This seems an unfair leap. The most common cause of a checksum mis-match is going to be a partial download or something similar.
It's also not relevant to the current attack since the code was legitimately included in the official release and, as such, baked into the valid checksum results.
Is the proper response to tell a customer to install the package anyway because it's just a partial download or something similar? Regardless, it seems irresponsible.
Regardless of the motivation, cause, mechanism of #2 - #3 is not the appropriate way to handle the problem. Attack is indistinguishable from unintentional corruption. And #3 trains customers to do the wrong thing when they encounter an attack.
The malicious file was signed with the right certificate. So yeah you should ideally be more careful with checksums but there already was a much more robust and secure authentication mechanism and it was defeated.
My employer has a knowledgebase on the public internet that is littered with lists of softwares and practices. There are thousands of employees. Name dropping software should be a risky thing to do, but that isn’t the world we live in.
1. Customers complain that they can't install latest version because it's checksum doesn't match what SolarWinds posted
2. The checksum doesn't match because malware has been inserted into the package during build/delivery
3. SolarWinds tells customers to ignore this and install it manually
Did no one think to check why the checksum didn't match?