The limits were to sunset starting from 2026 and end by 2031. The deal was to end with Iran being allowed to enrich as much as they wanted to, just a step away from a bomb.
The point was to build trust that Iran would not continue to pursue nuclear weapons. The trust would be built through the multi-year partnership.
The position you're taking only really works if you start from "Iran will always work towards having a nuclear bomb, no matter what." And yeah, if that's your starting place, you've figured out where that path ends up. You're never going to be satisfied with anything Iran says because your fundamental premise is that they can't be trusted to not pursue a nuclear bomb.
By walking away from the deal, we gave Iran a clear message: "you might as well pursue a bomb because we are always going to act like you are, no matter what you actually do."
>The position you're taking only really works if you start from "Iran will always work towards having a nuclear bomb, no matter what."
No, it's a position that assumes some people there have an interest in a nuclear bomb, and some suspicion is warranted - which means a safe deal needed to have them some distance away from a bomb.
After all, if they just wanted nuclear power, they could have trivially had it without all this fuss. It was always so much cheaper to buy LEU than endure all these sanctions.
> The position you're taking only really works if you start from "Iran will always work towards having a nuclear bomb, no matter what."
Understanding that Iran is religiously opposed to the creation of nuclear weapons with only the caveat that the fatwa declaring the development, acquisition, and use of nuclear weapons against Islamic law may be rescinded in the event of an existential threat to the republic, it naturally follows that people hold that belief because they intend to present an existential threat to Iran.
There's no evidence the fatwa even exists (aside from statements by self-interested parties), much less any details of its contents and any exception it may have. At any point they could point to an exception in subsection 4) c) and do whatever they want. Because the fatwa isn't published, they can add whatever exception they want later. If it really exists and is really meaningful, they would have publicized it in advance and so been bound by it.
I believe the right to "do whatever they want" is one generally valued by sovereign entities. The ability to "do whatever they want" is probably not really a good reason to bomb them. It does sound like a good reason to not capriciously discard the JCPOA, which is an agreement they adhered to restricting their enrichment of uranium that was discarded to no positive end by Donald Trump, the man who is illegally starting another US war of choice as we speak.
Would we have bombed them if they'd secretly been violating the JCPOA and developed nuclear weapons in 2017? It's worked for literally everyone else who's tried it and it is hard to empathize with a perspective in which the United States has true moral authority over a country that we destabilized and have continuously demonized.
Then it is very obviously a moral imperative for the leadership of Iran to have the ability to rapidly develop a nuclear weapon in order to protect its sovereignty, a concept you deny Iran, and its many people.
Enrichment to levels suitable for domestic nuclear power (the goal, and follow on decoupling from Russia as the supplier and extractor of fuel for existing Iran nuclear power station) is a magnitude and more less time and effort than enrichment to levels suitable for weapons.
Isotope separation by centrifuge as a physical process follows the laws of diminishing returns, getting rid of all the uranium variations save the rare target weight takes more and more time as percent purity increases.
"Just a step away" was more a hard bridge to cross back when third party inspectors were at the enrichment centres and leaving locked and logged "long soak" spectrometer instruments behind. It's hard to enrich to greater levels without leaving a ratio fingerprint behind in the gamma spectrum.
"The revelation that Iran had built major nuclear facilities in secret, without required disclosure to the IAEA, ignited an international crisis and raised questions about the program's true aim."
That's a tad Descartes before the hordes .. the response that situation in 2002 was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015 which had plenty of carrots, sticks, and ability to peer into dark places .. but not real support from Isreal or the US who scuppered the plan under Trump.
You are aware the deal was entirely dependent on Russia, and the follow-on Biden wanted to sign (but couldn't since Iran wouldn't fully cooperate with IAEA) involved Russia even more heavily? There's no other place that both sides accept can store the enriched Uranium or supply fuel rods to Iran.
>Isotope separation by centrifuge as a physical process follows the laws of diminishing returns
It's the other way around. Going from 3 to 20 percent is much harder than 20 to 60 which is harder than 60 to 90. Going to 99.9999% would be tough, but is unnecessary even for nukes.
>"Just a step away" was more a hard bridge to cross back when third party inspectors were at the enrichment centres
They were allowed to enrich to that level under the deal starting in 2031, inspections would have tested if the enriched material was diverted.
Even if they could be effective at such short notice, it would have taken the US being distracted by some other crisis and being unable to act in the short period between detection and weaponization to lead to a nuke.
https://www.statista.com/chart/23528/irans-stockpile-of--low...