Again, this boils down to the rationalist vs. empiricist stance. Hidden variable vs. probabilistic approximation and so forth. The partisan error is to consider these two stances as mutually exclusive. They are not, as illustrated by decoherence for example. On the other hand, it is, I believe, undeniable that the rationalist endeavor is much more complex than the empiricist one and therefore also less linear. Less predictable and, please, let's not forget, less financially profitable. Chomsky's position has always been to advocate for the rationalist stance in a world conveniently inebriated with its empiricist successes to the point of turning this one aspect of thinking into a belief system. It is a waste of energy to argue for a monopoly of the yin over the yang or the other way around. They are complementary but not mutually exclusive. Privileging one over the other will result in an increase of ideological/mystical bias and essentially miss the whole point: it is their interaction, the transition from and to one another, that holds the key to a global understanding.