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Good luck hiding an effective backdoor in an FPGA. The attacker (the FPGA fab) has no idea of how it's going to be programmed.


The usual thing the military worries about is a "kill switch" (a very unlikely sequence of bits) which disables the hardware completely. The idea is that at the beginning of a war, the kill signal is broadcast by the enemy by every means possible which brings all your electronics to a halt.

This can be hidden in an FPGA - for example attached to the input pins or SERDES - without needing to know anything about the application.

(Article: https://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for...)


Triggering a malfunction is incredibly easy compared to a proper backdoor. A kill signal could also be injected through side channels e.g. a power line, and the kill mechanism could be implemented in many other semiconductors than an FPGA.




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