>Either you care about this entire class of channels, and you do all of those things, or you don't, and
This vastly simplistic, binary belief that all such channels are a simple on/off is not at all practical. Every mitigation has costs and tradeoffs. Your argument is as simple as saying "don't have information, voila, no information to steal. Simple!"
In real life, blocking has costs, blocks have leaks and openings.
An excellent example is you write "block sound/vibration" as if that's a simple on/off process.
In real life, there are degrees of vibration, degrees of cost, hindrances and benefits to each possible continuum of solutions, etc.
A really funny example of this is your claim "Faraday cage, bye bye RF. Etc." when this group you mock has papers showing how to escape a Faraday cage. And no Faraday cage is perfect. And it's insanely impractical to put all data in the world in Faraday cages.
And note this: all Faraday cages leak. It's simple physics. Thus it's good to know design parameters for the various modes of possible signals to design the best Faraday cage for a given situation.
If they ever get to using gravitational signals, good luck with shielding :)
>Indeed, if advanced modulation and processing were used, that would be useful research
Then you'd simply say well "that's simply modulation! Where is the real research?"
I think you are vastly oversimplifying the real world and how threats are dealt with in practice.
The DoD doesn't simply spend billions on security research such when they could have simply wrapped themselved in foil and padding to solve security leaking.
>They do not contribute to the state of the art in any way.
I think we have different ideas of what state of the art contribution means. This team has thousands of citations from researchers that I think disagree with you. Someone is citing their work.
Look, I'm saying all these papers are weekend Hackaday projects. You can say it's useful, but it's still trivial, anyone can do it, and shouldn't be held up as a massive accomplishment, nor given as much credit as they are.
> This team has thousands of citations from researchers that I think disagree with you. Someone is citing their work.
It's not like non-research research is a novel problem in academia, so I wouldn't point at citation count as a particularly useful metric. It's not just this guy, the incentives in academia are to publish publish publish, which is why paper mills like this happen.
>Look, I'm saying all these papers are weekend Hackaday projects.
I'd challenge any hackaday member to create one of these from scratch in a weekend. I've done quite a few over the years for fun, and most involve a significant amount more work than simply saying "measure EM, done!" Some of these do take significant effort to get working, especially if you have a simple understanding of physics, electronics, noise, or measurement.
No comments on all your claims on how simple you think defense is?
I'm guessing that if you really think one simply says "Faraday cage!" and all EM is solved, or one says "Sound proofing!" and all vibration is blocked, then you also may not understand the value in having the detailed nuances of each of these things worked out.
So this stuff seems useless to you. There are plenty of groups getting paid to do stuff that seems trivial to people that honestly don't understand the nuances. And in this space the nuances make a big difference.
And, as others pointed out - this is useful to plenty of people as a starting point for stuff they want to do. Knowing that 1980's CRT emanations were leaking does not give someone new to the field the ability to read RAM noise.
This vastly simplistic, binary belief that all such channels are a simple on/off is not at all practical. Every mitigation has costs and tradeoffs. Your argument is as simple as saying "don't have information, voila, no information to steal. Simple!"
In real life, blocking has costs, blocks have leaks and openings.
An excellent example is you write "block sound/vibration" as if that's a simple on/off process.
In real life, there are degrees of vibration, degrees of cost, hindrances and benefits to each possible continuum of solutions, etc.
A really funny example of this is your claim "Faraday cage, bye bye RF. Etc." when this group you mock has papers showing how to escape a Faraday cage. And no Faraday cage is perfect. And it's insanely impractical to put all data in the world in Faraday cages.
And note this: all Faraday cages leak. It's simple physics. Thus it's good to know design parameters for the various modes of possible signals to design the best Faraday cage for a given situation.
If they ever get to using gravitational signals, good luck with shielding :)
>Indeed, if advanced modulation and processing were used, that would be useful research
Then you'd simply say well "that's simply modulation! Where is the real research?"
I think you are vastly oversimplifying the real world and how threats are dealt with in practice.
The DoD doesn't simply spend billions on security research such when they could have simply wrapped themselved in foil and padding to solve security leaking.
>They do not contribute to the state of the art in any way.
I think we have different ideas of what state of the art contribution means. This team has thousands of citations from researchers that I think disagree with you. Someone is citing their work.