
Side note: the only pilots that ever allowed us to shoot 81mm suppression over the top of the ingress routes to target when training to run CAS were the ANG A10 guys. All the active duty fast movers weren't game, and that included the MC Harrier pilots....
> Side note: the only pilots that ever allowed us to shoot 81mm suppression over the top of the ingress routes to target when training to run CAS were the ANG A10 guys. All the active duty fast movers weren't game, and that included the MC Harrier pilots....
For those of us not in the military, can you translate this for us? It sounds interesting, but I have no idea what any of it means.
The 81 is a semi-portable mortar. Three dudes can carry it although each part is pretty heavy and the ammo is not exactly helium balloons either. So you'll find it "organic" with the troops not so much 20 miles behind the lines. Anyway it's "theirs" so they tell their crew what to do rather than some arty support guy coordinating with the aircrew. Thats why the pilot coordinates with the ground troops telling them to keep firing or cease firing during the airstrike, rather than coordinating with the naval 16 inch battleship guns and the ground troops have no direct involvement in the conversation.
So a good use of a mortar is area denial, keep down and stop moving or you'll get blown up. So you find a concentration of troops and pin them down with a mortar every XYZ seconds and call in an airstrike. Mortars shoot almost straight up so they're indirect fire, you can plink away all day and the enemy can do nothing about it unless they have indirect fire capability (like their own mortar, or their own close air support, or arty support, etc). You can try suppressive fire with a machine gun, but the ammo is really heavy and its direct fire so if you can fire on them, they can fire on you, western gunfight style, so its kinda hazardous. So if you're a ground troop, and you've got an indirect fire weapon like a mortar, you will greatly enjoy using it compared to the alternatives.
Most pilots are unamused at the idea of flying thru actively firing artillery. So stop firing the mortar and hope the enemy doesn't do something bad until the airstrike arrives... Bad being anything from a massive counterattack, or charging your position, or maybe hiding from the airstrike really well. If the enemy does pretty much anything but lay there, its probably bad for the troops on the ground. On the other hand there's a 1 in a zillion chance of the aircraft getting hit by a mortar round or fragments.
The A10 guys let them just keep firing mortars while they attack unlike other pilots.
From a complimentary position, obviously a 400 knot fixed wing aircraft has less than 1/4 chance that a 100 knot helicopter has of accidentally getting hit. And its much more heavily armored than a delicate modern fighter, so taking a hit doesn't really matter as much. Its a flying tank, basically, and/or the pilots are a bit more aggressive so they are willing to take more risks.
Not entirely complimentary, as the A10 guys might also be saying that an incoming modern surface to air missile is more lethal overall than getting hit directly or indirectly off their own guy's mortars. Something like getting a 1 in a million accidental hit from a mortar is less dangerous than a 1 in a hundred hit from a modern enemy surface to air missile. So the mortar fire is stopping the enemy from preparing and firing a SAM at the incoming aircraft. Who's protecting who, exactly?
From the ground troop perspective, anytime somebody doesn't stop you from suppressive fire is a universal good, so that's why they like the A10 so much, regardless of reason.
A bit safer than you describe, "shoot 81mm suppression over the top of the ingress routes" I.e. there's a route to come in that's a 3D box, with the height typically being low for a variety of reasons (often including rules for anti-air that they can shoot anything higher), and the complete, high arc of the indirect fire 81 mm mortar is over and around that box.
Assuming, of course, the right number of propellant charges were used, something done by hand if one or more have to be removed, and it doesn't "land short" for any other reason (failure of all the propellant to burn??? Don't know if/how often that happens).
> It is mind blowing to many of us that the USMC didn't buy up all of these things when the Air Force wanted to dump them.
Any time the USAF makes noise about dumping the A10, rumors about the USMC or the Army pop back up, and the USAF soon decides they're not dumping the A10 after all.
I expect the USAF will just run the existing frames until they're gone, at which point they can tell the Army and USMC to fuck off because there's no plane left to grab and fix.
The guys in those Harriers were Marines. The guys in those F/A-18s were Marines. There are really good reasons for not allowing suppression over ingress routes with those platforms. Think about it... the BEST guys in aviation were slated for Harriers... because you just couldn't have nuggetheads flying Harriers. For a lot of really good reasons.
We don't need us against them type arguments. We need only solve problems. And problem solving requires employing different tools, with different strengths and weaknesses at different times.
it comes down to this: you should be training like you are gonna have to fight (i.e. in real world you won't always have the luxury of having suppression assets perfectly positioned.
and yes, I am blowing a little shit at my brothers in the air wing side of the house but, everything in the Marine Corps exists to support the infantry (that's why MC pilots wear cammo covers on their helmets), and frankly I was disappointed at the time they didn't have a go at it...
> you should be training like you are gonna have to fight
Maybe I misunderstood what you mean, but that sounds like a pretty stupid thing to do. When you practice advancing under direct/indirect fire, do you actually have machine guns/mortars firing towards you? I would guess that you don't (we certainly never did in the Finnish Defence Forces).
