Western industry has progressively lost their ability to efficiently manage many types of heavy industry and large construction projects. This is particularly true for nuclear, which requires the application of disparate and highly specialized techniques and skillsets that are quickly lost. Though not to the same extent as the U.S., Japan, France, and South Korea have lost many of the same skills even though only a couple of decades ago they could churn out new nuclear plants with breakneck speed. (The only thing more astonishing than the efficiency of the French and Korean nuclear industries was how quickly they died.)
Reviving the nuclear industry will be painful and costly, but the same is true for reviving and rehabilitating other heavy industries that have withered away, if and when these countries ever choose to do so. The justifications for resolving ourselves to their death are hypocritical. Both solar and wind power manufacturing industries, not to mention the automobile industry, would be non-existent in the U.S. without heavy subsidies. For example, special trade zones that incentive partial manufacturing of certain wind generator components in the U.S., or in the case of automobiles flat-out quotas. But even then the future of these industries in the U.S. remain tenuous. Fortunately for consumers (but less so for semi-skilled and skilled factory labor), solar panels, wind generators, and cars are easily imported; nuclear plants not so much, not unless the modular reactor designs take off.[1]
[1] Interestingly, the skillsets, including project management techniques, for these industries can't be imported, either. Toshiba bought Westinghouse because they thought they could use their superior heavy industry skills to rehabilitate Westinghouse and the American nuclear industry. But heavy industry skillsets are especially tuned to local industrial supply chains and labor pools, as well as domestic regulatory frameworks. Toshiba couldn't do squat with Westinghouse; it was deadweight from day 1.
To some extent, it turns out that the problem is France never actually had those specialized nuclear techniques and skillsets. For example, they had huge problems with defective welding and large forgings that weren't up to spec and had faked QA testing documentation which caused big delays. Then the regulators went back and looked at the old plants from the original wave of nuclear building, and they had the same problems. It's just that French nuclear wasn't so well scrutinized back then, possibly for political reasons.
Westinghouse was all rotten from the beginning, they sold reactors like cigarettes packs and disregarded scientists' safety concerns. Just look at the guy at 15:21.
So how do you turn a whole unsafe industry into a safe one? That's a lot of organizational DNA to change. Might as well convert a dinosaur into a gazelle.
Dunno, probably act responsibly like the AECL (Canadian company responsible for CANDU reactors) has. Usually it's a management problem. Start by changing the CEO? The nuclear industry, just like aerospace, should be very risk adverse. It's no place for SV or tobacco company mentalities.
I am hopeful about the new crop of companies currently designing SMRs. This was probably the way it should have been done from the onset, rather than pushing single unit power to hundreds of gigawatts.
I only began recording in 2018 particularly noteworthy reporting and research pieces (regarding any topic) I stumble upon. I just added the above to my personal bibliography for good measure.
Reviving the nuclear industry will be painful and costly, but the same is true for reviving and rehabilitating other heavy industries that have withered away, if and when these countries ever choose to do so. The justifications for resolving ourselves to their death are hypocritical. Both solar and wind power manufacturing industries, not to mention the automobile industry, would be non-existent in the U.S. without heavy subsidies. For example, special trade zones that incentive partial manufacturing of certain wind generator components in the U.S., or in the case of automobiles flat-out quotas. But even then the future of these industries in the U.S. remain tenuous. Fortunately for consumers (but less so for semi-skilled and skilled factory labor), solar panels, wind generators, and cars are easily imported; nuclear plants not so much, not unless the modular reactor designs take off.[1]
[1] Interestingly, the skillsets, including project management techniques, for these industries can't be imported, either. Toshiba bought Westinghouse because they thought they could use their superior heavy industry skills to rehabilitate Westinghouse and the American nuclear industry. But heavy industry skillsets are especially tuned to local industrial supply chains and labor pools, as well as domestic regulatory frameworks. Toshiba couldn't do squat with Westinghouse; it was deadweight from day 1.