This resonated with me way too much, which is kind of scary. My startup hasn't failed yet, as I haven't launched yet, but I truly understand the technical mindset issue.
I've been getting better at this as I have started to focus more on the marketing/business aspect of things. As much as I have learned in the past couple of months, with regards to the business side of things, I can't seem to shake the mentality of "it's just not good enough yet".
I may have a point though, as I will be competing against in house solutions, so I really have to come at them with a compelling reason to use my solution.
I guess the good news is in the next couple of months, I'll have the opportunity to be more formally educated on the business side of things.
It will save your startup. And no, I don't get a dime from your click but yes, I am going to buy 10 copies right now so I can have 3 in my bag to sell at cost to anyone that asks, wherever I go.
He outlines a simple methodology for you to get out there, early, as soon as you start development on your first product concept, and get validation from the marketplace. The fact is: almost every startup makes bad assumptions about what their customers want, or who the customer for their product is. Steve's methodology takes it for granted that you are probably wrong about things, and incorporates customer feedback into your product development from day one.
Most of the existing product development literature fails to address the fact that most startups fail because they build something their customers don't want to buy.
So far, i only read about 35% of the content. I think what makes it unique is the language that it used is quite casual and it gives a lot of example per cases. It emphasized a lot about validating your assumptions. All in all, i highly recommended it too.
I highly recommend it too. The advice and method concrete enough but not too specific. It tells you a bit what to do, why and how. Since it's iterate process its gets better by time and goes well with agile development.
At first your goal is to define your assumptions, test them with potential customers and gather facts. Next integrate the facts into your product development. Continue verifying your product and business with customers, start your sales and go-to-market activities. Last, if you're successful, scale your company.
There may not be any specific reason for a startup failure. It is quite normal that only a small percentage of startups find a unique spot on the 'fitness landscape' that would allow them to grow and prosper. The rest may be just as well equipped and funded as the lucky ones, but still they will perish. Randomness among reasons for success dwarfs most of other factors.
The rational strategy is not to try to discover some 'success recipe' (there is none), but to do a lot of tinkering, be prepared for many false starts, and make sure that the unavoidable failures will not kill you as an entrepreneur.
The number of people who come out of the woodwork to say that they invented delicious before delicious is ridiculous.
He says "essentially the same" and then indicates it was actually a great deal more complicated.
The hard part is not deciding what to do. It's deciding what NOT to do.
I can't seem to find any image or screenshots of the actual site (it appears to have been prodata.de) so I can decide if "no product clue" should be added to the list.
Indeed! Many, many failed startups have hidden within them a much smaller and more simple idea that could have succeeded, if they'd had the insight and guts to strip away the excess.
Another example is that the earlier generations of bookmarking sites (which included Backflip and HotLinks among others) overlooked the massive-potential of delicious-style tagging and public link-sharing-flows. They were hung up in, among other things, a model of categories/folders/outlines, and explicitly-created interest groups.
The sixth point may or may not be true, but surely plenty of software companies in the last 10 years have started on the VC model of spending a ton of money on upfront development and then reaping the economies of scale afterwards. He doesn't mention anything in his specific situation that would lead us to believe that model couldn't possibly have worked. It sounds like his consulting idea would have been a valid risk mitigation strategy, but ideally in software you always want to get to the point where you are selling zero marginal cost bits, rather than only charging customers for person-hours.
My somewhat limited experience with selling to enterprises leads me to this conclusion:
Sell either to the people at the very top for a high price, or sell to the actual users inside the enterprise for a price (and using a deployment model) they don't need approval for.
I agree completely with ghshepard. Presuming it's not some sort of consumer play, if one of the founders is not good at sales, you'd sure as hell better (1) learn to sell and/or (2) bring in sales talent. Preferably #1 before #2. The absolute worst mistake you can make is focusing on a fancy technology without bringing in dollars.
Look at the way a typical company runs. They spend huge sums of money on third-rate products, many of which have a superior alternative available. Why didn't they buy the better product? Why do vendors with clearly inferior products get the sales dollars that a vendor with a better product doesn't? It's because the vendor with a good sales team gets the product to the customer, and the fact is that a mind-blowing offering will not get bought unless there's some guy getting that customer to buy that product. If you can combine a fantastic product with a great sales team, watch out. But if you've got a great product but aren't selling early, don't look for a technical solution out of a business problem.
I thought the need for sales (and therefore, a salesperson) was the most important element of the post. If you don't have revenue, you go out of business. Period.
The salesperson might be the CEO, the VP of Marketing, or even an outgoing CTO - but each and every day, someone needs to be chasing down a source of revenue, talking to customers, and figuring out how, one day, the company is actually going to make revenue - and feed that information back into whoever your "product manager" is.
If you wait for year two or three, after you've built a great technology, it may be too late to discover that your customer doesn't want to buy what you've been building.
I, for one, do not start a company these days without a sales person onboard, and it better be a great one. Sale of product rarely happens by itself, you need someone who is passionate about getting those deals set up.
The hard part is finding a sales person who also truly believes in your product and gels with the team. I have worked with some awful sales people, who even when they sell can be terrible for your company (often selling the wrong thing). The first sales person in your organisation, I believe, should not be paid commission, but be paid just like the rest of the founders and have a long term interest in the company.
Most startups fail because they fail to connect with a market for their product. If you don't need salespeople to connect with your market - good for you!
Lots of money gets thrown at projects that are doomed to fail. They give the industry a bad name.
They are a typical example of the pendulum in action, it never stops in the middle, it always swings through to one side or the other. Either everybody and their dog seems to be able to get funding or nobody. There is never a long time when investors seem to have a cool head and a steady hand.
I've been getting better at this as I have started to focus more on the marketing/business aspect of things. As much as I have learned in the past couple of months, with regards to the business side of things, I can't seem to shake the mentality of "it's just not good enough yet".
I may have a point though, as I will be competing against in house solutions, so I really have to come at them with a compelling reason to use my solution.
I guess the good news is in the next couple of months, I'll have the opportunity to be more formally educated on the business side of things.