> If we attack organizations making an effort to study their impact on the world, we're effectively sending the message that it's safer not to look at all, in case you find something that could be held against you.
Someone on HN actually linked to the slides, and it does seem like there's a lot of FUD being created.
This reminds me of moxie talking about damaging research focusing on Signal:
> To me, this article reads as a better example of the problems with the security industry and the way security research is done today, because I think the lesson to anyone watching is clear: don't build security into your products, because that makes you a target for researchers, even if you make the right decisions, and regardless of whether their research is practically important or not. It's much more effective to be Telegram: just leave cryptography out of everything, except for your marketing.
Someone on HN actually linked to the slides, and it does seem like there's a lot of FUD being created.
This reminds me of moxie talking about damaging research focusing on Signal:
> To me, this article reads as a better example of the problems with the security industry and the way security research is done today, because I think the lesson to anyone watching is clear: don't build security into your products, because that makes you a target for researchers, even if you make the right decisions, and regardless of whether their research is practically important or not. It's much more effective to be Telegram: just leave cryptography out of everything, except for your marketing.
source: https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=moxie&next=16117487