Internal Boeing e-mails between various Chief Technical Pilots and other Boeing staff are available at [1]. It shows that there was an overarching requirement for the program to to ensure that 737 pilots could fly the 737 MAX with minimal "Level B" training (e.g. no need for hours of simulator training).
Per [2], MCAS was poorly designed and exhibited a failure mode (e.g. AOA sensor failure) that required immediate pilot action to avert disaster. For pilots that were aware of the MCAS failure mode and how to respond, simulation showed they could respond and avert disaster within typically 4 seconds. A delay of 10 seconds from a pilot to respond correctly to the failure event would be catastrophic.
A Boeing staffer wrote to the Chief Technical Pilot now indicted[^][1] regarding the pilot action required in those critical few seconds:
"I fear that skill is not very intuitive any more with the younger pilots and those who have become too reliant on automation"
The Chief Technical Pilot now indicted[^] responds:
"This is the path with least risk to Level B. We need to sell this as very intuitive basic pilot skill".
Boeing it appears then opted for updating Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs) for pilots instead of:
* Fixing the MCAS flaw to remove the failure mode altogether
* Ensuring pilots were trained to handle an MCAS failure in a simulator
* Otherwise ensuring that pilots were aware of the non-intuitive nature of MCAS and the particular failure mode requiring immediate <10sec response from pilots
If the failure mode with MCAS did occur, pilots didn't even have 10 seconds to find the NNC and go through the checklist steps before catastrophe was set to occur. They were not aware of MCAS being present on the aircraft and per the Boeing staffer raising the concern, "that skill is not very intuitive" in relation to acting on the failure mode should it have occurred.
Per [2], MCAS was poorly designed and exhibited a failure mode (e.g. AOA sensor failure) that required immediate pilot action to avert disaster. For pilots that were aware of the MCAS failure mode and how to respond, simulation showed they could respond and avert disaster within typically 4 seconds. A delay of 10 seconds from a pilot to respond correctly to the failure event would be catastrophic.
A Boeing staffer wrote to the Chief Technical Pilot now indicted[^][1] regarding the pilot action required in those critical few seconds:
The Chief Technical Pilot now indicted[^] responds: Boeing it appears then opted for updating Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs) for pilots instead of:* Fixing the MCAS flaw to remove the failure mode altogether
* Ensuring pilots were trained to handle an MCAS failure in a simulator
* Otherwise ensuring that pilots were aware of the non-intuitive nature of MCAS and the particular failure mode requiring immediate <10sec response from pilots
If the failure mode with MCAS did occur, pilots didn't even have 10 seconds to find the NNC and go through the checklist steps before catastrophe was set to occur. They were not aware of MCAS being present on the aircraft and per the Boeing staffer raising the concern, "that skill is not very intuitive" in relation to acting on the failure mode should it have occurred.
[1] https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Compressed%20...
[2] https://www.incose.org/docs/default-source/enchantment/21031...
[^] Assumed from job titles in the e-mails, as names are redacted.