US military doesn't care. But the TWnese care, which US thinktankers/media, and I'm guessing US based commenters like you seem to forget. Hence the disconnect on why people seriously contemplate these TW will blow up TSMC memes. And why TW media reminding US, that if they're going to evacuate anyone off the island first, it's not going to be their semi engineers, it's going to be women and children. Or that more generally, they're not interested in blowing up their lively hood to stick it to the PRC. Like how in UKR war, it's RU whose blowing up UKR infra and industry when they decided it was better to scorch earth long term.
Yes, Taiwanese obviously care more about their children. But that doesn't change that the US military won't allow the Chinese to obtain TSMC or the knowledge of their engineers.
Sure, except original comment also highlights that the incentives of destroying TSMC is backwards. It's PRC who benefits most from denying US access to TW semi supply chains or engineers not vice versa. Denying TW to US closes relative semi gap for PRC, leveraging PRC control of TSMC in case of successfuly invasion to compel US to lift sanctions also closes relative semi gap for PRC. US has leverage via sanctions during peacetime, but PRC has leverage via threatening access or destruction of east asian semi supply chain during war. Utlimately it's in both US and TW interests for TSMC + co to survive because they extract most value / benefit, but not necessarily for PRC. And for TW, ensuring TSMC+co survival =/= paperclipping them to US. All the interest calculates points towards PRC/TW denying US access, and US wanting continued access since US fabs will still be dependant on TW inputs as much as current TW fabs or future PRC controlled TW fabs will be dependant on US/EU/JP inputs.
But this is missing the obvious. Yes the US would prefer being able to maintain its tech advantage over China by continuing production and receiving of state of the art chips. And this is clearly better for them than choosing that gap by destroying TSMC fab. But if China takes over TW, that's not an option. The options are either flatten the gap or flip the gap in China's favor as it now controls those chips while the US falls back to tech multiple generations old. There is no other strategic option for the US flatten the gap is the only choice, flipping the gap is the worst case scenario for the us.
This deal is in US and TW best interest. TW is still valuable as cutting edge is still made on island. So production and economics so benefit them. US still provides military protection / defense. They are still long term partners will aligned goals. And if China does invade TW, US can continue a long fight and win by falling back only a generation or two to is smaller but important domestic production to continue supporting its defense technology needs.
I can't speak for them, but I have to assume RW also sees its best interests if China invades to lose TSMC plants but US win the war and they maintain democracy, rather than keep TSMC plants but controlled by China and US lose the war and go under full control of mainland rule.
Plants can be rebuilt, just like Marshall plan or what will happen in Ukraine. TW wants long term freedom from China - strengthening US defense's tech position helps this the most.
The obvious option in event of PRC control is everyone deferring to mutual leverage, where US controls fab inputs, TW controls outputs, PRC negotiating access to % of high end production by controlling island. Meanwhile buys both US and PRC time to secure independant semi chain, TW gets to still profit off semi, much like pre techwar arrangment. That's the strategically rare win-win-win scenario where everyone gains / avoids loss vs having accessible leading edge setback 20 years. Of course PRC wins most in this arrangment, and US/TW relatively loses, but if PRC wins in TW scenario vs US, that's going to be least of worries / concessions. The least obvious option is US deciding to scorch earth tech that supports their most competitive high tech industries, responsible for huge % of competitive advantage, especially if that leaves PRC the biggest producer of mature nodes (where things are trending). Even less sensible considering long term timeline after which experts believes PRC can reach semblance of semi parity.
This is short/medium term balance / interest calculation irrespective of the deal - which I didn't comment on - substantial capacity won't shift off TW in the timelines US forecast PRC will make move. Leading edge isn't particularly relelvant to defense hardware ends which use mature nodes, nor does anyone project long fight with how irreplaceable modern platforms are. It's why PRC (and chip partners US is trying to coerce into export controls) views Oct chip curbs as attack on their commercial sector, not military since PRC also have small batch 7nm production capability.
> TW also sees its best interests
It's also obvious "best" TW interest is to hedge having continued leverage over being leading ledge supplier regardless of who wins. There is no scenario where giving away their silicon dominance makes sense, unless coerced to, which is why US had to unilaterally announce export controls - because CHIPS4 partners weren't biting and actively pushing back. Least of all because no one is sure TW can win local war against PRC. Wealthy TW industrialist/elites/chip talent would rather be wealthy under PRC control after war then be fruit farmers because their industry got glassed. Read between line of Morris Chang stating US efforts to reshore chips manufacturing doomed to fail - it's not commentary on US talent - but TW isn't ceding industry to be Americanized. IMO don't expect these plants to launch without hitch. Prolonged war is probably least in TW interests because island simply can't sustain past a few months on domestic resources. There's reason TW defense posture is not prepping for prolonged war like US wants, deep down leadership and industry knows best interest for TW is to survive short/sharp war as developed economy and work with whoever wins.
> strengthening US defense's tech position
Except, again, TW offshoring leading edge fabs doesn't substantively strengthen US defense indy that depend on mature nodes with respect to PRC war. As stated, US fabs will STILL depend on TW inputs for forseeable future - it's not just ASML that's bottle neck - niche suppliers and expertise will be stuck on TW long term. Also consider "partners" pushing back on unilateral US curbs or SKR, JP building out their own indigenous defense industry - very few are actually interested in giving/strengthining US further leverage especially at their cost. And let's be real, fabs aren't going to be rebuilt on TW if they get leveled when they can be reconstructed in more secure locations.
Why would you expect the US military to care about children or try to evacuate them?