It doesn't say that information cannot be _reasonably_ reconnected, but that you shouldn't be able to reconnect it at all.
I don't know how you have drawn that it shouldn't be NSA-proof from this text if it literally says "in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable."
Thanks for the quote. Wow. I wonder if this odd definition doesn't render "unidentifiable" to mean "almost certainly identifiable by someone, with a current technique" - since, given enough techniques, most of them will be statistically unusual. I admit it's a start, but mangling semantics that baldly gives me the willies.
The parallel history of cryptography is little more than a history of overconfidence re what counters were thought to be likely, and not. Do we really need to recapitulate that?
I don't know how you have drawn that it shouldn't be NSA-proof from this text if it literally says "in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable."