> Many things in the military are rock-paper-scissors considerations
Hence the importance of combined arms operations. Sending a column of tanks on its own is just a case of scissors...scissors...scissors. Pre-operational training is also essential. It's too late, in contact, for infantry to figure out how to fight alongside tanks.
Lots of armies seem to discover this the hard way in a war, adapt their tactics accordingly, only to forget it in time for the next war. Incidentally, this also explains the western Battlegroup concept. It's the smallest integrated unit with a sensible mix of different arms, usually structured around an infantry or armour battalion depending on the circumstances.
Honestly, I didn't expect Ukraine to hold out as long as they did, let alone force the Russians to retreat from Kyiv. It does tell one thing so, despite the counter-insurgency warfare of the last decades, Western militaries are the most experienced fighting forces right now. Maybe they'll have some of the problems against advanced AA, like the Ukrainians are deploying, but when it comes to ground combat no other countries are coming even close it seems.
That makes also an interesting case study for Taiwan. If, or rather when, Taiwan can deny its air space a Chinese invasion is basically of the table. The Battle of Britain showed that much. And Ukraine showed that current AA, deployed with proper doctrine and part of a well defined and integrated strategy, can deny air space to modern air forces. Personally, I'm surprised how well drones work. All in all Taiwan seems to have decent chance in case China tries something stupid. Being an island definitely helps as well.
The Battle of Britain isn't a great example, there are plenty of suggestions that the war with Germany would have been over faster if they had been allowed to try an invasion and had their fleet sunk in the Channel.
I don't like maybes, but that approach (letting the Germans try and sink their fleet) sounds risky. Because the invasion could work. And it's not that the German surface fleet played big role in WW2 anyway.
The Battle of Britain showed, so, that Germany called of the invasion once it was clear that air supremacy was not going to be achieved. Which meant that the Royal Navy wouldn't be neutralized to the point of allowing enough of the invasion force to actually cross the channel. The same holds, to an extend, true for China and Taiwan. Without air supremacy China cannot be sure to get enough ground forces across the straight to establish a sustainable beach head. They fail to do that and they lost.
Hence the importance of combined arms operations. Sending a column of tanks on its own is just a case of scissors...scissors...scissors. Pre-operational training is also essential. It's too late, in contact, for infantry to figure out how to fight alongside tanks.
Lots of armies seem to discover this the hard way in a war, adapt their tactics accordingly, only to forget it in time for the next war. Incidentally, this also explains the western Battlegroup concept. It's the smallest integrated unit with a sensible mix of different arms, usually structured around an infantry or armour battalion depending on the circumstances.