> Things like morals are real in the sense that people agree on them.
That is sufficient for a cultural relativist. But not for the bulk of moral realists, who want to say that it is possible for whole cultures, or even the human race as a whole to be just wrong about some moral proposition.
It's not even a hypthetical excercise. For example: to the moral realist, branding slavery as being unacceptable was not just a matter of switching from one social convention to another. It was about switching from being wrong (both factually and morally) to being right.
That is sufficient for a cultural relativist. But not for the bulk of moral realists, who want to say that it is possible for whole cultures, or even the human race as a whole to be just wrong about some moral proposition.
It's not even a hypthetical excercise. For example: to the moral realist, branding slavery as being unacceptable was not just a matter of switching from one social convention to another. It was about switching from being wrong (both factually and morally) to being right.