> the only pilots that ever allowed us to shoot 81mm suppression over the top of the ingress routes to target when training to run CAS were the ANG A10 guys. All the active duty fast movers weren't game, and that included the MC Harrier pilots
I can imagine this must be harrowing for the pilots. You actually shoot the 81s over their flight path?
yes, there are scenarios where you are limited by the terrain, bad guys, etc w.r.t. routes from the IP to target, and the only way to get suppression onto the necessary locations is shooting over the IP to target route.
A10 pilots are bit of a different breed and I didn't have to ask twice to get them to do it they were pretty game.
granted this was right after we got back from first gulf-war and so for those of us that had been there this was just run of the mill stuff. i don't know if things are more safety focused now, probably are...
There was, iirc, an article in the Gazette about this. Guy ran the numbers, and it worked out okay: the Corps could run X squadrons per wing, at cost Y per year, plus buy up the spare parts inventory and keep them running for Z years.
It is certainly the kind of airplane a Marine would love, and would fit the Corp's persona.
> the only pilots that ever allowed us to shoot 81mm
Well .. you know. A mortar round would bounce off an A-10. Kinda trash a Harrier.
The USS Ford can probably safely launch one. So you could do one-way Doolittle style raids. But their landing gear and the lack of an arrester hook means they're not strong enough for the controlled-crash that is a carrier landing.
No, just the opposite. Think of low speed as meaning it can fly in spite of low relative air-speed. If a plane could fly at 20 knots, say, then it could take off with 0 runway length if the carrier is steaming at 20 knots into the wind. It would just appear to hover up into the air relative to the carrier.
If you're landing on a wide range of terrain, much of it unimproved, soft, and/or uneven, large tires will float you over the soggy stuff and smooth out the lumps (large wheels experience less shock with terrain / surface variation than small ones)
The Air Force never wanted this plane in the first place. A renegade general who focused on effectivenes instead of glamorous, shiny supersonic planes pushed it through and went to the press to pressure congress to help keep it in service.
I think that post Cold War US military has very hard time developing anything.
Probably comes from the vague mission, unlimited resources (yes they are a curse sometimes), single super power winner mentality, lack of imminent treats for the us mainland, and lack of political will to do anything.
Sums up proper design. Figure out the job requirements first, the design comes naturally from that. Trying to come up with a fancy design first and then fit that to some task just ends up with a glorified CAD rendering.
In all fairness, the JSF program at least started out as a legitimate response to the plethora of different airframes and programs coming out of the different branches of the US military (as well as the UK). For years, there was a lot of complaining about the costs of each service demanding to have its own designs because it was special and the Marines couldn't possibly make do with a plane designed for the Air Force, etc. etc.
Unfortunately, the history of trying to make merged designs isn't great. Differences in missions (and, frankly, the fact that those missions have been changing in many cases) seem to lead to designs that cost too much, don't do most tasks especially well, and take too long to design and build.
And the Air Force for air superiority (F-15) and CAS (e.g. F-16 and of course A-10). Pretty much only deep interdiction for Air Force, out of a total of 5 planned roles including 2 for the Navy, survived. F-111s were also used by the SAC in a likely one way trip to deliver nukes from Pease Air Force Base in Portsmouth, New Hampshire and perhaps elsewhere (I lived near it right as the Cold War was ending).
While it developed some useful things, and pioneered variable geometry (swing) wings, it was almost entirely a debacle. Forced the Air Force to use designed for the Navy F-4s for a long time, which I'm sure they hated (and of course it was obsolescent, required two crewmen, the engines smoked (makes it much easier to spot in ACM), etc. etc.).
I wouldn't be surprised if the Air Force will be forced to use F-18 Super Hornets to replace falling apart F-15s. A nasty failure in the process of going from the design drawing to what was built in the factory resulted in all of our air superiority variants having a nasty weakness in the attachment of the cockpit to the air frame: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_F-15_Eagle#S... (living back in Missouri at that time it was pretty big news that one simply fell apart around its pilot while doing pretty much normal stuff).
Maybe better stated as developing an aircraft, or anything, has to define not only what it will do well, but what it won't do. It seems that for effective CAS, you have to be willing to say that this airplane will suck at air superiority, speed, and radar-stealthiness. You will never be able to nuke Moscow with it, and it seems that the USAF is not willing to build a plane like that.
But that isn't what was eventually designed and built, it was made into a fighter-bomber which required a much heavier airframe, sacrificing supercruise among many other things.
Given that the original concept was strictly a daytime fighter I'm not at all sure the decision was incorrect.
It's a tiny bit disingenuous to say that the per plane cost is $618 million. That figure is arrived at by dividing the total estimated lifecycle cost of the program by the number of planes currently planned for production. Your number is, in the strictest sense, true, but just saying "per plane" isn't telling the whole story.
Putting things the other way around, USAF is about 40% of U.S. military by value, so we can assume it takes about 300 billion a year to operate. A plane's life is about 30 years. It makes up 9 trillion. And there are about 6000 aircraft it in. So each consumes about 1.5 billion over its lifetime, all accounted.
Why is the difference of 'per aircraft lifecycle cost' so important then? Only plane for which it is comparable (actually greater) than USAF total spent per airframe is B-2A, which is no doubt a unique aircraft worth keeping at all cost, and providing much above average 'value'. So if F-35 will be 600 million per airframe, okay. Low combat attrition and delivery of 8 SDBs per sortie (which probably does several times more damage than B-52 did in Vietnam War, against average target) will make it a good buy anyway.
>Putting things the other way around, USAF is about 40% of U.S. military by value, so we can assume it takes about 300 billion a year to operate. A plane's life is about 30 years. It makes up 9 trillion. And there are about 6000 aircraft it in. So each consumes about 1.5 billion over its lifetime, all accounted.
Now you're ready to compare our AF to someone else's.
>Why is the difference of 'per aircraft lifecycle cost' so important then? Only plane for which it is comparable (actually greater) than USAF total spent per airframe is B-2A,
Because you can compare each platform's "efficiency" at a given mission, as you state in the last part of your post. It relies on getting in lots of wars though to get enough data to make reliable comparisons, "fortunately" we've got that part covered.
>will make it a good buy anyway.
That remains to be seen / demonstrated. The way it shakes out so far is that there is a lot of doubt as to whether the AF will be able to keep enough of them in the air, or enough pilots trained for them to do anything other than make cameo appearances. The unit cost keeps rising, the performance keeps getting revised down. This thing is going to be like the Space Shuttle (IMO), too expensive for what it does and never able to to fulfill all of its intended roles.
You know, you might say most of our national defense establishment is operating at the (in)competence level of McNamara, with not-coincidentally similar results.
With his actions at the World Bank after being sacked from the DoD I'm not sure there's a single man who caused more suffering and death than him in the 2nd half of the 20th Century.
For mass production aircraft, efficiencies should be okay. F-35 is already a mass production aircraft, with about 150 of them flying or i various stages of production, so little doubt final production run will be at least, over a thousand given any further possible cuts.
Shuttle was killed by a lack of market: if it was actually flying 50 missions a year as planned it would provide decent costs and justify most missions - but there appeared to be no market for that. USAF had a second thought on manned military space station (Keyholes and Lacrosses did the job better and cheaper - Soviet Union came to same conclusion scrapping their Almaz project), and civilian satellites became so reliable there was no need to launch many of them, or to repair them on orbit. It was never a technical failure, just overestimation of potential market size (same will happen to SpaceX reusability plans i believe).
My main point was that overall USAF expenses are pretty high, whatever aircraft are in use. So we shouldn't be scared by high per-airframe costs, if F-35 is say 40% better than some 'average' aircraft of comparable role, say F-16, that will be already okay even if F-16 'direct' costs are only 10% of F-35'th. Because indirect costs are high anyway, over a billion bucks per airframe. There is little doubt it will be at least 40% better (because of lower vulnerability and situational awareness) IMO.
>My main point was that overall USAF expenses are pretty high, whatever aircraft are in use. So we shouldn't be scared by high per-airframe costs, if F-35 is say 40% better than some 'average' aircraft of comparable role,
I see that and agree. I just don't see how the F35 is ever going to do all of the thing that its supporters want us to believe it will do.
They want to kill the ~300 A10 fleet that costs ~18000/hr to operate in exchange for about a half-dozen F35's that cost who knows what /hr in that same role. That is not a good proposition. There is no way that a half-dozen F35's can replace 300 A10's at any operating cost.
Realistic estimates and actual history put airframe and total crew losses for the Shuttle fleet at ~25 flights per vehicle as I remember, definitely no more than 35. The SSMEs needed total rebuilds before reuse, there were the obvious expendables, etc. etc.
Spending more money upfront and wisely could have changed that, but once the turkey's design was set in stone its infrequent launches and insane operating costs (especially from all the staff who had to be retained no matter what the launch rate) were baked into the cake and turned it into a public works project. Certainly not something that demonstrated much about a market, given its insane costs/lb and severe restrictions on what it could loft due to safety reasons (e.g. no lithium batteries, Centaur booster canceled post-Challenger, etc. etc.).
The only reason the A-10 is constantly threatened with retirement is politics. The USAF insists they control fixed-wing aircraft, leaving the Army to helis or depend on the AF to support. But the AF looks down their nose at ground support. If we'd get politicians with backbone to yank ground support back to the Army, this yo-yo nonsense would end.
And the reason the A-10 is still around is because it take the federal bureaucracy longer to end a program than it does to start a new war. Then they really need the A-10 because it works.
