> I would imagine the desire to unify GR and QM is because if we expect the universe to operate on a set of rules, they should by unified.
That is one key principle that drives the effort, yes. However, that doesn't mean things will always work out that way. Freeman Dyson, for one, published at least one paper making arguments for why gravity didn't need to be quantized.
> the forces and factors that work on the smallest particle should be the same forces that work on the largest of galaxies.
If you mean fundamental forces, then this is true (that's the definition of "fundamental"), but it also means that you have to adopt many levels of indirection between those fundamental forces and what actually happens with macroscopic objects. Or, to put it another way, the models we actually use to make predictions can have "forces and factors" in them that are not any of the fundamental ones, and that's fine, as long as we have some chain of reasoning that connects those models to the fundamental forces and factors. For example, our models of macroscopic objects can have dissipative forces like friction and viscosity in them; those aren't fundamental forces. But we have a chain of reasoning that connects them to fundamental forces (electromagnetic forces between electrons in atoms).
That is one key principle that drives the effort, yes. However, that doesn't mean things will always work out that way. Freeman Dyson, for one, published at least one paper making arguments for why gravity didn't need to be quantized.
> the forces and factors that work on the smallest particle should be the same forces that work on the largest of galaxies.
If you mean fundamental forces, then this is true (that's the definition of "fundamental"), but it also means that you have to adopt many levels of indirection between those fundamental forces and what actually happens with macroscopic objects. Or, to put it another way, the models we actually use to make predictions can have "forces and factors" in them that are not any of the fundamental ones, and that's fine, as long as we have some chain of reasoning that connects those models to the fundamental forces and factors. For example, our models of macroscopic objects can have dissipative forces like friction and viscosity in them; those aren't fundamental forces. But we have a chain of reasoning that connects them to fundamental forces (electromagnetic forces between electrons in atoms).