The tone of the introduction is a bit preachy and the findings as stated are underwhelming and beyond obvious [1].
But when reading this type of papers -- and academic literature in general -- don't consider the application and research questions that were chosen by an academic and/or young graduate student with minimal resources. Look at the actual innovation. In this case, the methods. Then ask what else you can do with the increment of innovation.
It is now possible to methodologically analyze rhetorical patterns in open source communications on a shoestring budget. Because producers are also consumers, you can begin to understand at a very granular level which sequences of words elicit the desired effect in subsets of a population, and how. Work like this used to be laborious, expensive, and required a huge amount of socio-cultural training/expertise/judgement. By comparison, all of the technical work described in the paper has a relatively low barrier to entry.
Also: the obvious next step is to treat this as an optimization problem instead of a categorization problem.
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[1] "othering intensifies during crises" is framed as a finding in this paper, but that's like using nukes to fish for trout. It's a fact we already know and have known for thousands of years. Therefore, the fact that the method reached this conclusion is best understood as validating a proposed method for automating intelligence collection and analysis in the context of open source war propaganda.
Yeah, I agree, this is a cool demonstration of growing capabilities in quantitative social sciences, probably soon leading to analyses that have been imagined for a long time but not (easily) possible until recently.
It'll take time to understand and integrate, but I imagine it should make theory that used to depend on small numbers of examples (glued together with rhetoric and charisma) richer and more sophisticated. Exciting.
Fast forward 20 years and we have propaganda machines that have been optimized on a nearly individual level, available to the highest bidder (or, more likely, available only to the people who happen to control the attention platforms at that particular point in history).
But, I suppose it's probably accurate to say that, within the walls of the academy at least, the potential for research on nuclear technology was exciting in the 1930s-1940s.
Fast forward 20 years and we have propaganda machines that have been optimized on a nearly individual level
And now I have to ask: what are the beneficial applications of this research? My gut reaction is to unplug, to go offline, to seek out in-person communication and to shun online media.
But I have watched all this play out gradually over time. What about the younger generations growing up now? Will they be more vulnerable to the ever-increasing sophistication of these techniques? Or will they somehow develop a resistance to them?
Again, my gut instinct here is towards pessimism. I work with young people as a volunteer tutor. Many of them seem to keep shutting down due to the overwhelming burden of information thrown at them. At the same time, their attention is sucked away by media which draws them into a frenetic loop of scrolling behaviour, like a mouse on a treadwheel. It's extremely disturbing to watch.
> Keep in mind this is rank speculation 20 years into the future.
It's a bit amusing that the comment right next to yours (albiet a cousin not a sibling) is insisting that what I'm describing is already happening.
The (naive) weaponization of this tech is already underway. What's more, the tools and methods to turn the categorization work in this paper into a goal-oriented optimization procedure already exist -- see for example the Diplomacy work from Meta; again, focus on methods, not the application.
The tech is here today, the barrier to use is low, and the incentive structure to weaponize exists.
What will take 10-20 years is the trickling of that impact into social processes and then the retrospective reflection of what happened.
Note, for example, that Facebook was founded in 2004, but it took 10-15 years for the impact on social processes to reach a point of significant material impact on global society and politics.
> If this were 2004 OP would have you convinced 90% of your day would be spent culling spam from your inbox.
It's not about the amount of time spent; it's about what happens in the time that is spent.
Spam, and online attention markets more generally, is an incredible apt analogy.
Even for the most strict definition of "spam", the market for prevention is pretty huge. Anti-email-spam tech alone accounts for ~$5B/yr in spend with a 21% CAGR. Going all-in on anti-spam tech in 2004 and capturing even of sliver of the market would make you very wealthy today.
If you include spam-like content on social media platforms, that number certainly more than doubles. On headcount alone, Meta told Congress that they have 40K employees directly working on trust and safety, and TikTok says they have about the same number. That's just headcount, and at just two companies.
Beyond that, the following question will prove only more prescient as time goes on: where does "spam" stop and "algorithmically curated content designed to part consumers from their dollar" start? Even today, the average person in places like the US will spend ~2.5 hours consuming algorithmically curated feeds on social media (in service to online advertising revenue). And many aspects of non-social media now have some aspect of quantitative optimization as well.
Contrary to your take here, with the benefit of hindsight, I think the "Eternal September" doomers of the early naughts significantly under-estimated the impact of information technology on how people spend their time and how society spends its resources. (And, anyways, your strawman is a bit too hyperolic -- no one was seriously arguing that 90% of anyone's day would be spend culling spam from their inbox, least of all me...)
It's reality. Russians started to use something like that few days ago. Messages from Russian bots are hard to distinguish from real people, while real people are shadowbanned by FB/YT. It's still relatively easy to see them (few dozens of new characters appears and start to sing almost in unison: stop the war, retreat early, leave occupied land to Russia, massive losses, etc.), but it's harder to catch them individually.
In Ukraine, to fight with fake accounts, government designed BankID[1][2] system, based on experience of few other countries, such as Canada. In this system, user authenticity is confirmed by a bank. It would be nice to integrate BankID with FB/YT/etc., then display country of the bank.
The tone of the introduction is a bit preachy and the findings as stated are underwhelming and beyond obvious [1].
But when reading this type of papers -- and academic literature in general -- don't consider the application and research questions that were chosen by an academic and/or young graduate student with minimal resources. Look at the actual innovation. In this case, the methods. Then ask what else you can do with the increment of innovation.
It is now possible to methodologically analyze rhetorical patterns in open source communications on a shoestring budget. Because producers are also consumers, you can begin to understand at a very granular level which sequences of words elicit the desired effect in subsets of a population, and how. Work like this used to be laborious, expensive, and required a huge amount of socio-cultural training/expertise/judgement. By comparison, all of the technical work described in the paper has a relatively low barrier to entry.
Also: the obvious next step is to treat this as an optimization problem instead of a categorization problem.
--
[1] "othering intensifies during crises" is framed as a finding in this paper, but that's like using nukes to fish for trout. It's a fact we already know and have known for thousands of years. Therefore, the fact that the method reached this conclusion is best understood as validating a proposed method for automating intelligence collection and analysis in the context of open source war propaganda.