I agree that people should be reading the paper. Crucially, the whitepaper explains why it doesn't preserve privacy.
For example, section 5.4 (design trade-offs) says that individuals who have declared themselves as infected can be retroactively tracked and identified. Tracking only requires a bluetooth receiver which is aware of its own location - government agencies could easily do this.
Because the keys, from my understanding, change every day. So if someone is infected, you can only track them for the relevant days because those are the keys they would give you.
You could simply set it up to delete your own keys after 14 days, for example.
This is obviously just all obfuscation. The entire plan is that you are uniquely identifiable, you are being pinged by every person you walk near, there is protection from Target, Bestbuy, “Ze Russians” but not Apple, Google, Gov.
You can put as many crypto or “random” or key derivation layers you want in there, you just also need to admit they are surface deep and really “just for show”.
This is constant person tracking, that’s the whole point.
Is it really worth it to track 0.1-1% of the population for a few days?
I don't really see how this level of investment is worth it.
I'm also not sure as to how widespread it has to be, with the 2. proposal from DP-3P, you won't be able to link EPIDs, so you would need to infer the new infected epids from the last known position. That seems only feasible if there are sensors everywhere.
For example, section 5.4 (design trade-offs) says that individuals who have declared themselves as infected can be retroactively tracked and identified. Tracking only requires a bluetooth receiver which is aware of its own location - government agencies could easily do this.