Like the other commenter said, we've been doing stuff like this for a long time. Satoshi combined some existing ideas with an uncommon area of application, currency instead of mere transactions, to create Bitcoin. It's clever and a lot of activity happened but its components aren't original and similar things were promoted before.
For instance, people in auditing and anti-subversion fields promoted schemes that allowed multiple, untrusted parties to accept a result by one party doing something whose logs were checked by others, partly (esp randomly) or totally. The scheme required nothing but a database or filesystem on inexpensive hardware for most of it. Only crypto was hash of some set of transactions or big file with a signature on it. Soooo efficient. Also builds on stuff we have decades of work on securing with full, battle-tested stacks for internal components.
And then there was Bitcoin with its long transaction times and insane work in mining. And use of begging to avoid a key risk at one point. That's innovative as it's the first time I've seen it in decentralized security.
> Satoshi combined some existing ideas with an uncommon area of application, currency instead of mere transactions, to create Bitcoin. It's clever and a lot of activity happened but its components aren't original and similar things were promoted before.
That's pretty much how genius works much of the time, seeing possibilities that exist with existing stuff that haven't been done yet.
I agree. It's what I did in high-assurance security. Almost everything I built was composed of premade parts and ideas. Usually in a way that was straight-forward with some really clever. Really just recycling ideas, though, into hopefully better ones.
Doesn't make me feel dumber when I realize how few programmers or systems people are re-using or recombining the best stuff from CompSci or past commercial activities. Versus how many ignore it to repeat same crap and failures. :)
For instance, people in auditing and anti-subversion fields promoted schemes that allowed multiple, untrusted parties to accept a result by one party doing something whose logs were checked by others, partly (esp randomly) or totally. The scheme required nothing but a database or filesystem on inexpensive hardware for most of it. Only crypto was hash of some set of transactions or big file with a signature on it. Soooo efficient. Also builds on stuff we have decades of work on securing with full, battle-tested stacks for internal components.
And then there was Bitcoin with its long transaction times and insane work in mining. And use of begging to avoid a key risk at one point. That's innovative as it's the first time I've seen it in decentralized security.