Do you think the USAF will look down on Textron's "world’s most affordable tactical jet aircraft."[1] and the concept of private companies building tactical aircraft prior to orders
From a development cost standpoint I think this is a great experiment as it will skip a lot of the external politics, project managment headaches, requirements changes and politics again. But I fear politics will shun this type of development from taking off.
Do you think the USAF will look down on Textron's "world’s most affordable tactical jet aircraft."[1] and the concept of private companies building tactical aircraft prior to orders
I think you're missing the mark with F-20 Tigershark. The development was started under one political mindset and that mindset was blown away by Reagan. It doesn't make sense to develop an export aircraft when there are existing aircraft with superior capabilities suddenly available for export.
There is a point to be made: aircraft are chosen for political reasons, not for their suitably to the mission. The A-10 is an example of an exceptionally suitable aircraft as is the B-52. This is not a reflection of good decision making, but just the outcome of random selection. If you build enough boondoogles (i.e. JSF) you eventually accidentally build a useful aircraft. These aircraft prove their utility and are kept around whereas the glass elephants are quietly retired.
For example, consider the B-58. By all measures it was an amazing aircraft that met all of its goals. But by the time it was complete, it was built for a mission that no longer existed. The aircraft literally had no role by the time it became operational.
Absolutely. It was meant to replace the B-52 but the B-52 is likely to outlive it.
I'm not really even sure how it is an improvement on the B-52 anyways. The listed payloads on Wikipedia is higher than that of the B-52, but I'm not sure I trust those numbers.
I don't think it much matters that it is supersonic. The US enjoys air superiority in all conflicts by virtue of it being the only one with planes in the air. Perhaps it is slightly less vulnerable to SAMs due to its speed advantage? The US is pretty good at neutralizing SAM installations using missiles, long before any planes get over the battlefield.
I don't see how the B-1B can fit into a modern military.
It is a morbid reality, but the market for those planes is exactly as you described it. The established warlord who has become wealthy through conquest and now wants ground-attack aircraft to reinforce his authority. It'll be popular amongst supporters as well since it is such a visible emblem of power and collateral damage will be low.
But yes, the idea of that plane going up against any modern fighter is a joke. Even the dated Mig-21 would have no problem destroying that plane using just the cannon.
I looked at the article again a bit more closely. The Scorpion does have a valid use: as an observation platform. Essentially, replacing the repurposed Pipers or Cessnas that were used in the WW II to Vietnam era for spotting ground targets.
The given reason the A-10 is retiring is very effective MANPADS are proliferating and the A-10 is too vulnerable. It doesn't seem so easy to dismiss the point to me.
Many systems people claim are great have worked well against dirt poor "insurgents" in recent foolish wars of choice. Arming against a more serious adversary is a separate question.
Manpads are a threat to all aircraft. Any good CAS means going low enough and slow enough to see what's going on. This makes any CAS vulnerable to a variety of ground attacks. The AF solution is to fly higher and faster: great for them less good for the ground troops. A better solution will probably be drones. But, again, the AF is cool on drones when everyone else loves them (including CIA). The major problem is the AF won't let the army provide it's own ficed-wing CAS, but doesn't have enthusiasm for the job.
And again, the alternative is? Not to provide CAS at all? Precision munitions from 30,000 feet?
As others have already stated, that's pretty much the job of any CAS; go get your butt shot off while trying to destroy the other guy first.
Just because MANPADS are becoming more dangerous and more ubiquitous doesn't mean that the job of CAS no longer exists, it simply means that the ongoing battle of offense versus defense continues. You adapt, you move on.
If the Air Force wants to create a new, better, A-10 (as the A-10 was a new remake of the A-1), and then retire the A-10, I don't think many people would be complaining. But the fact is, the Air Force keeps coming up with rather asinine, nonsensical, and downright lies about why they should get rid of the A-10, but yet they have nothing to replace it with.
The whole argument of "But it's a dangerous environment, it might not survive" doesn't quite fly when you're talking about fighting wars. That's what wars are, dangerous environments in which people might not survive. It doesn't mean that you still don't fight them (ignoring the fact that yes, we've certainly have made poor choices in which wars to start/fight in lately).
It's a good question. Not one that A10 drivers would like to find out the hard way. A10 / CAS aircraft need counter-measures. IIRC, the USAF's answer to this is that the F35 will do CAS from high altitude with smart-munitions.
It's funny how just from the description - "toughest, ugliest" - I knew exactly what warplane it was. As a kid thirty years ago, I probably put together five different plastic models of the A-10 Warthog.
Me too. I love the A-10 itself and the concept. I've talked to a number of people who said that when they heard the A-10s coming in, they knew help was close. That's awe-inspiring for me.
The A-10 was the first plane to come to mind when I saw the description, as well. Living in Tucson as a kid, I saw these planes flying around quite a bit.
