Collision attacks make for a fun tech demo, but I've yet to hear anyone suggest any plausible scenario where they could be used against Apple's implementation. It would require absurdly elaborate, Oceans Eleven style espionage to achieve any outcome whatsoever. And it would be immediately apparent to anyone involved that a collision attack was involved.

It would be far easier (and far more effective) to just acquire child porn, break into your victim's house, stash physical prints under their mattress, and then contact the police.

Furthermore, the website includes numerous misleading statements about Apple's system, or makes critical omissions on the description of Apple's system. Whatever side you're on, misleading arguments should be dismissed for what they are.

This is apples to oranges. The whole thread was about random false positives and not adversarial ones.

If it's that easy to generate a false positive then I believe it will be more common to accidentally have one.

Onge again, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

The ease of adversarial collisions has no relationship to the probability of natural collisions.

It's entirely possible to make a cryptographic hash algorithm that has an exceptionally low probability of natural collisions but where adversarial collisions are trivial.

It's also possible to create a cryptographic hash algorithm where occasional natural collisions are expected, but adversarial collisions require brute force.