You're assuming that this request is at the bottom of the slippery slope rather than at the top.

The FBI made clear that this was a special case, just one solitary phone to decrypt from a nasty terrorist. And no one likes terrorists, so we can all agree that we need to read his secret data.

But then it's revealed that there are dozens, perhaps even hundreds of these requests in queue, and few involve terrorism.

And after the government is successful at coercing Apple into creating special software, why do you think that the next stop won't be to coerce apple into handing over signed code that will work on any phone (or even signing keys themselves)? After all, if the government needs to read data off of thousands of phones, surely they can't wait for Apple to do them all.

> The FBI didn't ask Apple to decrypt the device because that would be impossible.

Decrypting the phone is only impossible if the user had a strong passphrase, which is unlikely, so if Apple turns off the brute force checks, decrypting the phone means only cycling through 10000 or 100000 passphrases. A few hours or a few days at most.

If decrypting the device is impossible, then the FBI wouldn't be asking for Apple's help.

Not all slopes are slippery. But Americans have had several hundred years to get to the grips with search warrants allowing the government to search stuff. Nobody seems to want to answer why an iPhone should be more privileged than — say — a diary.

Apple cannot decrypt the phone. Removing the brute force checks is not the same as decrypting it, because even in the nightmare scenario where the FBI get their hands on this modified software, and randomly start installing it without a warrant, it only works if they have the device and you've used a crappy pin code. If you use a strong pin, you're protected, still. Except for the whole contempt of court thing.