I took a look at the B-52's Wikipedia article. Apparently, it's expected to serve until the 2040s. If the last B-52 is active until 2045, B-52s will have been around for 90 (!) years. Isn't that utterly ridiculous? Imagine if any militaries were still using bombers from 1924 in 2014.
That was the development time period. Once a military problem is solved, it often doesn't need changing for a surprising amount if time. For inatance, imagine if we were still using a gun from 1911? (.45 ACP) But a gun from three decades before that would be laughably archaic.
If we could have slapped electronic countermeasures and upgradable radars, etc on them I don't really see why we couldn't have flown the old WWII style flying fortresses today. I mean the job essentially hasn't changed since then, and even back then they would still need fighter escorts.
Well, the B-52 has in fact reverted to limited role, I gather for delivering nukes it's limited to delivering stand off missiles outside the range of SAMs etc.
The fly really high concept, going back to e.g. the WWII B-25 Superfortress, ended, and the B-1 went in the direction of low level penetration (below radar, and hard to pick up from ground clutter by fighters above it, something the B-52 tried for a while, but it wasn't designed for that), and the B-2 back to flying (fairly) high, but essentially invisible to radar (it can be detected in a general sense by certain types of radar, but not such that you can shoot it down).
We had to transition from piston engines if for no other reason than reliability and maintenance, plus, commonality and safety in fuel, etc. etc. The B-37 was our last in the strategic bomber role, also see the piston powered CAS A-1 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_A-1_Skyraider), heavily used in Vietnam, which the A-10 replaced.
It's a relic of the cold war that everyone seems to have a completely unrealistic and romanticized view of. Yes it's a heavy slow plane that was designed around a massive gun. But that gun actually isn't very effective against modern armor.
The A-10 could not penetrate the T-62 from the front, let alone the better armored T-72. For a gun kill, it would need to attack from the rear, but that would put it at significant risk to soviet anti air. The solution was to use a Maverick missile against armor.
There are now far more effective planes to lob missiles at armor. All while staying high and away from danger. The A-10 also was not designed with MANPAD's in mind, because they didn't exist then. Even if they do survive, there is down time in having to repair the platform.
In a cold war gone hot scenario, the airforce estimated that they would have lost all of their A-10's within 2 weeks of conflict.
For the CAS mission an Apache would be just as good. 16 Hellfire missiles along with strafing with a 30mm chain gun throws a hell of a punch, all while being slow enough to accompany ground troops.
Except that Apaches are fragile, while the A-10 can take a huge beating and stay in the air.
Anything which claims to be CAS but can't take some hits without falling out of the sky isn't terribly useful.
The reason Apaches are used is that they're not fixed wing, which means the Air Force isn't demanding to own them, meaning that they can get pilots and commanding officers who do more than pay lip service to the idea of CAS.
The A-10 also was not designed with MANPAD's in mind, because they didn't exist then.
Nonsense on stilts.
US production of Redeyes was ended, at about 85,000 total produced, a year before the detailed specifications of the A-10 were finished. The Soviet equivalent went into service a couple years before the latter.
As for penetrating MBT frontal armor, I was always under the impression that top hits were the objective if trying to destroy one without using a missile, which the A-10 can carry a lot of. Airplanes do have the advantage of being above land vehicles after all.
> For the CAS mission an Apache would be just as good. 16 Hellfire missiles along with strafing with a 30mm chain gun
The A10 has triple the hardpoints (11 to 4) and 10 times the payload (7200kg to 770) of the Apache… So it's just as good if you have 4 or 5 times as many systems in flight.
But that gun actually isn't very effective against modern armor.
How much 'modern armor' has the US come up against in practice in the last two decades? If you want to kill tanks, it's not like there isn't something else in the US military catalogue to use.
Well, we've had to bust a lot of T-72s in both Iraq wars.
The M1A1 and later version's 120 mm canon's "Silver Bullet" amd later version sabot rounds turned out to be good enough to go through a sand berm and then penetrate T-72's frontal armor, negating a standard desert warfare technique.
Getting back to the A-10, we expended 5,000 Maverick missiles in the first Iraq war, and nearly 1,000 in the second, mostly employed by F-16s and A-10s in the first (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-65_Maverick#Deployment).
Which brings up an interesting hack used in the first Iraq war: the Mavericks used at the time fed a 15 degree wide image to a screen in the A-10 cockpit. While officially a daytime plane, they found that by the expedient of mounting on and just using it for imagining, they could do all sorts of nighttime missions that e.g. F-16 declined to take. All this per a book on there deployment during the war, I'm pretty sure it's this one: http://www.amazon.com/Warthog-Flying-10-Gulf-War/dp/00288102...
What does penetration of armor matter? The only relevant aspect of anti-tank warfare nowadays is mobility kills. Strafe the vehicle from the side, destroy its tracks and its just a big obstacle to the enemy now.
