It's entirely possible it's an inaccurate account of events. I haven't read all of the primary documents, just secondary sources.
In your linked documents,Exhibit 1 is the original June 10th order. Attachment A of it(page 4 of the PDF) details what he was order to hand over. It does not mention SSL keys at all. Instead it asks for a bunch of meta-data. In fact, it explicitly doesn't even cover communication contents. It also doesn't specify how Lavabit has to execute the order, just that it must provide the data.
This was the order Lavabit apparently initially refused.
Can you point to the first point they demanded the SSL keys? The stuff on page 100 looks like it pertains to the July 16th order. Which is, again, considerably after the June 10th order that originally asked for the data and after Lavabit refused that order. Also, totally inline with narrative of events as I presented it.
Regardin pen-registers: a pen-register can be done in software and is typically done by the service provider, not the government. The term is an anacranism dating back to telgraphs. It doesn't necessarly mean government hardware or software[0]. Hence the discussion page 99 of the pdf about "implementing the pen-trap device" in section d. So that's not blanket access
The June 10th order is on page 2, and seems to be only for the Target's account details (not metadata on messages, AFAICT.) Page 19 (and again on 97) says "Mr. Levison provided very little of the information sought by
the June 10,2013 order." This sounds like he did not refuse it, and may have actually not had much data to turn over since part of his business niche was to not collect that kind of stuff. (Page 98 says "Levison claimed 'we don't record this data'" although in context "this data" appears to be non-content message data, which would not apply to the June 10th order.)
The June 28th order ("pen register/trap and trace order", page 7) is the one he started refusing, then tried to negotiate on later. I think the order "that Lavabit shall furnish agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, forthwith, all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and use of the pen/trap device" includes keys implicitly. The June 28th Order Compelling Compliance Forthwith (to the earlier order on the same day) notes, "To the extent any information, facilities, or technical assistance are under the control of Lavabit are needed to provide the FBI with the unencrypted data, Lavabit shall provide such information, facilities, or technical assistance forthwith."
The first explicit order referring to keys seems to be the July 16th search warrant, specifically Attachment B on page 36. According to page 98, FBI agents discussed encryption keys with Levison as early as June 28th.
In your linked documents,Exhibit 1 is the original June 10th order. Attachment A of it(page 4 of the PDF) details what he was order to hand over. It does not mention SSL keys at all. Instead it asks for a bunch of meta-data. In fact, it explicitly doesn't even cover communication contents. It also doesn't specify how Lavabit has to execute the order, just that it must provide the data.
This was the order Lavabit apparently initially refused.
Can you point to the first point they demanded the SSL keys? The stuff on page 100 looks like it pertains to the July 16th order. Which is, again, considerably after the June 10th order that originally asked for the data and after Lavabit refused that order. Also, totally inline with narrative of events as I presented it.
Regardin pen-registers: a pen-register can be done in software and is typically done by the service provider, not the government. The term is an anacranism dating back to telgraphs. It doesn't necessarly mean government hardware or software[0]. Hence the discussion page 99 of the pdf about "implementing the pen-trap device" in section d. So that's not blanket access
[0]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pen_register