I think we're talking at cross purposes. Me, the body I inhabit, is still on Earth. The person on Mars, who likely also has a consciousness, and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me, but someone else, because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies.
So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.
> and is for the whole world exactly the same as me, is still not me
If both are identical I don't see why both aren't equally me.
> because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies.
Why must there be a single continuation of "me"? I wouldn't necessarily consider this true even under current medical technology - we can split the brain in two and have two parts that do not directly communicate.
What if the process is symmetrical (one body in, some kind of mitosis occurs, two bodies out at equal distance)? Does one get assigned "the real me" at random? If both have the same memories/personality/train-of-thought and experience the process as continuous, why not both?
I can't seem to be able to reply to your comment below, but thanks for the clear illustration. I don't disagree with PM PM; I don't believe in souls. What I do believe in is that there is a quality of consciousness that is linked to the PM - what makes you see through your own eyes and not others. That quality does not seem transferable, in that bodily possession is not a thing.
If you posit that teleportation is equivalent to spaceship, and that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies, then what is your hypothesis about the more-or-less instant transfer of that quality to a remote planet's newly created clone?
Consider IM to be any immaterial "self" that you believe wouldn't be included in the clone - doesn't have to be a soul as various religions may conceptualize.
> and that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies
I believe there could be two bodies with identical personalities/memories/train-of-thought/etc. (whatever we label as consciousness) at some instant, but they would diverge due to different environments and not have any kind of special link between them.
> what is your hypothesis about the more-or-less instant transfer of that quality to a remote planet's newly created clone?
In my view it's just included in the clone - there's nothing extra that hasn't been cloned that needs to be transferred afterwards. If you totally clone an ocean, it has the same waves.
But we are not talking about mitosis, so we don't need to go there. We are taking about a machine that assembles atoms on a remote planet. None of the atoms come from your current body. What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone?
> But we are not talking about mitosis, so we don't need to go there
I'm probing to get a better understanding of your belief system. How does it hold up under symmetrical cloning?
> What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone?
I'll label:
* PM: Physiological "me" - personality, memories, train of thought, currently instantiated as a brain
* IM: "Immaterial" "me" - a "soul", impacted by the PM. May impact the PM or just be an observer (depending on variant of dualism)
From what I understand, you believe there's an IM controlling a PM, and the IM is a different kind of stuff that would not be cloned. The IM generally follows the same PM, but could be "shaken off" from too-large changes. On cloning of PM you think this happens (at the instant of cloning):
IM New soul
| |
PM PM
You ask "Would you control both bodies, see through both set of eyes" because you thought sunaurus is proposing this happens:
IM
/ \
PM PM
Whereas I (and I think sunaurus) don't believe in an IM. We think two identical PMs really are identical persons, including whatever we'd call consciousness:
PM PM
Others may believe that IMs do exist but supervene on the PM (so identical PM has identical IM arising from it):
> What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter?
If you believe that you die when your cells are replaced (because you are in the old cells and thus can't be in the replacement), then I understand your point of view. But if you're saying that slowly replacing you is different than quickly replacing you, then I would be super curious to hear the logic for this! (This is a sincere comment, I am not seeing the logic myself and would really like to understand it)
So, the slow replacement preserves consciousness. Why, who knows, but it happens to us already every day, so we can take it as granted. If it didn't, we'd be someone different every day, with false memories, and while it's not impossible there's not really many places reason can take us from there.
The problem with the teleportation is not even that it's a quick replacement... it's that it's not a replacement at all. You're building a clone somewhere else, and destroying the original. You could build 50 clones at the same time on 50 planets if you wanted - and of course none of them would be you, there's zero chance you're preserved. So, you're dead, even if to the rest of the world it makes no difference.
What you're saying seems like a clear contradiction to me.
In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement.
There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
I'm saying replacing a neuron or cell at a time within a quadrillion of them empirically leads to continued consciousness, and that assembling a quadrillion cells on a remote planet with no material connection whatsoever with the original body is a very different thing. You want to hide both cases behind the same word. I don't see why you think that's valid.
So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.