> An unforgivably naive market of architects and contractors then began merrily specifying it for a wide range of uses well beyond its original test.
Architects are architects, Contractors are contractors, and neither are fire engineers. No one can be an expert on everything. This is why we have building codes, product certification, and engineering assurance process. The problem here appeared to be dishonest players. If certified independent labs were required to test products, and licensed engineers were required to approve the assembly and submit their letters of insurance for the permit, it seems like there would be a net benefit to the public (this is how it works in Canada). If there was a stronger regulatory system, the investigators would be able to look up the letters of assurance for this permit, obtain the project documentation from the responsible engineer, investigate and possible charge him with negligence if he failed to spec a certified fire assembly. It appears that in the UK, there is no clear hierarchy of responsibility. When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible.
As an aside, Fire rating generally involves more than just a single product - it requires an 'assembly'. That assembly must be recreated every time the product is used to achieve the fire rating. If the testing assembly required 1/2" non-combustible cement backing board, the installation also requires it. It sounds like the fire rated assemblies were not being followed in this case.
> It sounds like the fire rated assemblies were not being followed in this case.
The fraud by Celotex and Kingspan is more literal, in this case.
The only assemblies that managed to pass the large scale fire test cheated by using a bunch of nonstandard parts, materials that weren't available on the market, and even put kiln insulation material blocking the temperature sensors on the test rig.
They then truncated any test reports sent to customers, omitting mention of the cheats. It was literally impossible for any customer to build the assembly that had passed fire testing, as they were never told about the cheats.
They then took the reports from these cheated "third party tests" and converted them into certificates from further authorities.
And their manufacturers' marketing departments "misunderstood" the test reports and put out marketing material claiming the material was of limited combustibility - which it was not.
Architects are architects, Contractors are contractors, and neither are fire engineers. No one can be an expert on everything. This is why we have building codes, product certification, and engineering assurance process. The problem here appeared to be dishonest players. If certified independent labs were required to test products, and licensed engineers were required to approve the assembly and submit their letters of insurance for the permit, it seems like there would be a net benefit to the public (this is how it works in Canada). If there was a stronger regulatory system, the investigators would be able to look up the letters of assurance for this permit, obtain the project documentation from the responsible engineer, investigate and possible charge him with negligence if he failed to spec a certified fire assembly. It appears that in the UK, there is no clear hierarchy of responsibility. When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible.
As an aside, Fire rating generally involves more than just a single product - it requires an 'assembly'. That assembly must be recreated every time the product is used to achieve the fire rating. If the testing assembly required 1/2" non-combustible cement backing board, the installation also requires it. It sounds like the fire rated assemblies were not being followed in this case.