There was an incident in which a mobility kill was scored against an M1. Crew was unharmed and was able to retreat thanks to the other tank covering it. The tank was ordered abandoned and destroyed. The problem was, even firing at it from the other M1 they weren't able to destroy it.
Interesting to see the service rivalries in this thread. My dad was Air Force and he likes this plane.
It is an interesting challenge arming up for war. I recall watching nearly every episode of Wings (which was a Discovery channel show that each episode focused on a single plane) and was really impressed at how people thought about things. The show on the A-10 is on youtube in 5 parts (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sM2KbwPMU18) and its worth a watch.
My Air Force dad liked it, too. He also liked the P-47 Thunderbolt, another ugly CAS airplane that could take a lot of damage and still get the pilot back home.
The idea that the B1B will replace the A10 is crazy enough that is hard to know what to say about it. (Except that I'm sure the air force is saying that if it helps them get what they want)
Am I the only person who thinks it does not look that bad?
It has that special elegance that comes from being pure function - it's, after all, a cannon with wings - where no line is afforded if there is not an excellent reason for it to be there.
It's loaded weight is around 1/10 that of the A-10, they aren't at all comparable aircraft. The derided elsewhere in this discussion Scorpion sounds like it's maybe 5 times the plane the ARES is, and these things don't scale linearly in terms of effectiveness.
>> It's loaded weight is around 1/10 that of the A-10, they aren't at all comparable aircraft.
If the primary mission is to carry the big gun, then they serve the same purpose. I would bet ARES could have benefited from being a bit larger with better armor, but the price tag was around $1M if I recall correctly, and the small size and composite construction may have given it a smaller radar cross section as well. Part of the weight savings is in the non-hydraulic control surfaces. It's nice that the A-10 could revert to manual control when both hydraulic systems failed, but that raises the question "why have them at all?". Simplicity is has been a major part of designs from Scaled Composites.
I live in Tucson, and my house is on approach for Davis Monthan Air Force base. I enjoy being in my backyard watching an air show everyday. The A-10 is quite well liked in Tucson, many people here call it "an all terrain deer rifle" or a set of wings strapped to a big gun. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAU-8_Avenger#mediaviewer/File:...
I doubt it will go away any time soon. D-M is one of Tucson's biggest employers, and Senator McCain will want that to keep existing. Also, people in the military who serve on the ground seem to universally love it. It seems like everyone has an A-10 story. As for the replace it with an F-16 argument, I would think the most likely replacement would be a drone version of the big gun with wings. McCain would get behind that, since a lot of drone work is done 60 miles down the road at Ft Huachuca in Sierra Vista AZ.
A-10 stories are always amazing and fun
to read. But there is another side
that maybe should be mentioned:
Supposedly the argument against the A-10 is
that (1) the most important weapon the A-10
has is no longer that amazing gun but one or more of
just various missiles and (2)
can use an F-16, maybe an F-15, likely
an F-18, in time the F-35
to fire such missiles but do it at higher
speeds and altitudes where the plane is
not so vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire
from the ground.
Or, it's great that the A-10 can take so
much punishment, but a claim is that it would
be better still to fly higher and faster
and get nearly no punishment at all.
I'm sure the astounding advantages of the A-10 are
well understood. So, if some people want
to put the A-10 out to pasture, maybe
there is a reason.
I'm just repeating the story I heard and
am no expert.
But, to argue for the A-10 again, to destroy
an ISIS truck with a 50 caliber machine gun
in the back, want to use a ~$1 million missile
or a few shots from that amazing A-10 gun?
It's pretty funny that the military would replace this function partially with B-1B's as a cost savings measure. IIRC, B-1's were notorious for having a 50:1 hours in hanger/hours in air ratio.
We seem to be in age of small unit combat against various guerilla-style organizations. They should start building A-10 like aircraft again.
No military experience myself but this is sounding similar to the way the harrier jump jets were taken out of service in the UK. High and increasing maintenance costs, effective in certain roles, no obvious replacement.
The RAF Harriers were taken out of service in 2010 as part of a gigantic axe-swinging defense review with across-the-board cuts that sliced to the bone -- the Navy lost its carriers (the new ones won't be fully in service for a while yet), the RAF lost its entire anti-submarine warfare capability (the Nimrod MRa.4 upgrade program was shitcanned at the same time), the entire Tornado F.3 force (even though the Typhoon-II was only just marginally operational) and nearly the Tornado GR4 bombers (they have survived -- for now -- largely due to IS). The army just lost most of its main battle tanks -- they got off lightly!
The RAF brass didn't "hate" on the Harriers -- they were just under pressure to take their part of huge defense cuts.
I could be mistaken, but I don't think the Harrier was ever hated by by the RAF or the RN, whereas the A10 certainly wasn't liked (or desired) by the USAF, and they've been looking for a way to dump it without the Army or USMC operating them pretty much since they got the frame.
