No the gp is correct, references in c++ can't be null. Your code invoked undefined behavior before you did anything with a reference, namely *a which is a null pointer dereference.
Which is a textbook example of the null reference problem.
Edit: There may be some terminological confusion here: when programming language folks talk about "references", they include in that definition what C/C++ call "pointers". See for example the Wikipedia article, which gives as the C++ example not C++ references, but C++ pointers.
The "null problem" is that a static language does a run-time check instead of a compile-time check. By the time the undefined behavior is invoked, compilation ended.
> Unfortunately, regulations are complicated, vague, and enforced unequally.
All true, they are. But how implying helping somebody to navigate this mess is somehow bad thing? The bad thing is complicated, vague and capriciously enforces law, not people trying to deal with it.
> And yes, sometimes they're even secret, because of fear that if their exact model is publicized, the banks will just optimize around it
This is the opposite of how the law should work. It's like the argument of making the laws and the courts secret because otherwise criminals would know the law and would learn how to avoid being prosecuted, and would also be able to hire lawyers for the same purpose. Yes, they are, and that's how a normal country works. The opposite is how a totalitarian police state works. Sure, it's probably harder to get away with a financial crime in North Korea - but it's also impossible to live a normal life and enjoy freedoms we all have. I'd rather let some crooks slip through now and then than turn the country into North Korea.
To be clear, regulatory capture is when the regulator advances the interests of the industry rather than of the public. Revolving door is a separate issue.
There's an interesting argument that the revolving door actually prevents regulatory capture through encouraging regulators to be more strict. The idea is that the more onerous the regulations, the more desireable it is for corporations to hire former regulators who know the system. "Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer."
The revolving door doesn't require regulators to be more strict.
All it needs is for companies to give big rewards (six figure salary for a day a month of work) to regulators who have previously done things the companies like.
Then their replacements will know strengthening regulations is against their personal interests.
You don't hire an ex-regulator for their expertise, you hire them as payment for services already rendered.
The problem with civil servants taking high paid jobs when they leave is that it can be a payoff for being biased for the company. If companies can dangle the carrot of an eventual job the civil servant will avoid actions that sink their chances.
There's a lot of stuff on real revolving doors in the UK in the magazine Private Eye. Stomach turning really.
Nobody is arguing in favor of the revolving door, they're just pointing out how it differs from regulatory capture. Don't argue for the sake of argument.
There's an interesting argument that the revolving door actually prevents regulatory capture through encouraging regulators to be more strict.
So "interesting" now means is "deceptive and ingenuous".
In a hypothetical world where corporations were akin to mom-and-pop bakeries that would need to hire power, sophisticated regulators to guide them through a very tough state, that argument might be plausible.
In the real world where corporations are powerful, forward-looking institutions who know full well that paying people involves a process of rewarding behavior, this argument says more about the person advancing it than anything else.
And sure, a lot of smart people might claim this, just as similar stable of smart people operate in the stable of the corporations writing arguments for newspapers and magazine. But maybe all those people aren't at all tainted in their views. I'm sure they could come up with hypothetical situations where they aren't.
>stable of smart people operate in the stable of the corporations writing arguments for newspapers and magazine
I'm not sure if you're suggesting Matt Levine is "in the stable of corporations", but if you read his article history, he's clearly not. One reason (among many) it's fun to read him, is his incisive criticism of his previous jobs in finance and law.
Certainly the first thing that's apparent when watching pros play is their speed. However, after playing years of Tetris myself (though nowhere near pro level), I've really come to appeciate that speed is only a small fraction of what makes pros pro.
* Many multiplayer games give bonuses for combos (multiple consecutive line clears), T-spins, and Tetrises. Setting these up efficiently can require reading several pieces ahead and takes a ton of practice. An example where both players do a fairly elaborate setup, one with combos and the other with T-spins: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mASSHXLTuU4
* 20G mode, made famous by games like TGM, drastically reduces the ability to manipulate the pieces. Even surviving takes new strategies (you're forced to play a lot of strange moves), much less making tetrises like the pros do. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoU0DQh7zdU
* Some multiplayer games give difficult garbage, I'm thinking of Cultris 2 specifically. Clearing garbage efficiently, known as "downstacking", requires much more careful piece placement than regular play. It's hard to appreciate from video, but if you compare pros downstacking to a normal person, you can see they use fewer pieces to clear the same amount of garbage, which is a real competitive advantage. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgK4aJ_3zCw
By the way, that's not a 10% increase in individual performance, but rather a 10% increase in relative performance for your weight. People on PEDs will usually move up a weight class from increased muscle mass.
