I think Claim 1 is actually more about determinism; that if by knowing all the inputs you can reliably get the same outputs what you have isn't consciousness.
Neural nets are somewhat starting to escape that dynamic but there still isn't a neural net that reliable pulls in a continuous stream of randomness to generate meaningful behaviour like our consciousness does.
Now to be honest; I'm not entirely sure if John Searle would agree that that is consciousness when we do get there but I do agree with him that deterministic consciousness is essentially a contradictio in terminis.
Neural nets are somewhat starting to escape that dynamic but there still isn't a neural net that reliable pulls in a continuous stream of randomness to generate meaningful behaviour like our consciousness does.
Now to be honest; I'm not entirely sure if John Searle would agree that that is consciousness when we do get there but I do agree with him that deterministic consciousness is essentially a contradictio in terminis.