What the USAF and RAF have in common is a very clear idea of who their real enemy is: the Army and Navy. They would gladly sacrifice all war fighting capability, if it meant burning the other two services in the process. Hence the Eurofighter, and now the F35. I refuse to call it the Lightning; the original Lightning was a proper weapon.
If you had wasted as much money on strategic bombers as the air force has and still had to look the public in the eye, your ideas would be a little warped too. As nutty as this is, it's not as nutty as the way we've used the B2.
They'll be writing this story in 2030, 2040, etc. The A-10 is a good plane and it's not going anywhere. Versions of this story pop up every couple of years going back decades. A-10 is the plane that won't die (After the B-52, that is)
Close Air Support -- CAS -- is one of those interesting things that you rarely read or think about when you think of air power, but is absolutely critical to mission success in anything that looks like conventional warfare.
Someone already linked John Boyd below in the comments. He's worth reading much more about --
He's often credited with his later-life grand strategy, but his Aerial Attack Study in the early 1960's is actually more impressive to me. He developed a working mathematical model of how fighters (and other aircraft) can gain or lose speed, velocity, turning, etc at different speeds/altitudes/etc based on their specs.
A lot of "sexy-looking" fighters performed pretty poorly, and the Air Force command were aghast at many aspects of the study.
At the time, the "state of the art" was building multi-purpose aircraft that could do reconnaissance, establish air superiority (dogfighting), bomb enemy targets, etc. But these multi-purpose aircraft didn't excel on any parameter: they weren't large enough to carry the fuel and payload to be exceptional bombers, and they weren't fast and light enough to out-dogfight the leading Soviet aircraft.
The book on Boyd I linked talks about the back-and-forth nature of defense contracting and the armed forces in that era, which was a problem. Likewise, it describes the various jockeying for power and budget between the various branches of the armed services: Navy, Air Force, and Army all had aircraft and certain missions assigned to them, and fought to preserve and expand their territory.
Close Air Support (CAS) is a mission the Air Force was never so crazy about and was somewhat de-prioritizing compared to air superiority and strategic bombing missions... yet, at the same time, they didn't want to lose the mission to the Army for political reasons.
Meanwhile, Boyd and the people he worked with, notably aircraft designer Pierre Sprey who led the A-10's build -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Sprey -- they didn't see their roles as just related to being a technician or soldier, but were very deep historians and scientists.
They noted that a lot of Nazi Germany's early success was the mix of maneuver warfare mixed with close-air support from Stuka Bombers. The Nazi advantage was erased when the Western Allies eventually achieved air superiority, but Luftwaffe CAS was absolutely devastating in the early stages of WWII.
Sprey, Boyd, and the rest built around the theory of CAS and seeing the potential of it for turning a ground war, and then sat to work out an aircraft that was about as un-sexy as it gets, but was incredibly safe for the pilot, could stay involved in the battle for a very long time, and could have devastating impact on enemy ground forces.
The A-10 thus isn't flashy, can't do multi-mission roles (at the time, it was the only pure CAS airplane in the U.S. armed forces; it only did close air support and nothing else), it's not particularly fast, it doesn't look good at an air show, it's not particularly prestigious.
It is, however, devastatingly effective as a tank killer, artillery killer, convoy killer. Rather effective against infantry too.
The lessons from Boyd, aircraft design, etc, are probably worth reading for anyone who deals with technology or organizational development, since they seem timeless -- eventually prestige and politics come to dominate true mission, and how do you navigate around that?
The book "Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the World" is worth reading; so are the remnants of various briefings Boyd and colleagues gave with commentary. A useful insight into lots of things, not the least of them how to actually get things done with ingenuity and how to really be service-oriented in a world that often doesn't reward that. Marvelous book, amazing men, great stories, lots of lessons. Highly highly recommended.
I saw an A-10 at an air show around 1990. I looked pretty impressive to me. The thing could almost fly sidewise while the pilot pivoted with the nose obviously tracking a fixed point a few hundred yards out. Scary stuff if you knew what you were looking at. No gun at the show, of course, but easy to visualize what was happening: approach the target slightly off to the side, then start a spin while strafing with the gun. From the ground target's POV, you are moving past faster than most cars on a freeway, while the pilot has the target locked into view during the spin for about 2 seconds, then breaks away again at about 200 knots.
Agreed; the one I saw flying at an airshow impressed the crowd. Relatively quiet, very aggressive and precise in pointing itself, and we could look at the one on static display to see just how impressive its cannon is.
This was a great book about highly inspirational men. I have the letters OODA on my white board as a reminder of his strategies. I also note that several of his Acolytes still write a number of editorials in attempts to curb gross errors in defense planning.
Just an fyi, Pierre Sprey is a bit of a controversial figure. He has argued that the army should abandon the M1 Abrams and go with M48's. Both war's in Iraq should have unequivocally shown that numeric superiority can be defeated by a more technologically advanced foe.
