Bear Sterns fell first, at $350 Billion in assets.
The issue in 2008 was that the banks were doing a domino effect on each other. We don't see any such signs of that with Silicon Valley bank, and SIVB is smaller than Bear Sterns (and other banks) from 2007 crisis.
There was a domino effect, but a number of banks had the same root problem -- MBS held on their books at higher than their true value. Bear Stearns just happened to have a whole lot of the worst MBS, so it went down first.
In this case, a number of banks are holding a lot of long-term debt as "hold til maturity", so they're not recognizing on their books that it has lost value due to rising interest rates.
Well Bear Sterns never went bust, it was bailed out.
The issue in 2008 is rather that institutional investors (mostly money market funds) ceased to lend to banks, or only overnight. I am not saying that the banking system is as fragile as in 2008, it is clearly not. But it only takes a panic to cause another post-Lehman contagion across the financial system.
The really troublesome securities of the Global Financial Crisis were complex derivatives of private-label, almost universally sub-prime, asset-backed-securities:
The standardized, so-called "agency" MBS on the SVB books really isn't anything like that CDO plague. In 2008, people were losing faith in the ability to even assign valuations to CDOs; SVB's problem with their MBS portfolio is that the current market valuation is obviously not what they needed it to be just now.
The Times says stock prices of other banks fell as concern spread that they could also be facing similar problems. First Republic Bank in California fell 16.5 percent, Signature Bank in New York more than 12 percent and Zions Bancorporation 11.4 percent.
