> In most of these kinds of situations, the unpopular proposal is actually addressing some real problem that probably should be addressed.
I agree that this happens. But I think the claim is overbroad, and the followup "[the public] know that there still is an underlying problem to be solved" is fundamentally inaccurate.
Sometimes, there's a problem affecting the public, but the laws proposed to fix it are bad. This can come from incompetent drafting, where we'd expect successive bills to improve, but it can also come from conflicting interests, meaning anything from a powerful stakeholder undermining good laws to a party split rendering coherent laws unpassable. Quite a few people have observed that American private-actor, public-mandate laws like the ACA might perform worse than private or public solutions, but are legislatively easier. This is definitely a category worth discussing. Even here, though, I think calling on a law's opponents to give an alternative solution is too restrictive. Sometimes the reason a law is bad is that we don't know how to solve the problem, or the problem is fundamentally not amenable to a legislative remedy.
But sometimes, there simply isn't public benefit available. Talking about what's a "real problem" is of course question-begging, since very few laws have literally no beneficiaries. But there are no shortage of proposed laws which benefit no one but the authors, or a few influential companies, or some unnatural constituency like "retired factory workers in two swing states".
A lot of the Article 13 provisions, like many SOPA/PIPA/CISPA/ACTA/TPP provisions, fall in that second category. They're fundamentally bad law, written only for the protectionist benefit of a few already-monopolistic businesses, or to expand government authority without better serving the public. The public becomes exhausted of these fights, too, and it's not at all a matter of wanting an underlying problem solved. They pit protracted industry lobbying against highly-visible mass action, and the use of money and access as force multipliers for lobbying enormously increases its staying power. Even that might be alright, just as corporate campaign donations sometime lose out to small-donor funding. But the legislative ratchet effect means that unlike with elections, bad laws can be pursued repeatedly with virtually no downside.
I do think your point is worth addressing for activists, though. When campaigning against a law, it's worth talking publicly not just about the law's problems but why those problems exist. Is it simply a botched bill? Is it a problem needing more study (or less gridlock) before a good law can be attempted? Or is it a fundamentally worthless law, of the sort where action is needed to prevent it from coming back like a weed? This stuff isn't easy to convey to a mass audience, but it's an important part of building for a good outcome instead of averting one bad one.
I agree that this happens. But I think the claim is overbroad, and the followup "[the public] know that there still is an underlying problem to be solved" is fundamentally inaccurate.
Sometimes, there's a problem affecting the public, but the laws proposed to fix it are bad. This can come from incompetent drafting, where we'd expect successive bills to improve, but it can also come from conflicting interests, meaning anything from a powerful stakeholder undermining good laws to a party split rendering coherent laws unpassable. Quite a few people have observed that American private-actor, public-mandate laws like the ACA might perform worse than private or public solutions, but are legislatively easier. This is definitely a category worth discussing. Even here, though, I think calling on a law's opponents to give an alternative solution is too restrictive. Sometimes the reason a law is bad is that we don't know how to solve the problem, or the problem is fundamentally not amenable to a legislative remedy.
But sometimes, there simply isn't public benefit available. Talking about what's a "real problem" is of course question-begging, since very few laws have literally no beneficiaries. But there are no shortage of proposed laws which benefit no one but the authors, or a few influential companies, or some unnatural constituency like "retired factory workers in two swing states".
A lot of the Article 13 provisions, like many SOPA/PIPA/CISPA/ACTA/TPP provisions, fall in that second category. They're fundamentally bad law, written only for the protectionist benefit of a few already-monopolistic businesses, or to expand government authority without better serving the public. The public becomes exhausted of these fights, too, and it's not at all a matter of wanting an underlying problem solved. They pit protracted industry lobbying against highly-visible mass action, and the use of money and access as force multipliers for lobbying enormously increases its staying power. Even that might be alright, just as corporate campaign donations sometime lose out to small-donor funding. But the legislative ratchet effect means that unlike with elections, bad laws can be pursued repeatedly with virtually no downside.
I do think your point is worth addressing for activists, though. When campaigning against a law, it's worth talking publicly not just about the law's problems but why those problems exist. Is it simply a botched bill? Is it a problem needing more study (or less gridlock) before a good law can be attempted? Or is it a fundamentally worthless law, of the sort where action is needed to prevent it from coming back like a weed? This stuff isn't easy to convey to a mass audience, but it's an important part of building for a good outcome instead of averting one bad one.