Not helping matters is the fact that the Lightning II (or as I like to call it, the Littoral Combat Ship of the Air) is at least as ugly in functionality as the Warthog is in looks.
I suspect that troops on the ground don't get a say in this.
Edit: I suspect that US troops on the ground don't get a say in this. In other words, it doesn't further some politician's (or politically motivated general's) agenda to champion this plane over something less effective.
A larger issue here is the very idea of different armed services. If you were designing a military today, would you have Army and Marines? I don't see how it makes sense.
Let's fast-forward a few decades. If we have combat robots (not that I'm advocating this, but I think that's where we'll end up) then brain-wise one soldier can know everything that another can. I.e. there's no need for different MOS. You can have one brain that is both a special-operations infantry assaulter, and knows how to service any aircraft in your arsenal. The real differentiator would be morphology of the units.
So, if every unit could conceivably be trained in all tactics and doctrine, what's the point of services vs. just specialities?
Division of labor, and producing specialized units.
Marines are traditionally a power force to be employed from the sea (amphibious) while the army is mostly land-based operations. Do they both see armed combat? Yes, but they are specialized for different scenarios.
If we had a robot armed force, would it be better to have a single, mass-produced ubiquitous unit? Probably not. There you would probably want robots designed and specialized for each of their combat scenarios.
It was basically designed to “take apart a Soviet tank,” says Jeffery S. Underwood, a historian at the United States Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.
Just in case the collapse of the rouble, precipitous drops in oil prices (traded in dollars printed somewhere else), problems in Ukraine, the technical inability to extract vast hydrocarbons found in the Arctic, and a list of other issues, have a negative impact on Russian decision making.
Should better read: Americas "most effective" Warplane is Going Back into Battle.
As much I know, this plane is the most effective plane against ground targets. Some targets just can't be hit effectively from great heights and this plane also stays much longer in the area as other planes can. It might be the best compromise between a helicopter and a plane.
Also it is very cost effective in comparison to some of the more modern planes.
Glad to see the A10s going. I'm involved with helping raising money for the refugees in Iraq and it seemed a shame that tens of thousands of people had to flee their homes when a few A10s shooting at ISISs vehicles could have prevented much of that.
I think you misread the article and posted a garbage comment.
The article, while perhaps garbage, is "A-10 is best, despite efforts by others to end it". Point by point the author's narrative is clear:
"But it is heavily armored and wickedly armed, making it a ruthlessly effective weapon. And that is why, despite ongoing efforts by Defense Department brass to kill it, the Warthog is headed back into battle to help in the fight against ISIS."
"That makes the A-10 something of a zombie—it refuses to die. The Air Force wants to scuttle the 238 A-10s"
"The A-10, little more than a flying tank, is perfectly suited to the task and beloved by pilots and troops alike."
"The A-10 can take a ton of abuse, and continue flying if it’s lost an engine, a tail or even half of a wing."
and so on... The article is about the A-10 versus the Air Force brass, a continuation of the "Whiz Kids" versus the tried and true. The narrative is not "America is best".
The whole article including your quotes praise this weapon made by US which was designed to "take apart a Soviet tank". It is “the ugliest, most beautiful aircraft on the planet.”
It's like an ad for the army or something. America's toughest airplane, a flying zombie tank, is resurrected to destroy the evil ISIS. War is so cool.
The article was a discussion of the back and forth between steak and sizzle in military procurement. Seems a bit hyperbolic to interpret it as part of a heinous, jingoistic propaganda campaign.
What do you consider wrong? It should be wrong to glorify killing people. This is what the article does, doesn't it? It's basically an enumeration of things that make this war plane awesome, written in a North Korea propaganda style. Come on, it even ends with a threat...
I don't want to see my neighbor's kids coming home in a box with a flag on it.
Sure, the elite starting these wars for profit are bastards.
But, let's protect the people we ask to protect us. Sometimes, other people do start the fights, and we still need a military unless we want to be run (eventually) by somebody else with a better military.
Work to change who is picking our fights for us, but don't begrudge the people doing the fighting some help.
While the airframe still makes for a great weapons platform, the sensor suites, avionics, and countermeasures are obsolete, and not in a good way. They've been doing a lot of nasty hacks to allow it to support modern weapon systems and electronics but there are a growing number of important capabilities that simply cannot be "backported" to that airframe.
This has been increasing its vulnerability to more advanced threats and reducing its ability to deploy more advanced weapons over time. Its shelf-life has been extended by virtue of it being used in practice against adversaries with unsophisticated weaponry. This makes it immediately useful in practice but the military is well-aware that it would not be nearly as successful against a more sophisticated adversary and this is why they have been angling for an alternative.
It is a relic of the Cold War not just in its history but, unfortunately, also in its defenses and weaponry with no obvious upgrade path. Its survivability and effectiveness are predicated on being used against Cold War level adversaries. To replace it with something that could support the capabilities they desire, they would need to design a completely new airframe.