The flawed specification was done in-house by Boeing employees. That design wasn't outsourced.
I think you may have glossed over this point of the article:
If you separate the thinking about things from the doing of things, then innovation will suffer.
The article is arguing that the specification might have been flawed because the company doesn't have in-house manufacturing expertise any more -- there was not enough knowledge left to validate the designs.
>The article is arguing that the specification might have been flawed because the company doesn't have in-house manufacturing expertise any more -- there was not enough knowledge left to validate the designs.
Even though Airbus also outsources the flight control systems, they did not make the same mistake of only using 1 AOA Angle-of-Attach sensor in computations.
It doesn't mean Airbus is perfect. Some observers think Airbus' deliberate decision to decouple the pilot and co-pilot joysticks to not show synchronized physical feedback is a flaw which contributed to the 2009 Air France 447 crash. The co-pilot mistakenly pulled the joystick back the entire time and the senior pilot was unaware of it. Consequently, Gulfstream Aerospace (they also outsource many components including flight controls to Honeywell) decided to not copy Airbus' design for the new 500/600 business jets and instead, coupled both joysticks together with force feedback so the both pilots have physical sensation of what the other pilot is doing.
So instead of thinking "outsourcing leads to bad outcomes", there's an alternative explanation of "good or bad outcomes regardless of outsourcing". E.g. Blaming the "outsourcing" can't explain the good & bad outcomes when you study all the case studies of Airbus, Gulfstream, Tesla, Nvidia, etc.
.EDIT reply to : >The scale of outsourcing Boeing has done for the 787 is not comparable to AB (or anyone else). They outsourced core competencies, wing design, materials, software, basically everything,
I still don't understand why we begin the analysis by the amount of outsourcing and working backwards from that to conclude that the 787 is a worse airplane. Instead, why can't we consider that the 787 may be be considered superior to Airbus A330 by pilots and airliners. The more heavily outsourced 787 can also be superior to the 737-MAX in-house wing design.
>, and it pretty much aligns with the point the author is making: you can’t innovate / design if you don’t know how your products are made.
Similar to Boeing 787 carbon composite wings being outsourced in Japan potentially being superior to Airbus in-house designs...
AMD outsources more than Intel (because AMD outsourced to TSMC) and AMD Neoverse outperforms Intel Xeon. AMD out innovated Intel. Intel is so behind that they've made public statements of possibly outsourcing their chip fab in the future. But the AMD innovation story does not align with author's point. See the flaw in his analysis?
The scale of outsourcing Boeing has done for the 787 is not comparable to AB (or anyone else). They outsourced core competencies, wing design, materials, software, basically everything, and it pretty much aligns with the point the author is making: you can’t innovate / design if you don’t know how your products are made.
But you seem way more interested in proving right than having a productive discussion here. I suggest writing a blog if you’re interested in a monologue rather than wasting people’s time with inflammatory retorts.
Jenks, who leads the wing team, said the crucial, conceptual stage of the 787’s wing design was “100 percent Boeing.”
To define the shape of the wing and the system of movable flight-control surfaces, Boeing aerodynamicists conducted detailed analysis of performance requirements, historical flight-test information and new wind-tunnel data.
Only after that defining phase of the 787 design did Boeing bring Mitsubishi engineers to Seattle to figure out the broad parameters of the internal structure of the wing.
“We gave them the shape,” Jenks said.
“That is the family jewels,” Noble said. “That part I could never see Boeing sharing in any way, shape or form. That is what our brilliant engineers are able to figure out.”
Boeing engineering legend Joe Sutter, lead designer of the iconic 747 jumbo jet in the late 1960s, agreed that this first design phase is the key.
“That’s the stuff that Boeing still pretty much keeps under its own belt,” said Sutter, who at 86 still talks at aviation gatherings about jet design.
Of course Boeing will say it’s key. Can I just quote back from the same article?
> Boeing delegated to Mitsubishi of Japan a big slice of the design work.
How can that “100%” be true… these are all just empty words.
> If 10 or 15 years from now the world’s leading authority on this kind of structure is in Japan, then you can’t reallocate your resources to do that work,” Sorscher said. “You are dependent on them.”
This is part of the point the original article makes. Nothing here disproves it. The fact that Boeing succeeded (despite several production issues) doesn’t mean they won’t fall victim to the innovation issues that will result from offshoring engineering knowledge.
>How can that “100%” be true… these are all just empty words.
Seems like reasonable interpretation is that the shape of the wing was 100% Boeing aerodynamic engineers. So the simulations and computational fluid dynamics to design the external flight characteristics was Boeing. But the internal spar structure and key reinforcements for the carbon fiber structure was Mitsubishi.
>this kind of structure is in Japan, then you can’t reallocate your resources to do that work,” Sorscher said. “You are dependent on them.”
>This is part of the point the original article makes. Nothing here disproves it.*
>Boeing [...] fall victim to the innovation issues that will result from offshoring engineering knowledge.
But Boeing didn't have in-house knowledge to build a carbon fiber wing so there was no expertise to offshore. To get around that limitation, Boeing seemed to execute a very shrewd business playbook:
(1) 2003 : currently have knowledge on building metal wings in Seattle but no expertise on manufacturing new carbon fiber wings
(2) 2004 : outsource carbon fiber wing manufacturer to Mitsubishi Japan.[1] This also attracts support from Japan government and Japan Airlines to be first key customers of the new plane. Mitsubishi also helps pay billions for development of the new carbon fiber wing.
(3) 2016 : Boeing builds its own carbon fiber plant in Seattle to switch from outsourcing to inhouse production of the carbon composite wings.[2]
(4) Boeing is no longer dependent on an outsourced supplier for a carbon wing
This thread's article doesn't cover the above scenario either. So lessons learned are: (1) Outsource a key component you're not familiar with. (2) If it later proves to have strategic value, bring it in house.
Boeing used outsourcing to become more innovative -- which is the opposite situation the thread's article was complaining about. He writes paragraphs lamenting about companies outsourcing MS Office 365 but doesn't really dig into business case studies that don't match his thesis.
I think you may have glossed over this point of the article:
If you separate the thinking about things from the doing of things, then innovation will suffer.
The article is arguing that the specification might have been flawed because the company doesn't have in-house manufacturing expertise any more -- there was not enough knowledge left to validate the designs.